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Welcome from the Editors

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume XIII, Issue 3 (June 2019) of *Perspectives on Terrorism*, available online now at: <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/PoT>.

Our free and independent online journal is a publication of the Vienna-based Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI) and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University's The Hague Campus. Now in its thirteenth year, *Perspectives on Terrorism* has nearly 8,400 regular e-mail subscribers and many more occasional readers and website visitors worldwide. The Articles of its six annual issues are fully peer reviewed by external referees while its Research and Policy Notes, Special Correspondence, and other content are subject to internal editorial quality control.

The opening article by Tore Hamming examines the evolution of global jihadism following the conflict in Syria. The second article, by a team of researchers led by Cori E. Dauber, offers a unique analysis of the intersection between video games and jihadist propaganda videos. In the third article, Ronen Zeidel and Hisham al-Hishami provide a research-based projection on the future evolution of Daesh (ISIS) following its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Next, Daniel Koehler and Verena Fiebig explore the quality of CVE initiatives and their potential usefulness for practitioners. And in the final research article of this issue, Greg Miller examines how to properly categorize domestic terrorist attacks where the perpetrator was inspired by a foreign ideology.

In our Research Notes section, Chelsea Daymon examines a relatively under-studied question of how the Islamic State uses disabled fighters in their propaganda and recruitment efforts. The Resources section includes our regular contributions from Joshua Sinai (book reviews), Judith Tinnes (with two bibliographies), Berto Jongman (web-based resources), Ryan Scrivens (theses), and Reinier Bergema (conference calendar). In addition, there is a review by Daniella Scerri of an important new book, *Extremism* (The MIT Press, 2018), authored by J.M. Berger.

The current issue was jointly prepared by James Forest (Co-Editor) and Bart Schuurman (Associate Editor), with the assistance of Alex P. Schmid (Editor-in-Chief), Christine Boelema Robertus (Associate Editor for IT), and Jodi Moore (Editorial Assistant).

Global Jihadism after the Syria War

by Tore Refslund Hamming

Abstract

The period 2012-2018 is turning out to be an important transformative period for the global Jihadi movement, most importantly because of events in Syria but also resulting from Jihadists' ability to expand and take advantage of beneficial opportunity structures in other war theatres. The article identifies the most important trends of this period for the future evolution of Jihadism, namely the ideological evolution, Jihadism as a tangible political project, internal conflict, networks and training, the coming of a new generation of ideologues and technical evolution. Similar to previous transformative periods in Afghanistan and Iraq, the argument made here is that these six trends will have a long-lasting impact on the Jihadi movement and guide the behaviour of groups and individuals for years to come.

Keywords: Jihadism, Syria, Global Jihad, Fratricide, Ideology

In 2013, Danish researcher Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen posed the question of whether Syria would become a school for terrorists.[1] Now, six years later, the answer appears to be a resounding confirmation. The war in Syria will go on record as one of those key periods that transformed the state of Jihadism, similar to previous experiences of Jihadi melting pots like Afghanistan in the 1980s-90s and Iraq in the 2000s. In 2006, Thomas Hegghammer published the article "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War" examining how the war in Iraq impacted the Jihadi movement and its engagement in other battlefields.[2] This article builds on Hegghammer's piece in that it identifies how the Syrian war—and more generally the period 2012-2018—has had an impact on developments and trends within Jihadism.

Looking at past transformative periods, like the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, helps to understand how current events may change the future. Hence, our knowledge of how these past experiences influenced the ensuing evolution of the Jihadi movement offers further insights into how current trends affiliated with the Jihadi school of Syria will influence the future development and configuration of the Jihadi movement. The article does not only deal with the Syrian war, but more generally, its evolutions within Jihadism during the period (2012-2018) of the Syrian war as Jihadists have been active on several battlefields, but with Syria being the most dominating, not least because of the success of the Islamic State and Syria being the centre of its caliphate. Moreover, it identifies the most important trends of this period and discusses how they may influence the future. These trends are: ideological evolution, Jihadism as a tangible political project, internal conflict, networks and training, a new generation of ideologues, and technical evolution. Each of these aspects has been characteristic of the ongoing Jihad in Syria and other battlefields since 2013 and will likely have an impact on the future development of Jihadism locally, regionally, and globally.

This article is founded on several years of close observation of the Jihadi movement as part of a larger research project on the internal dynamics within Jihadism. This process has involved reading thousands of Jihadists' own written products, following their online behaviour on Twitter and later Telegram, and interviewing senior ideological figures. Based on this research, the article first describes each of six identified trends before concluding with a discussion of how these trends will have an impact on the future evolution of the Jihadi movement.

Ideological Evolution

The emergence of modern Jihadism is usually dated to 1960s Egypt although it can be traced back to the 19th century and the military struggles of Abd al-Kader and Omar Mukhtar against Western imperialism. Abu Musab al-Suri, one of the most prominent contemporary Jihadi strategists and thinkers, sets the start of the

Jihadi current to 1963.[3] Since then, Jihadi ideology has evolved considerably in terms of the definition of the main enemy, the objective, its modes of legitimation and how it related to the broader society.

Prior to the Syrian war, three distinctive currents of Jihadism can be identified: The first current emerged in the early 1960s in Egypt with Sayyid Qutb and later Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj as the intellectual and organizational pioneers. This current, which can be termed a *nationalist Jihad* with an ideological foundation in the Muslim Brotherhood, viewed local governments as illegitimate since they were not ruling according to God's law, the shariah. While they did have their disagreements, both Qutb and Faraj considered Jihad as a means to achieve a certain objective: to topple the near enemy (*al-aduw al-qarib*) through the struggle of a vanguard movement.

The second current, the *solidarity Jihad*, started in 1979 and dominated until the mid-1990s. Led by Abdallah Azzam, this current still emphasised the need for a vanguard, but it centered around the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. In that sense it was much closer to classical Jihadi doctrine, which emphasizes the fight against an occupying enemy, but its innovation was Azzam's reframing of Jihad as an individual duty (*fard al-ayn*) and that Jihad was not a matter of a certain nationality but the concern of the entire ummah. The obvious result was an internationalization of Jihad which would turn out to have a lasting impact. It was also around this time that the debate about whether to prioritize the near enemy (un-Islamic Arab governments) or the far enemy (Israel) emerged within Jihadist circles. Ayman al-Zawahiri, a senior member of Egyptian Al Jihad, wrote that the liberation of Palestine goes through Cairo,[4] but in the mid-90s, other Jihadists slowly started to doubt such an assertion.

This re-orientation towards the far enemy after the fall of the Soviets initiated the third current, the *global Jihad*, but unlike early debates, it was now the US and not Israel that was viewed as the main far enemy, the head of the snake, that had to be defeated to facilitate successful national Jihadi campaigns. There have been different accounts of whether this re-orientation was led by Bin Laden or the Egyptian contingent represented by al-Zawahiri.[5] It appears likely, however, that it came as an amalgamation of al-Zawahiri becoming disillusioned with the unsuccessful struggle against the Egyptian regime, and Bin Laden, being extremely preoccupied with the issue of Palestine, starting to see the US as the main obstacle to Palestinian liberation and as transgression against Islam with its presence in the holy land of Saudi Arabia. The rise to prominence of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi implied a return to prioritize the near enemy and, thus, does not represent a qualitative shift or evolution in the characteristic of the Jihadi current despite his strong emphasis on sectarian violence, which certainly made him stand out even in Jihadi circles. Salafi ideas were already a strong influence within al-Qaida, but they gained even more traction within al-Zarqawi's Iraqi movement, especially in terms of the impact of concepts such as *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* (loyalty and disavowal) and *takfir* (excommunication). With the US invasion of Iraq, the ideas of Bin Laden and al-Zarqawi coalesced to some degree, which eventually facilitated a union between the two in 2004 and, to Bin Laden, striking the far enemy in the Middle East region became an acceptable substitute to strike in the far enemy's own countries.

A fourth current, *hybridised Jihad*, emerged with the Islamic State in 2014 and represents one of three key ideological evolutions resulting from the Syrian war. Arguably, since al-Qaida's branching out through its affiliate-structure, Jihadi groups have been hybrids in their enemy hierarchies to some extent, but the Islamic State became the first Jihadi group that rightfully could be described as a hybrid due to its concurrent military campaigns against local and Western enemies.[6-7] Such "glocal" outlook is evident from its consistent campaign of international terrorist attacks simultaneously with its establishment of provinces around the world and military struggles against local regimes. Since May 2014, the Islamic State can be connected one way or the other to 54 terrorist attacks in the West (including Australia), while leading insurgencies against local regimes in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Yemen and to a lesser extent in Somalia, Pakistan, Kashmir and Indonesia.[8]

No other Jihadi group has ever managed to run dual campaigns against both the far and the near enemy with a similar attack frequency as the Islamic State. This enabled the group to communicate with and attract a diverse

group of people with differences in ideological motivations and grievances. In his 2009 article studying the phenomenon of ideological hybridization, Hegghammer argues that the negative effects of hybridization likely surpass its positive impact. He identifies three risks for hybrids: inconsistency between discourse and action, internal ideological division, and provoking unnecessary enemies. Interestingly, the Islamic State has only suffered from one of these risks, namely the provocation of unnecessary enemies, but that did not stem directly from its campaign of international terrorist attacks, but more from its successes locally on the ground.

A simultaneous ideological evolution within Jihadism is a diversification of ideological orientation. With the emergence of groups like the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam on the Syrian battlefield, Jihadism has become a much more complex ideological landscape. Previously, al-Qaida Central and its affiliates represented the mainstream, albeit an extreme, ideological position within the Jihadi movement. Other groups of a more nationalist and socio-revolutionary character existed and differed from al-Qaida in terms of objectives and their relations with states, but the emergence of new groups nonetheless represents a broadening of Jihadism as an ideological movement.

On one side of the ideological spectrum, the Islamic State emerged from the ashes of al-Qaida in Iraq, but the extremism characterizing its predecessors became even more pronounced, distinguishing it from other Jihadi groups including al-Qaida. Thus, its horrifying use of violence, exclusivist attitude to other Jihadi groups and theological rigidity made it stand out on one extreme. On the other side of the spectrum, groups like Jaysh al-Islam and especially Ahrar al-Sham represent a new and more 'moderate', or revisionist, face of Jihadism.[9] Despite an obvious Salafi influence, Ahrar al-Sham appeared as a third way between Jihadism and the broader scope of militant Islamism.[10] Compared to al-Qaida and the Islamic State, it was especially Ahrar al-Sham's willingness to cooperate with non-Jihadi and external actors, including states like Turkey, that sets it apart. More recently, tensions between al-Qaida and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham have emerged over the future of the Jihadi project. After splitting from al-Qaida and changing its name from Jabhat al-Nusra to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the group has aligned increasingly with Turkey in an attempt to navigate in an opposition environment under intense pressure from the Syrian regime assisted by external actors. The schism between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and al-Qaida is founded in diverging opinions on how to cope with this pressure, with the former propagating the necessity of abandoning *organizations* as the foundation of the Jihadi struggle and instead support a jihad of the ummah (*jihad al-ummah*), while the latter stresses the need for Jihad of the elite (*jihad al-nukhba*) to uphold the correct Islamic creed (aqida).[11-12]

This shows how al-Qaida continues to subscribe to the idea of Jihad fought by a *vanguard* in contrast to a mass movement. This division between supporters of a popular jihad absent of organizations as the center of gravity and those in favour of a pure vanguard movement has also led to fractures in the relationship between the arguably two most influential Jihadi ideologues alive, Abu Qatada al-Filastini and Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi.[13] The two Jordanian ideologues and personal friends have long been considered supportive of al-Qaida, but the recent schism has revealed differences in their view of *reality* (waqi') and how to deal with it. While al-Maqdisi continues to stress the necessity of a purist creed and upholding monotheism (tawhid), Abu Qatada appears willing to accept certain actions that perhaps dilute the proper creed but benefits the Jihadi project.

The ideological evolution within the Jihadi movement since 2013 has impelled the necessity to develop new analytical categories to capture the internal diversity between Jihadi groups. Previously, the dominant way of conceptualizing Jihadi groups was according to their primary enemy (far or near enemy) or their driving rationale for militant activism (classical, global or socio-revolutionary Jihadism).[14-15] Other research has distinguished between *strategists* and *doctrinarians*. [16] But these terminologies fail to capture much of the evolution explained above to a satisfying degree and are incapable of explaining the nuances and dynamics that characterize contemporary Jihadism. This prompted Stenersen to develop a new typology presented in the article "Jihadism After the 'Caliphate': Towards a New Typology," which places Jihadi groups on two scales; how they relate to society (integration vs. separation) and whom Jihadists fight for (the nation vs. the ummah).[17] This typology offers an important framework tuned to a more fine-grained analysis of the internal diversionary

issues within the movement that allows for a nuanced understanding of the internal diversity and dynamics over time. Thinking of Jihadi groups in terms of these two scales helps conceptualizing groups' primary objective and how they see not just the surrounding society but also other groups including potentially rival Jihadi groups.


Jihadism as a Tangible Political Project: The Caliphate and Strategic Experiences

The Islamic State's caliphate declaration presented a second evolution within the Jihadi movement. Existing Jihadi groups, including al-Qaida, have always been rather vague about their actual political objective besides identifying an Islamic state as the end goal. A more specific definition of how that state should be established and how it should look has been absent. Examples of the establishment of political entities do exist, however. These includes Abu Eesa al-Rifai's Jama'at al-Khilafa (aka Jama'at al-Muslimin) in Peshawar and later in London, the Islamic Emirate of Kunar founded by Jamil al-Rahman in Kunar, al-Shabab in Somalia and AQAP's emirate in Yemen in 2011-2012.[18]

In his seminal 2001 book *Knights under the Prophet's Banner*, Ayman al-Zawahiri is realistic albeit vague about Jihadists' objective. "The establishment of a Muslim state in the heart of the Islamic world is not an easy goal or an objective that is close at hand", he writes. But "If the goal of the jihad movement in the heart of the Islamic world in general and Egypt in particular is to cause change and establish an Islamic state, it must not precipitate collision or be impatient about victory. The jihad movement must patiently build its structure until it is well established. It must pool enough resources and supporters and devise enough plans to fight the battle at the time and arena that it chooses." [19] In the post-9/11 period, much of the debate has centered around the strategy of the Jihadi movement in a new security environment rather than elaboration of the configuration of the ideal political Islamic entity. This discussion has mainly taken its foundation in the writings of Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji both of who authored detailed strategies of how to approach the enemy, either through campaigns of *qital al-nikaya* (fighting to hurt the enemy) or *qital al-tamkin* (fighting to consolidate control of territory).[20]

The Islamic State's decision to announce a caliphate on 29 June 2014 put immense pressure on the entire Jihadi movement and instigated a debate on the process of the establishment of a political entity, which particularly unfolded in 2015-16. As already mentioned, ideas such as controlling territory or establishing an Islamic political entity, whether it being a caliphate or an emirate, were not new, but were simply taken to new heights by the Islamic State's declaration. For the al-Qaida leadership in AfPak, this was a challenge for two reasons. First, it knew from history that some within al-Qaida were in favor of establishing a political entity of some form. Second, it quickly turned out that the caliphate declaration had a massive impact on support mobilization with the migration of foreign fighters spiking around the time of the declaration (see Figure 1, courtesy of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point). The Islamic State's state project thus put pressure on other groups to actually discuss the political project further than just 'the action of jihad', which arguably illustrated the lacking depth of a political program within Sunni Jihadism.

The main response from the al-Qaida leadership came in a publication series by al-Zawahiri titled *The Islamic Spring*, which was published from March 2015 to July 2016. In the nine episodes, al-Zawahiri rejects the legitimacy of the caliphate, criticizes its methodology while laying out the requirements for a 'legitimate' caliphate on the 'prophetic methodology' taking inspiration from the companions of the prophet, *the sahabah*. The Islamic State's caliphate, al-Zawahiri claims, caused disunity and confusion among Muslims, while the purpose of a truthful caliphate should be the exact opposite. A similar debate took place among Jihadi ideologues in Syria.[21]

Figure 1: Fighter Entries per Month

Source: Brian Dodwell, Daniel Milton & Don Rassler, 'The Caliphate's Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State's Foreign Fighter Paper Trail', *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, April 2016, p. 7. Reprinted with permission.

Even though the territorial caliphate has been almost entirely dismantled in Syria and Iraq, the group's organizational structure contracting and arguments being made that it is now mainly a virtual caliphate, the fact that it was established and controlled large swaths of territory for several years will have a lasting impact on the Jihadi movement.[22] State creation has become a part of Jihadi consciousness and Jihadists are likely to discuss the political objective of their project in more tangible terms in the future based on the experiences from 2014-2018. Another likely result of the post- or lost-caliphate period is caliphate nostalgia as argued by Hegghammer.[23] The current generation will refer to its success in standing up to local Arab regimes and the entire West although they might disagree with its religious interpretation and violent strategy, while younger generations will idolize it as the vanguard of the Jihadi cause.

Considered its obsession with establishing an Islamic state or a caliphate, Jihadists have dedicated exceptionally little time and few words to explaining what they actually mean by the caliphate and how its establishment should be achieved. The most elaborate document prior to 2014 was likely "Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq" authored by the Islamic State of Iraq's shariah official Uthman Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi in 2007.[24] The Islamic State's caliphate declaration, however, has led to new discussion on the caliphate including several written pieces published either in support of the new caliphate or against it.[25] The result is that Jihadists' state project has evolved both on a theoretical and a tangible level. It is no longer the utopia it appeared prior to 2014 and, in the future, Jihadists will have a literary corpus and a concrete strategic experience to rely on. The experience of building the caliphate not only offers a lot of 'dos' but also 'don'ts' for the future.

Fragmentation, Polarization and the Normalization of Infighting

The Jihadi current has seen internal debate, contestation and occasional infighting from its inception, but the Syrian war entailed hitherto unseen levels of intra-Jihadi conflict and animosity between groups that are ideologically close (like the Islamic State and al-Qaida) and distant (like the Islamic State and Ahrar al-Sham or the Taliban) from one another. The tensions that emerged from the Islamic State of Iraq's expansion to Syria in early April 2013 led to discursive contestation with Jabhat al-Nusra and the al-Qaida leadership, which over time translated into direct military infighting between the Islamic State and a wide range of groups for the control of territory and Jihadi authority. This *Jihadi civil war* critically escalated in January 2014 and spiraled out of control in the Spring until the Islamic State declared its caliphate in June.[26]


Despite being prone to internal conflict, Jihadists have always stressed the illegitimacy of infighting as it not only threatens their political project but also because it potentially entails spilling the blood of Muslims, which is deemed impermissible.[27] Back in the days of the sahabah, a supporter of Husayn ibn Ali allegedly told a supporter of Yazid ibn Muawiyah that "Until now we have been brethren with the same religion and community ... if the sword is used ... we will be an umma and you will be an umma".[28] In 2014, the sword was not only introduced, but became a default feature used by Jihadists against other Jihadists, cementing the failure of peaceful institutional mechanisms to settle internal conflict. Amidst the intensifying infighting, senior al-Qaida leader Abu Khalil al-Madani cautioned on 9 April 2014 his fellow Jihadists in other groups saying "We are like one body, and we are in one ship", but only three days later a senior Jabhat al-Nusra leader concluded that the "methods [of the Islamic State] clearly caused the biggest rift in the global Jihad that the ummah has ever seen since the fall of the Khilafa".[29-30] It started to appear as if Abdallah Azzam's prophecy that "Muslims cannot be defeated by others. We Muslims are not defeated by our enemies, but instead, we are defeated by our own selves" would become true.[31]

The infighting turned very al-Qaida-Islamic State centric although it involved most of Syria's Jihadi groups. The Islamic State narrative was that al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was at fault for the conflict, famously claiming that "here we are extending our hands to you again, to be the worthy successor to the best predecessor; for the shaykh Usama bin Ladin united the Mujahidin upon one word, while you [al-Zawahiri] disunited them, split them and dispersed them in total dispersion".[32] Al-Qaida and other Jihadi groups would argue that it was due to the Islamic State's aggressiveness and exclusivist approach. While the intra-Jihadi conflict first emerged in Syria, it eventually spread to Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya and Egypt concurrently with the Islamic State's territorial expansion outside the Levant. Numbers are notoriously challenging to measure, but qualified estimates are that casualties from fratricidal Jihadi infighting number in the thousands in Syria and Afghanistan, in the hundreds in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya and likely even lower in Egypt.

The intra-Jihadi conflict has left the Jihadi movement more fragmented and polarized than ever before. Bakke et al. define fragmentation according to three dimensions: (1) the number of groups in the movement, (2) the degree of institutionalization across groups, and (3) the distribution of power among groups.[33] Based on this we can conclude that in the period 2013-2018, the Jihadi movement has experienced severe fragmentation resulting from and causing infighting and at the expense of movement cohesion. While competitive cooperation was still dominant among Jihadi groups opposing the Islamic State, over time it developed into a general logic of factionalism within the Jihadi movement at large.[34] From late 2013 and until October 2014, 15 calls for arbitration and reconciliation can be identified with 10 of them involving tangible initiatives to settle the conflict, but none of them succeeded in illustrating a Jihadi failure at establishing institutional setups to manage inter-groups issues. Although supra-group military alliances have been more successful, they have nonetheless been short lived and volatile.

Figure 2: When Jihadis Fight Jihadis

Six years of militant infighting between Jihadi factions, 2013-2018



Source: Author's own data compilation

The Jihadi movement also became polarized, mainly as a result of the Islamic State's self-perception and its caliphate declaration which entailed an imperative—according to the Islamic State—to either join the caliphate or be considered an enemy. This logic was evident in two now famous texts. The first is a declaration by the late Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani from June 2014 when he declared the caliphate and announced that “As for you, O soldiers of the platoons and organizations, know that after this consolidation and the establishment of the khilafah, the legality of your groups and organizations has become invalid”. Indicating that this was not only a ruling for Syria, he emphasized that “The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilafah's authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.”[35] The second is an article published in the group's English language magazine, *Dabiq*, in February 2015, titled “The Extinction of the Grey Zone,” in which the author argues that neutrality is not a legitimate position.[36] The intention was to force groups and individuals to take a stance on the Islamic State, and in light of its military strength at the time it was likely the author assumed that a compelling argument like this would lead competing groups to join.

Among the opponents of the Islamic State, prominent Jihadi ideologues have partly contributed to this polarizing environment. Some ideologues, like the Egyptians Hani Sibai and Tariq Abdelhaleem and the Syrian Abu Basir al-Tartusi, were quickly out declaring the Islamic State as *khawarij*, referring to a historic extreme Islamic sect, and calling for Jihadists to fight the group.[37-39] Others, like Abu Qatada and al-Maqdisi were more hesitant to call for such attacks and initially only considered it legitimate to defend against attacks instigated by the Islamic State. In particular, al-Maqdisi tried to soften the perception of the Islamic State by arguing that “What makes them [the Islamic State] differ from the khawarij is that IS do have an ok idea and intentions, but they are simply doing things wrongly. The khawarij had bad intentions when they were killing Muslims”.[40] Abu Qatada and even al-Maqdisi would eventually turn more explicitly critical of the Islamic State, thus enabling their followers to target more aggressively Islamic State fighters.

Now, after five years of directing bombs and bullets towards other Jihadists, intra-Jihadi conflict is becoming increasingly normalized within the movement. The boundaries for what it takes to attack fellow Jihadists has been lowered and a new generation of militant Islamists and sympathizers have grown up being socialized into the legitimacy of infighting. Ideological texts enabling infighting or internal criticism now exist in abundance making it easier for future generations to engage in similar fratricidal behavior.[41]

Networks and Training

Arguably the most important short-term impact of the Syrian conflict on the global Jihadi movement can be seen in the networks established and the skills gained from years on the battlefield. It is hard to overstate the importance of previous active battlefields like Afghanistan (1980s-90s) and Iraq (2000s) on the ensuing evolution and effectiveness of Jihadism around the world. Organizationally, Jihadists returned home to their respective countries and established new groups engaged in local struggles. In terms of efficiency and social networks, active battlefields have been key to educate and connect people from all over the world, who have benefitted from this know-how and social capital in the following years. Experience from previous battlefields has even become a prerequisite for future leadership positions, while the ideological and technical training at camps in battlefields have been essential for perpetrators of international terrorist attacks.[42-43]

On the importance of training camps in Afghanistan, Hegghammer wrote: “The training camps generated an ultra-masculine culture of violence which brutalized the volunteers and broke down their barriers to the use of violence. Recruits increased their paramilitary skills while the harsh camp life built strong personal relationships between them. Last but not least, they fell under the ideological influence of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri”.[44] Similar conclusions can be drawn from Aimen Dean’s account of his own experiences in several training camps.[45] Just as we can talk about a Jihadi *generation* of Afghanistan and Iraq, so we can talk about the generation emanating from the Syrian Jihad. We will see new networks and groups emerge based on connections established during years of interaction in Syria. We will see future Jihadi leaders with experience from the Syrian Jihad. And we will see perpetrators of international terrorist attacks who learned their trade and prepared in Syria’s training camps. In this light, battlefields are extremely effective *socialization platforms* both in terms of ideological, strategic and tactical socialization.

Table 1: Overview of Foreign Fighters (FF) Mobilized in Recent Conflicts

Location	FF mobilization period	Conflict (simplistic)	Number of FF
Afghanistan	1980-1992	Mujahideen vs. Soviet Union	5,000-20,000
Bosnia	1992-1995	Bosnians vs. Serbs/Croats	1,000-2,000
Chechnya	1995-2001	Chechens vs. Russia	200-300
Afghanistan	1996-2001	Masoud vs. Hekmatyar Taliban vs. Northern Alliance	1,000-1,500
Afghanistan	2001-2010	Taliban vs. Kabul/USA/NATO	1,000-1,500
Iraq	2003-2010	Sunnis vs. Baghdad/Coalition	4,000-5,000
Somalia	2006-2010	Al-Shabaab vs. Transitional government/Ethiopia	200-400
Syria-Iraq	2012-2017	Jihadists/Islamists/revolution- aries vs. Assad/Russia/Iran government/Baghdad/External actors	30,000-42,000

Sources: Numbers on conflicts prior to the Syrian Jihad are taking from Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” *International Security* 35, no. 3 (2010): 61; Estimate on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq comes from UN CTED Trends Report, “The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives,” 2018.

Numbers of Jihadists are notoriously difficult to estimate because of the clandestine nature of the movement in general and should thus always be viewed critically.[46] Nonetheless, if we take a look at the number of foreign fighters joining the conflict in Syria and Iraq (Table 1), it is striking how high the number of foreigners mobilized to fight is compared to historic examples of Jihadi foreign fighters mobilization. While these numbers are not disaggregated in terms of the specific groups people fought with, we can with confidence say that the vast majority of the 30,000-42,000 people joining the conflict in Syria and Iraq between 2012-2017 fought in the ranks of the most hardcore Jihadi groups, namely the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

In the period 2012-2018, thousands of people, locals as well as foreigners, have trained and fought in active Jihadi battlefields in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sinai, Algeria, Somalia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Philippines (to mention the most important). In the training camps, fighters have followed military courses and received ideological education. The military skills are further developed and refined in active battle while the fighters' ideological stance hardens. In terms of military and ideological training, a generation has thus received its bachelor, master and—for those living long enough—Ph.D. degrees on these battlefields, making them experts in what they do. While many have died, others left disillusioned and some eventually returned to live their previous life before war broke out, the sheer magnitude of the number implies that a substantial number of well-trained Jihadists will continue as believers in the Jihadi project and in search of new battlefield arenas. In such future endeavors, their militant social network is important. Being on the battlefield has turned fighters into brothers-in-arms and established a high degree of trust so essential for (clandestine) militant activity. Either people are already connected or they can easily do in the future because of their pedigree as seasoned fighters.

Strong *networks*, both in the Middle East region but also when foreign fighters returned back to the West or joined third country conflicts, were a defining feature of the post-Afghan and Iraqi wars. Experienced fighters set up their own groups, became Jihadi entrepreneurs or perpetrated terrorist attacks on their home soil. So far, the rate of Jihadists with experience as foreign fighters who later carried out terrorist attacks in the West post-2012 has been surprisingly low compared to historical estimates and the number of returnees.[47-48] This has arguably led to premature conclusions that the threat of returning foreign fighters is perhaps not as severe as initially thought.[49] But arguably the most critical blowback from foreign fighters is still awaiting.[50] Two factors may explain this: first, Jihadists are still fighting a war and for those joining the Islamic State, the objective has been to establish and later protect the caliphate. This has obviously influenced their immediate priorities in favor of ongoing conflicts. Second, it must be assumed that most of those fighters who returned early have been the least committed. Those still fighting after several enduring years on the battlefield, who have not yet succumbed to bullets or the strenuous life as a Jihadist, are likely those we should fear the most. While few will survive and states around the world have made a serious effort to ensure they will not return to their home countries, they should nonetheless be considered a greater threat than early returnees or than during the zenith of the Islamic State's military and governance project.

A New Generation of Ideologues

An often underappreciated element is the emergence of a new generation of Jihadi ideologues helped by the context of the Syrian war and the organizational platform offered by certain groups. At the outset of the Syrian war, well-established Jihadi ideologues included Anwar al-Awlaki and Ahmed Musa Jibril for non-Arabic speaking audiences, and in the Arab world famous figures like al-Maqdisi, Abu Qatada, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Umar al-Haddouchi, Abu al-Walid al-Ansari, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Atiyyatullah al-Libi, Iyad al-Qunaybi and the Shuaybi-school of Saudi scholars like Sulayman al-Ulwan. Although these figures remained influential (both al-Libis died quickly after the outbreak of war), a new cadre of mainly young ideologues has also blossomed up.

At first, the Islamic State sought to attract, without success, the support of senior ideologues like al-Haddouchi, al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada. Out of necessity, the new state had to promote its own cadre of in-house ideologues

that were largely unknown within the Jihadi environment or at least not considered household names. When the Islamic State realized that it would not succeed in attracting any established ideologues—besides Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti for a brief period—it initiated a campaign to vilify these figures by questioning their credentials and personality.[51] Simultaneously, it offered its own ideologues an organizational platform through which to publish their work, which stands in clear contrast to how other groups including al-Qaida operate. Abu Ali al-Anbari, Turki al-Binali, Abu Bakr al-Qahtani and lesser known figures like Abu Yaqub al-Maqdisi, Abu al-Mundhir al-Harbi al-Madani and Abu Zeid al-Iraqi, to mention a few, have all produced pools of written and audio material shared widely on the Internet mainly through media platforms utilized by the Islamic State. Al-Anbari (Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli) had been a central figure on the Iraqi Jihadi scene for more than a decade when he emerged as the most senior ideologue within the Islamic State. An emissary of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Khorasan and later the emir of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq using the kunya *Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi*, al-Anbari was certainly not new to the world of Jihad, but he had always managed to operate under the radar. However, as a deputy to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in the Islamic State, his name and face was finally revealed. Besides his organizational role, his ideological ideas were presented in lectures and books on issues related to creed (aqida) and methodology (manhaj).

However, the Bahraini Turki al-Binali was the main ideological voice of the Islamic State, at least initially in 2013 and 2014. Al-Binali was portrayed as the *mufti* of the Islamic State and the main ideological voice of the group to bolster its claim to represent a caliphate and to counter the criticism from opposing ideologues. But this changed in mid-2014, as al-Binali's role became less public as he dedicated his time to his organizational role of heading the office of research and studies (*maktab al-buhuth wa-l-dirasat*). Generally, for the ideological figures within the Islamic State, being able to produce and disseminate material through official and semi-official Jihadi media centers was important to lend credit to their material and make it more authoritative. Although most of these ideologues have now been killed, their material is still available and will be used by Jihadi sympathisers in the future. Whether any one of them will reach the same standing of established Jihadi scholars is uncertain, but their vast production, still available and being translated into numerous languages, will be important to future generations of Jihadists. Especially al-Binali's writings on the caliphate and his critique of higher-ranking ideologues, including his previous mentor al-Maqdisi, will serve as an example, legitimizing the questioning of existing authorities.

Opposing the Islamic State, senior Jihadi ideologues unequivocally sided with al-Qaida or more moderate Jihadi factions and this decreased the pressure to promote new ideological figures. A few *new faces* supportive of al-Qaida, or later, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, did cement their names on the Jihadi scene, however. After his arrival in Syria in 2013, Abdallah al-Muhaysini, a Saudi preacher, quickly emerged as a rising ideological star of the Syrian Jihad. With a Ph.D. in Islamic jurisprudence from the Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, al-Muhaysini is well-educated compared to many other Jihadi ideologues, but his contribution to the Syrian Jihad was not limited to a shari' role as he engaged heavily in fundraising, reconciliation efforts and mobilization.[52] His lectures and videos often show him on the battlefield preparing al-Qaida affiliated fighters before battle, talking in his characteristic high pitch voice—sometimes screaming, sometimes crying—in an extremely passionate fashion. Mainly acting independently of any group, although close to *Jabhat al-Nusra*, he was briefly a member of its later iteration *Hayat Tahrir al-Sham*. A central figure behind the military coalition *Jaysh al-Fatah*, al-Muhaysini sought to portray himself as the *Abdallah Azzam* of the Syrian Jihad, trying to cross organizational boundaries and be perceived as *the* authoritative figure of Jihadists in opposition to the Islamic State.

Compared to al-Muhaysini, the Jordanian Sami al-Uraydi built his reputation inside the group *Jabhat al-Nusra* as a senior shari'. Close to al-Maqdisi, al-Uraydi was always part of the theological hardliners within his group, but it was first after leaving al-Nusra in February 2017, subsequent to the group's split from al-Qaida and name change to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, that the Jordanian seriously established himself as a central figure. In 2017 and 2018, he produced several major written productions, mainly critical of his former comrades in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and striking a similar criticism to that of al-Maqdisi emphasizing the importance of doctrinal purity and *tawhid* (monotheism).[53] In 2018, al-Uraydi was a central figure in the establishment of a new

al-Qaida affiliated group in Syria, named *Hurras al-Deen* (Guardians of Religion), claiming loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri and attacking Hayat Tahrir al-Sham for being *diluters* (mumayyi'a) of religion.

A third emerging figure is Abu Mahmoud al-Filastini, a Palestinian based in London, but supportive of Jabhat al-Nusra and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Abu Mahmoud was a student of Abu Qatada during his time in Britain and the two have remained ideologically close during the evolving Syrian conflict. Similarly to al-Uraydi, Abu Mahmoud really established himself in 2017 and 2018 as a strong supporter of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, regularly posting articles in defense of the group on his Telegram channel and launching a strong criticism against al-Maqdisi, al-Uraydi and their supporters. This has placed Abu Mahmoud in opposition to both the Islamic State and al-Qaida and a strong proponent of *jihad al-ummah* and the dissolution of Jihadi groups for the benefit of the general Jihadi project.[54] Other figures like Anas Hassan Khattab and Abdallah al-Shami (Abd al-Rahim Atoun) have been important ideological voices within Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and its predecessors as in-house ideologues, but their contribution is most in an organizational setting rather than as independent figures.

Technological Evolution

Arguably one of the most important features of the Jihadi current in the past five years, and key to understanding the rise of groups and individuals, is the evolution in information technology and how Jihadists have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by new IT-platforms. It is not that Jihadists are newcomers to the use of the Internet. Previously they relied on online fora to disseminate their material and communicate, but the outreach potential was rather limited. With the introduction of social media and file sharing platforms, the Jihadists now have an extremely powerful tool to reach new audiences, communicate with one another and ensure that their material is ever available.

At the outset of the Syrian conflict, Facebook was the main Jihadi alternative to their closed fora, but it was quickly replaced by Twitter and later Telegram as the media platform of choice. All these platforms have enabled Jihadists to disseminate, propagate and recruit at a hitherto unseen degree. Not only have these media platforms ensured a broader distribution of Jihadi material but also a certain consistency in availability. Although media companies have intensified their efforts at closing down Jihadi use of their platforms, they have been unable to prevent it entirely. Hence, these media platforms, in addition to file sharing platforms such as justpaste.it and archive.org, have ensured that Jihadi material is ever present. Groups like the Islamic State, al-Qaida, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Taliban manage accounts on online platforms themselves, but the impact is magnified even further through supporter (*munasirun* or *ansar*) networks functioning as semi-independent online *entrepreneurs*. Supporters either manage channels that specialize in specific elements or as individuals disseminating their own or official group material.

Compared to other groups, the Islamic State has been the pioneer in terms of the quality and the quantity of online dissemination. A plethora of unofficial media centers are publishing and circulating official group material, their own production facilitates discussion between sympathizers.[55] This has not only eased the pressure on official group channels to circulate material through a decentralization of responsibility, but also offered agency to a broad group of actors and helped ensure a constant online presence. This responsibility is being acknowledged by the Islamic State, but it is a relationship the group is carefully managing. The group considers its online presence as equally important to its battlefield operations, which was illustrated by its booklet published in 2015 titled *Media Operative, You Are a Mujahid, Too* and which explains the role of the *media mujahid* in the group's *information jihad*. [56] In October 2018, the Islamic State published a video in its *Inside the Caliphate* series focusing on the role of its *munasirun* and illustrating its advanced IT-infrastructure connecting the group with these unofficial channels.[57] But as the Islamic State has experienced, such decentralization of its information jihad comes with the risk of misinformation. Hence, on several occasions the group has issued directives to its *munasirun* to only publicize information coming from its official media establishment.[58]

Ascribing the media an important role is not an innovation by the Islamic State. Ayman al-Zawahiri once

wrote Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that “we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media” and more recently Abu Qatada al-Filastini similarly underlined the impact of media. [59-60] Al-Qaida’s online presence, however, is more centralized compared to the Islamic State and relies on accounts run by official media centers like al-Sahab (al-Qaida Central), al-Malahim (AQAP) or Shahada Agency (Al-Shabaab).[61] Instead, the group gets its online support from channels ran by sympathetic ideologues like Abu Qatada, al-Maqdisi, Hani Sibai and lesser known figures like Adnan Hadid.

Disregarding the degree of centralization in their use of media, IT-platforms have revolutionized Jihadists’ online behavior and perpetuated the existence of its digital material for the benefit of future generations of Jihadists who can easily access material once published. This implies easier access for future generations and enables them to tap into existing Jihadi narratives and legal judgements in an unprecedented way.

The Future of Global Jihadism

Where does the Jihadi movement stand after seven years of intensive fighting in Syria, Iraq and other battlefields? The period 2012-2018 saw the establishment of a caliphate, the geographical expansion of Jihadi military campaigns, unprecedented numbers of terrorist attacks in the West and foreign fighter mobilization. [62] It involved a broad international coalition against Jihadi groups, organizational fragmentation and ensuing infighting and the dissolution of the caliphate in all but its name. But has the period 2012-2018 been a success or a failure for the Jihadi movement and how will the six identified trends impact the future of the movement?

Since its emergence in the early 1960s, the Jihadi movement has experienced its ups and downs. The general assessment of the Jihadi movement by outsiders, however, has tended to be rather negative and the success of Jihadists (and terrorists in general) appear to be judged much more critically than other actors.[63] This is evident in Abrahms’ conclusion that terrorism does not work because, he argues, terrorists rarely reach their ultimate goals.[64] But as Richard English rightly points out, we make a mistake if we keep labelling Jihadists as failures unless they reach these ultimate objectives.[65] Based on the identified trends in this article, the period 2012-2018 should generally be considered a highly successful transformative period in the history of the modern Jihadi movement for the simple reason that the positive experiences and developments outweigh the negatives.

Jihadists have managed to take their political project further than ever before with the establishment of a tangible political entity in the form of the Islamic State’s caliphate. While the group’s governmental epicenter was the Levant, it has also controlled territory in Yemen, Libya and to some extent Nigeria and the Philippines. Despite the dismantling of the physical caliphate, the narrative still exists and so does the strategic experience that the state project entailed. Jihadists showed that they are capable of mobilizing supporters in unprecedented numbers and those of their followers who did not die have now gained invaluable battlefield experience, established social bonds locally, regionally and globally and learned important strategic lessons. A new generation of Jihadi ideologues is coming forward and a massive pool of writing material and audio-visuals of both an ideological, strategic and tactical character has been produced. Online communication and file sharing platforms are now available in abundance, and Jihadists have shown that they know how to make savvy use of these platforms to communicate with each other and reach new audiences, not least the media. None of these positives will simply go away but will likely benefit the future Jihadi movement one way or the other.

And yet, the last seven years have not been exclusively positive for the Jihadi movement. While discursive contestation has always occurred between Jihadists, recent years have witnessed a catastrophic escalation in military infighting between Jihadists, many of whom used to be fighting in the same group. Discursive vilification of opposing figures has similarly escalated and helped break down existing authority structures within the movement. This will have a lasting effect in that it has significantly lowered the threshold for engaging in infighting through normalization and socialization processes. For new generations of Jihadists, fighting other Jihadists is simply another enemy to crush on the way to the caliphate. Despite Jihadi groups’ recent successes of mobilization, the number of potential Jihadi sympathizers is still relatively low in absolute numbers. Hence,

Jihadists would do better allying rather than fracturing since internal conflict has a demobilizing impact.[66] The indiscriminate and limitless violence employed by the Islamic State is another detrimental experience for the Jihadi movement more generally. While the group may have succeeded in attracting vast numbers of youth who were fascinated with the brutality, it likely will not appeal to all future generations.[67] Other Jihadi groups have made an effort to distinguish themselves from the Islamic State's brutality but beheadings, burnings, massacres and indiscriminate terror attacks have nonetheless tainted the broader Jihadi movement.

That said, despite appearing more fragmented than ever, the experiences gained during the 2012-2018 period have generally made the Jihadi movement more dangerous, popular and arguably more mainstream. Jihadism is no longer the utopia supported by the few and promoted by men hidden in Afghanistan's caves. At least for a period, it emerged as a popular movement attracting and educating thousands of locals and foreigners. While the previous decade involved both positive and negative experiences for the movement, the objective going forward is to learn from its mistakes in its attempts to establish new religio-political entities. The diversification of group ideology and methodology is particularly noteworthy. Groups now appeal to a broader range of people and have shown themselves capable of adopting increasingly pragmatic attitudes to state authorities. Groups like al-Qaida and the Islamic State representing more hardline ideologies will continue to oppose any reaching out to the states they are fighting. But, as we have witnessed with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Taliban, serious engagement with the enemy is no longer inconceivable. This leaves us with a Jihadi movement more fragmented, more networked, more mature and politically sophisticated and more diversified than ever before.

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Notes

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- [53] Sami al-Uraydi's most important writings after Jabhat al-Nusra changed to Jabhat Fath al-Sham include "Advice to the Mujahideen," *Telegram*, March 2017; "Methodological messages from the Syrian front," *Telegram*, May/June 2017; "Jihadist movements, the Muslim peoples and the dead end," *Telegram*, 4 July 2017; "Methodology: Between Praise and Contempt, the Sunnah and Heresy," *Telegram*, 9 October 2017 and "Testimonies about the disengagement between Al-Nusra (Fatah al-Sham) and al-Qaeda Part 1-5," *Telegram*, 15-21 October 2017.
- [54] Abu Mahmoud al-Filastini's most important writings include "Jihad of the Ummah or Puritanical narrow," *Al Masra*, 17 January 2017; "The Jihadi movement march between Success and Failure," *Telegram*, February 2017; "An indispensable though imperfect unity," *Telegram*, April 2017; "The Jihadi Movement Between the Jurisprudence of Balances and the Jurisprudence of Comparisons," *Telegram*, 28 July 2017; "The ummah before organisations," *Telegram*, 14 October 2017 and "Maqdisi and the free fall," *Telegram*, 20 January 2018.
- [55] A few examples of such unofficial media foundations include al-Ghuraba (an archive of al-Ghuraba material can be accessed here: <http://web.archive.org/web/20160307213149/http://justpaste.it:80/archivealghuraba>), al-Battar (Al-Battar used the twitter handle https://twitter.com/me_bttr), al-Baqiya and al-Wafa' (Al-Wafa used the twitter handle https://twitter.com/alwaf_aa) on Twitter and the websites of Ansar al-Khilafa (the website is now defunct but used to be on <https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.com>) and Ahl ul-Tawhid (the website is now defunct but used to be on <https://ahlutawheed.wordpress.com>).

[56] Charlie Winter, “Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare,” *ICSR*, 2017; The Islamic State’s video titled “Media Man, You Are a Mujāhid Too” published by its wilayat Salahuddeen in May 2015 can be accessed here: <https://jihadology.net/2015/05/27/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-media-man-you-are-a-mujahid-too-wilayat-salah-al-din>; Charlie Winter, “What I Learned from Reading the Islamic State’s Propaganda Instruction Manual,” *Lawfare*, April 2017.

[57] The Islamic State, “Inside the Caliphate 8,” Video published 30 October 2018.

[58] See for instance Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “Give Glad Tidings to the Patient,” *Al Hayat*, 22 August 2018.

[59] Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi dating 9 July 2005 can be accessed here: https://fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf

[60] Abu Qatada al-Filastini’s article “The Importance of Jihadi Media” can be accessed here: <https://www.lawfareblog.com/article-shaykh-abu-qatadah-al-filistini-importance-jihadi-media>

[61] This is not to say that al-Qaida does not have munasirun channels. Examples of such include the *Global Islamic Media Front* (GIMF) and *Al Hijrah*.

[62] Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs: How the Islamic State Terror Wave Rose So High in Europe,” *CTC Sentinel* 12, no. 3 (2019).

[63] Fawaz A. Gerges, *Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[64] For example Max Abrahms concludes terrorism *does not work* simply because terrorists, including Jihadi groups, have failed to reach their ultimate objectives. See Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 42–78. In contrast, other authors claim that terrorism is a useful strategy to reach one’s objectives, see Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism in History,” *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, 2007, 8–28; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–80.

[65] English, Richard. *Does Terrorism Work?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

[66] Assaf Moghadam, *Nexus of Global Jihad: Understanding Cooperation among Terrorist Actors* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Tricia Bacon, “Alliance Hubs: Focal Points in the International Terrorist Landscape,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 4 (2014): 4–26.

[67] Olivier Roy, *Jihad and Death: The Global Appeal of Islamic State* (London: Hurst & Company, 2017).

Call of Duty: Jihad – How the Video Game Motif Has Migrated Downstream from Islamic State Propaganda Videos

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Abstract

From a technical standpoint, Islamic State (IS) videos are demonstrably superior to those of other groups. But as time goes by, their aesthetic is migrating downstream as other groups attempt to copy it. Specifically, IS has turned to video games, regularly mimicking and even directly copying the aesthetic and design of First Person Shooter games, most often Call of Duty, in their videos, and other groups have followed suit. This specific aesthetic offers a way to recruit young, technologically savvy, men while sanitizing the violence they were being recruited to participate in. This study offers an instrument for tracking the IS aesthetic as it moves to other groups as well as its evolution over time, and offers a case study of a specific group that has copied the IS aesthetic, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS.)

The Game Motif

This study examines the relationship between the visual aesthetic expressed in the video propaganda of the so-called Islamic State (IS) and the visual aesthetic expressed in the video propaganda of other, “downstream” groups to answer a deceptively simple question. We are seeing “downstream groups” trying to mimic or copy the Islamic State (IS) aesthetic. In examining what this means, the question we take up here is, “How do IS video propaganda aesthetics and standards appear in the work of other groups?” The dissemination of the IS aesthetic is in and of itself problematic and worth tracking. They have set a standard other groups are clearly aiming for. Furthermore, IS has multiple styles and motifs that its media makers employ. Aside from the overall problem of jihadist propaganda quality improving and IS becoming a model for other groups, the specific motif of “game” is being used by IS and copied by others, and that specifically is of concern for a number of reasons.

To that end, we compared a set of IS videos with videos from Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS.) The goal of this study was first, to establish the parameters of when a video ought reasonably be considered to be built on a video game motif, and second, to assess how the method behind IS's use of such a motif has migrated “downstream” to a group that has historically produced weaker video propaganda than IS. The paper first establishes what the characteristics of this motif are, discusses why it has become a popular choice in jihadist propaganda, then charts the downstream migration from IS. It should be noted, “video game motif” or “video game aesthetic” has in practice for these groups almost always meant the aesthetic of “Call of Duty,” a choice we discuss below. HTS and IS almost obsessively focus on copying the style of (and sometimes just copying) the various games in the Call of Duty franchise.

Our interest in propaganda focuses on videos specifically. Islamic State's choice to use the gaming motif is not a random one but is, in fact, an incredibly savvy decision. Videos that make use of such a motif are a “visual dog whistle” to the all-important gaming demographic. [1] The following meme has been widely referenced in the popular press.[2]

Figure 1: “This is Our Call of Duty” Meme



The argument has been made for a number of years that IS materials are littered with memes, images, and even ripped footage from popular culture materials marketed to what could be called the global youth demographic,[3] because that, more than any specific nationality or ethnic group, is the target audience, certainly for IS, but also for any of these groups who recruit outside of a narrow nationalist base. Video games are an important example of this approach on the part of groups' media makers.

Characteristics That Define the Game Motif

For this study we compared IS product with those of HTS. We chose HTS intentionally because this group's product quality—which has been gradually improving over a long period of time,[4]—is now closest to that of IS. (Indeed in many videos it is its equal, even in some sections surpassing that of IS.) Therefore, our argument is easier to see for those not used to regularly making qualitative judgments about video production.

In order to establish that both IS and HTS borrow from video games to create game motifs in their media products, we need to identify what precisely defines a particular video as “game.” While there are many characteristics that reflect a gaming sensibility (and IS in particular will choose to put individual gaming characteristics into videos in a scattered way so that there are many videos that include references to gaming that we would not call gaming videos) only when multiple gaming characteristics *dominate* a video can that video genuinely be said to represent a game motif.

There are several characteristics that we identify as “game.” These are First Person Shooter (or “FPS” games) so it is no surprise that a primary element of these videos is the heavy use of first person (sometimes called subjective) camera angles, powerful because they create an immersive experience—just as in game play, or game space. The use of first person camera is probably the visual characteristic that is “first among equals” in identifying a video as belonging to the gaming category.[5]

Figure 2: Frame Grab: FPS Shot, Image of Gun Visible, from HTS “Eastern Al-Ghoutah 2”

The next visual marker to appear prominently in gaming videos is the use of drone footage. But any groups who can use drones to capture footage rely on such footage, because it is dramatic and effective. (The primary use of such footage is to “objectively” establish a context, referred to by media professionals as an establishing shot.) The leap to “game” is made with the addition of two additional elements. First, there are colored graphics overlaid on top of the drone footage to permit the viewer to distinguish “bad guys” (always in red, as in video games) from “good guys” (always in green.) See for example “Epic Battle of the Lions”[6] or “Racers to Paradise”[7] and “Metals of the Men.”[8]

Figure 3: Frame Grab of Drone Footage, from IS “Stay for the End Times”

The second visual characteristic that points without a doubt to “game” is the use of drone footage in brief screen-in-screen appearances in the corner of the frame when first person footage is playing. This technique, applied in games (in the games it is called a “mini-map”) there offers players a sense of the overall “battle-space,” with the objective of providing context so as to eliminate extreme fixation on their own viewpoint, which in turn risks distracting the player from the overall action.[9] Here, actual drone footage recreates that effect, and it would be immediately recognized as such by gamers. Non-gamers in many cases either would not process the screen’s appearance and disappearance, given how inconsequential the overlay often appears, or would be disoriented by it, not understanding the intended relationship to the larger screen and not being experienced in switching perspectives, as gamers are.[10]

Figure 4: Frame Grab: Mini-Map, from IS “Raid of Abu Hasan Al Khathami”

The next visual feature consists of narrative elements which are often presented with a specific type of graphic, where suddenly instead of high-resolution footage images are grainy, in an extremely washed-out color palette, often all in grey or sepia toned. This again presents a “dog whistle” mimicking a very specific visual from the game, and thus capitalizing on association with the game environment. For example, the introduction of a new “mission” in Call of Duty would present a scene or weapon as the primary focus, while the introduction of a new character would use this kind of graphic, in which case a face would be the centerpiece. For IS see, “Epic Battles of the Lions”[11] or “Harvest of the Soldiers #1”[12] or especially “Profit Selling.”[13] Animated writing appears in the space remaining, accompanied by a techno sound effect taken from the game (if you are not a gamer, think of the sound effect that accompanied the appearance of the graphics in the film *Hunt for Red October*.) These graphics, and the timing with which they unfold, almost precisely mimic those in the game, except that they are mirror images, since of course English reads left-to-right and Arabic right-to-left, so the focal point of the images in the game and in gaming videos will appear on opposite sides of the screen. For HTS see again “Metals of Men.”[14]

Only someone who plays versions of Call of Duty specifically would notice that the introduction of larger and more powerful weapons is sequenced and timed in a very specific way. In the game, at least in “multiplayer” mode where one plays against other people, as a player becomes more successful one “earns” more powerful weapons. This is what is known as a “kill-streak” or “score-streak.” Mortars and artillery never appear until roughly two thirds of the way through the gaming “mission.” IS and HTS have incorporated the same sequencing of the introduction of weapons—“players” are never shown with these “reward” weapons until after they are shown with AK-47s or RPGs for example—but the mortars and artillery pieces appear, proportionally speaking, at roughly the same point in the narrative action of the video as in the game. This extremely subtle and precise point is very unlikely to be a reflection of anything other than intent. Very great care is being taken to copy the game in a number of details that viewers unfamiliar with the game simply would never notice or care about.

Finally (and strikingly), compared with other videos (particularly those of IS), the violence in gaming videos appears highly stylized to the point of being sanitized. This study is not specifically discussing the ultra-violent videos that have received so much attention in the press: it has been well established that these are a small percentage of IS output and have been throughout the group’s existence.[15] Rather, we are comparing violent gaming videos to the average video in the jihadist combat genre, which—while typically not showing the enemy during actual combat itself—often delights in showing the bodies of fallen foes in every imaginable state, as a final display of domination, of humiliation, and as a warning. These images are grotesque and horrifying.[16] Yet they are almost completely absent from the jihadists’ gaming videos. There are plenty of people being killed, but as in video games themselves, they are killed at a distance and with no focus on the aftermath, on the effects these weapons have on actual flesh and blood, on the actual carnage involved; not for the “bad” guys and not for the “good” guys who—just as in the game space—when shot, simply get back up and start over, as for instance in “Roar of the Lions”[17] or “And God Will Be Sufficient #4”[18] for the Islamic State, and “Metals of Men” or “Eastern al-Ghuthah” for HTS.[19]

The Benefits of the Game Motif for Terrorist Propagandists

What is driving this aesthetic choice? Answers, obviously, will be speculative, but examining the gaming demographic closely, the actual numbers provide strong evidence. Globally, approximately two billion people play some kind of video game, roughly one in every three people on the planet.[20] That number, of course, is inflated by virtue of the fact that it includes everyone playing every type of game. In other words, it includes parents giving small children educational games on tablets to entertain them in restaurants, and senior citizens playing Farmville or Candy Crush on their phones on the bus on the way home from work. From the perspective of terrorist groups, what matters is who (and how many) play First Person Shooter games. These are the games which insert an individual or group of players directly into a combat scenario of some kind (they literally become a “shooter”), giving them weapons and ammunition, and asking them to perform tasks which inevitably require them to directly engage an enemy to succeed. What additionally sets these games apart is that they offer the player a “first person” perspective—they are designed in such a way as to immerse the

player in the game space. It appears that the player is “in” the space, looking at their own hands, through their own eyes and so forth. Global player numbers for these types of games are, of course, far lower, but are still enormous when you realize the starting figure is two billion. Some 57% of those two billion play FPS games, and are below the age of 35.[21] Well over 90% are male.[22] These numbers not only mean that these motifs are familiar to hundreds of millions, but that they are in the exact sweet spot in terms of recruitment for these jihadist groups: young, male, and technologically savvy.

Still, why Call of Duty specifically? Because worldwide more than 100 million play that specific game.[23] One of the most recent iterations of the franchise made the company one billion dollars on the first *day* of its release. [24]

To be clear, we are not arguing that IS videos have been so good that thousands saw them, got swept up and simply made their way to Syria to join the fight. It is our argument that other groups saw how much better IS videos were than their own, and that thousands were joining IS, and drew their own conclusions – and therefore decided they had to step up their game (so to speak) both by attempting to increase the quality of their work *and* by including game elements in their aesthetic.

Available research offers extremely useful insights on why a game motif might be attractive to these groups, because it explains how the use of such a motif might increase the chances that “gamers” would be attracted to their cause (and at the same time be particularly attractive recruits.) Marcus Schulzke, very cautious about making arguments about the impacts of First Person Shooter (FPS) games on those who play them, makes compelling arguments about the power of these games as a form of strategic communication, if not outright propaganda.[25] Moreover, an extensive body of empirical research finds at least a correlation between regular play of violent games and increased aggressiveness (although there is some question whether FPS games correlate with aggression more than third person games.[26])

One key difference between games and other forms of entertainment media is that the game experience is fully immersive. They work, in other words, because they engage multiple senses, including the sensation of movement, cannot be played without full concentration, and foster identification with the characters being played.[27] These elements produce a sense of “transportation,” of actually being *in* the world of the game.[28] These findings stem from research on the actual *playing* of games, not looking at images that are essentially using games as memes. But until research on looking at imagery based on games is available, these studies seem reasonable proxies.[29] And what is called “transportation” seems very much like the phenomena referred to as “presence” in studies of the first person camera angle critical to the reproduction in videos of the gaming motif, and those studies come to very similar conclusions.[30] We doubt very much any of these groups are aware of such research, but it does go a long way towards explaining their choices. It seems likely these groups would prefer to recruit young men with aggressive tendencies, and the gamer communities are, for whatever reason, a place to find them. Terrorist groups have no doubt discovered this through experience.

There is, however, almost no research on the integration of video games as a *motif* in terrorist propaganda. [31] Miron Lakomy writes at length about jihadist groups attempting to incorporate video *games* into their propaganda, but notes that they simply lack the technical capacity to produce games that compete in any real way with the sophistication of those being produced in the West, and concludes that is likely why Islamic State has done no more than release “trailers” (if those trailers were actually official IS products, which is in question.) Professor Lakomy references the use of Call of Duty as a meme by IS, but does not mention the way it functions as a motif for them, perhaps because he is somewhat dismissive of their capacity to produce high-quality video propaganda (a conclusion with which we obviously disagree.)[32]

There has been intense debate for many years over whether FPS (and other violent games) simply attract young people with aggressive tendencies or actually increase the aggression of the young people who play them, and that is a critical question for educators and policymakers, but completely irrelevant to terrorist and extremist groups looking for aggressive young men. Either way, they need only tap the FPS gamer community in some way in their recruiting, and they are likely to be accessing a recruiting pool that includes young men who are more aggressive than the norm.

Charting the Migration Downstream

Previous work developed a basic instrument for the evaluation of extremist propaganda, and initially demonstrated that tool could successfully evaluate the impact on Islamic State propaganda of coalition bombing.[33] That forensic tool enables a focus on the ways in which compositional elements of video (editing, lighting, graphics, audio, camera angles and so forth) contribute to the rhetorical and persuasive power of video propaganda. Since the production of quality requires intent, it should therefore be possible to generate predictive models based on where and how the makers of these videos apply that intent. That first step demonstrated the basic viability of the instrument, and so we build on that earlier work.

In order to properly assess the relationship between “downstream” groups and IS, we created a version of the original instrument using the typical IS propaganda product as a baseline against which the aesthetic choices of other groups can be measured. The original instrument itself was straightforward. Down the vertical (Y) axis all the components of video production and messaging, which can be graded based on quality are listed. Along the horizontal (X) axis are the grading levels, ranging from “Consumer,” which is essentially what you see when a naïve user picks up a camera for the first time, through to a level defined as “Hollywood.”

Here the vertical (Y) axis starts with a list of production components from the original Quality Assessment Grid and converts them into points of assessment shifted into an aesthetic—in other words, a point of comparison against which a non-IS video can be measured. In addition to this inheritance from the original grid, we added components which characterize and define the IS standard. In this study we use video games as a specific motif or expression of that aesthetic. Within the motif there are aesthetic elements, some of which are shared with other motifs and some that are unique to gaming. Pulling out motifs within the overall aesthetic points us towards the particular demographics extremist groups are attempting to recruit as well as what comprises their message and how that message is presented.[34]

We modified the X-axis, now with a scale from 1-6 (or 0 to 100%), to provide the aesthetic value (or choices) relative to the IS standard. That now allows a graded aesthetic of the propaganda of other groups, such as HTS, relative to IS. And the Y-axis has been modified, now listing the points or elements of aesthetic assessment.

Figure 5: New Y Axis

MESSAGING
Delivery Technique - Compression, Metadata, Low DRC (Dynamic Range Compression)
Quality - Pixilation
Editing Enhances Story
Graphics - Messaging
Marketing
Message: Target
Resolution
Story - Content Organization
Story/ Scene/ Sequence
Symbology
Target and Appeal
Target Audience
Use and Type of Media Elements
Delivery
Narratives and Implication
MEDIA PRODUCTION
Image Quality (Scale; Flattened; 3-D; Intention)
Set/ Location - Use; Intent
2-D Graphic Implementation
FX (AfterEffects)
3-D Graphic Implementation
FX (ex. Cinema or Maya, Motion)
Actors: Identity, Continuity, Character
Audio - Craft
Acquisition - Microphone - Craft/Skills
Foley
Audio - Mix - Engineering
Auteur - Level and Sophistication
Camera Technique (Movement, Angles, etc.)
Camera Type
Cinematography
Composition - Image (1/3rds)
Continuity
Diegetic Representation
Editing Craft (Mechanics, Timing)
Equipment Knowledge (Grain, Depth of Field etc.)
Graphics - Introduction Quality
Intention
Intersection Points - Vulnerability - Valence
Lighting Type/ Technique
Logo, Brand (Quality, Inference)
Mechanics (Sophistication of Technique and Craft)
Mise-en-Scene
Standards --> Location: Local, Regional, National or International
Synchronous Audio
Timing
Visual/ Artistic/ Craft Sophistication

Figure 6: New X Axis

<u>Production Value - Quality</u>								
Percentage of Production Completion towards an Industry, commercial Hollywood Production Value								
0%	-----50%				-----100%			
	Consumer	Guerilla	Professional-Consumer	Corporate-Pro	Professional:	Professional: Hollywood		SCORE
	1	2	3	4	5	6		

When the IS video “Sniping One of the Apostates”[35] is run through this grid, not all values score 6 (or 100%) because that particular IS video does not represent a “perfect” representation of an IS video: there is no such thing (See Figure 7).[36]

Our initial comparison was between IS and HTS propaganda (see Figure 8)

This would seem to beg the question: how do we prove that HTS is in fact following IS, copying them, as opposed to independently making comparable aesthetic judgments about the value of a game motif? In point of fact we cannot conclusively prove this, because the forms of evidence we would need to lock down such a claim—interviews with media makers, production notes, or just raw, unedited footage—are simply unavailable, absent. As a proxy, however, we can examine historical works, and look at what HTS production choices were when the (IS) Caliphate was first declared, and IS initially began pushing out product. This would allow us to compare those to more recent examples of HTS work, thus focusing on the trajectory of their development.

Of course, when the Caliphate was first declared, HTS itself did not exist. They were then Jabhat al-Nusra.[37] Figure 9 illustrates a comparison between representative videos made by IS and Al-Nusra:

Al-Nusra videos prior to “infection” of IS standards and propaganda success, despite the fact that Nusra and IS had originally been a single organization, are markedly weaker, across the board.[38] As samples from this time period we examined “Liberation of al-Umiyyah Checkpoint”[39] and “Satisfy the Breasts of a Believing People,”[40] which are examples of poor craft, design, aesthetic, and execution. Yet HTS, after IS introduced the game motif, begins incorporating that aesthetic as well (admittedly after its own technical capacities have improved.) “Metals of Men” for example, which incorporates drone footage, also uses graphic overlays and sound effects ripped straight from the game[41] to create the look and feel of a FPS game.

HTS videos clearly feature gaming references, and importantly these include not only the First Person Shooter camera angles that a casual observer would be familiar with, (and that Nusra videos tried to incorporate), but much more subtle elements—again, the “dog whistles”—that would be immediately obvious to members of the gamer community, but which to others might be confusing, or even appear as “weaker” quality.[42] For example, videos with diluted or reduced color palettes and shots that are very grainy interspersed amongst very high-resolution footage make sense within a game comparison, whereas they otherwise might be taken for accidents or even evidence of poor craft. But when Call of Duty is the point of reference, then the diluted color palette provides an obvious shout-out, and the quick use of grainy footage (with graphic overlays) obviously imitates the manner in which a game introduces a break in the action, visually signaling that a new “mission” is beginning or a new character is being introduced.


Figure 7: Grid for Video “Sniping of Apostates”

IS Aesthetic Comparative Analysis									
Production Value									
Percentage of Production Value as Compared to Post-Caliphate IS									
0% -----50%-----100%									
New video message from The Islamic State “Bringing One of the									
How does the aesthetic appear in different groups?		1	2	3	4	5	6	SCORE	
MESSAGING									
Delivery technique - Compression, Miracast, low DMC dynamic range (compression)									
Quality - pixelation									
Editing Enhance story									
Graphics - messaging									
Intention - clear, refined, concise									
Marketing									
Message target									
Targets actual or Potential Extremists - youth male-video game ans									
Reduced Violence - sophisticated targeting of a specific demographic									
Production									
Story - Content organization/ scene/sequence									
Storyboard									
Target and Appeal									
Target audience									
Use type media elements									
delivery									
Narratives and implication Brutality, Mercy, Victimhood War, Belonging, Utopianism (POF)Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy - NATO (Strategy...)									
Media Production									
Quality delivery (IS HD)									
Image quality (SCALE: Flattened to 2D or intentional)									
Set - quality & location									
3-D Graphics implementation -									
FX (AfterEffects)									
3-D graphics adhere to design principles - formalist									
3-D Graphics implementation - Currently weak - formalist									
FX (Cinema or Maya, MOTION)									
Artists identity, continuity, character									
Audio - craft									
Acquisition - Microphone - craft/skills									
Foley									
Audio - Mix engineering									
Audio - either uninformal camcorder or non-synchronous sound via Canon DSLR and recorder (high quality, intentional)									
Mixing - level and sophistication of mix									
Camera technique (movement, angles)									
Camera type									
Camera technique - not steady as the majority - Less a shot from inside type as it is uninformal. Clear evidence or steady algorithms to									
Composition									
Composition - Image (Visual)									
Content - extreme action, pushed beyond all limits - Limit condition									
Upset status quo									
The single within the collective									
Navigates around sadness, pity - empathy									
Continuity - A clear linear narrative is evident - A beginning, middle and end which often reflects the chapter/act aspect									
Diegetic representation									
Editing CRAFT (mechanics, timing) Editing enhances story and creates a youth style (MTV aesthetic) comprised of rapid edits, flickering, flash edits, reverse, slow motion									
Editing enhances story and creates a youth style (MTV aesthetic) comprised of rapid edits, flickering, flash edits, reverse, slow motion									
Crafted edits reinforce spontaneity, impatience, craft is refined but informed by the democratization of digital media. Characterized by engaged camera (FP) handheld.									
Timing - reflects target demographic topical/young forms (games as example)									
Equipment knowledge (lens, depth of field etc.)									
Graphics - introduction quality									
Intention									
Interaction points - vulnerability - valence									
Lighting technique									
Lighting - Minor use of studio lights but clear attention to ambient and									
Logo, Brand (quality, informal) - careful, clear									
Mechanics (sophistication of technique and craft)									
mise-en-scene (well composed)									
Poetic - Characterized by the removal of- Shift from Arabian/Muslim access points to westernized. They turn to entertainment they are most familiar with, gaming, given it's languageless world appeal and									
propaganda over movie market and filtering									
propaganda of American interests - story made by non-ideologically trained practice disrupting the status quo by contrast final craft/producing is historically informed - A trained eye/hand exerts									
Standards -> location: local, regional, national or international									
Synchronous audio vs									
Video presented as chapters or parts									
Visual aesthetic sophistication									

IS vs. **HTS**



IS vs. Al-Nusra



Providing a metric for the IS visual aesthetic, and the game motif in particular as it moves to other groups, matters for several reasons. First, the ability to quantify how close (or how far) a group's output is to emulating (or deviating from) "IS standard" remains one of the critical long-term goals of this project, the development of an "aesthetic fingerprint" we can use to track media teams. As noted, HTS improved gradually over a long period of time. That is not the case with other groups now affiliated with IS, whose production quality jumped almost overnight. Not only has the quality jumped, but it jumped in precise ways making their videos entirely consistent with the IS aesthetic, which we take as a demonstration of intent. Mapping quality changes over time through the use of this modified tool makes these linkages more directly apparent.

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using FPS to lead a “player” to a gory death followed by the message THERE IS NO RESPAWN.

The enormous popularity of e-sports also provides tremendous opportunities. Governments and NGOs ought to be sponsoring advertisements during games and tournaments (or even teams or, frankly, smaller events.) E-sports provides a burgeoning arena, with literally tens of millions watching events via the web, and tens of thousands participating. It is well worth considering this new venue, a place where the precise demographic being targeted by extremist groups of all sorts are gathering, as a space that is just waiting for positive messaging from counter- and anti-extremist organizations.

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Notes

- [1] In political rhetoric, the “dog whistle” is a commonly used metaphor, meaning rhetoric that will sound largely neutral to the main audience, but means something very different to the targeted sub-set of that audience. It is a strategy employed by both right and left. See Tanzina Vega, “Decoding the ‘dog whistle’ politics of Trump and Clinton,” *CNNmoney*, October 19, 2016. <https://money.cnn.com/2016/10/19/news/dog-whistle-trump-clinton/index.html>. We here transfer it to the study of visuals.
- [2] See for example, Matthew Hall, “‘This is our Call of Duty’ How ISIS is using video games,” *Salon*, November 1, 2014. https://www.salon.com/2014/11/01/this_is_our_call_of_duty_how_isis_is_using_video_games/ as well as Jay Caspian King, “ISIS’s Call of Duty,” *The New Yorker*, September 18, 2014 <https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/isis-video-game>.
- [3] Cori E. Dauber and Mark D. Robinson, “Comments on Video Propaganda,” in Allison Astorino-Courtois, ed., *SMA Reach-back: Question QL 5 (CENTCOM NSI December, 2016)* http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/QL-5_-_response_-_how-audiences-receive-info_10-4-2016FinalDraftV2.pdf.
- [4] We make this claim based on our assessment of videos of first Nusra, then the follow-on groups, and finally HTS over the period between 2014 and the present.
- [5] For particularly clear HTS examples, see “New video message from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: ‘Glories in the Field #13,’” *Jihadology.net*, April 22, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2018/04/22/new-video-mesaage-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5riral-sham-glories-in-the-field-13/> or “New video message from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: ‘Glories in the Field #14,’” *Jihadology.net*, April 25, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2018/04/25/new-video-mesaage-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5riral-sham-glories-in-the-field-14/>.
- [6] See “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Epic Battles of the Lions – Wilayat al-Anbar,’” *Jihadology.net*, June 27, 2017, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2017/06/27/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-epic-battles-of-the-lions-wilayat-al-anbar/> at 19:40.
- [7] “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘The Racers to Paradise #2 – Wilayat al-Raqqah,’” *Jihadology.net*, January 26, 2015, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2015/01/26/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-the-racers-to-paradise-2-wilayat-al-raqqah/>. This is also a good example of the “bookending” feature discussed below.
- [8] See “Metals of Men,” the very end.
- [9] For IS examples, see “The Raid of Abu Hasan al Khathami,” or, “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Stay for the End Times – Wilayat Halab,’” *Jihadology.net*, April 16, 2017, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2017/04/16/new-video->

- [message-from-the-islamic-state-stay-for-the-end-times-wilayat-%E1%B8%A5alab/](#) or “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Traditions and Practices of God – Wilayat al-Barakah,’” *Jihadology.net*, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, January 6, 2018 <https://jihadology.net/2018/01/06/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-traditions-and-practices-of-god-wilayat-al-barakah/> or “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘And Prepare Against Them Whatever You Are Able of Power – Wilayat al-Jazirah,’” *Jihadology.net*, May 31, 2015, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2015/05/31/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-and-prepare-against-them-whatever-you-are-able-of-power-wilayat-al-jazirah/>. For HTS, see “Metals of Men.”
- [10] “al-Furqan Media presents a new video message from The Islamic State: ‘And Wretched Is That Which They Purchased,’” *Jihadology.net*, March 10, 2015, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2015/03/10/al-furqan-media-presents-a-new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-and-wretched-is-that-which-they-purchased/> is not precisely a mini-map, but it does demonstrate how this kind of footage can be used as screen-in-screen to create a game aesthetic in the middle of a narrative to add to its credibility.
- [11] Starting at 11:51. Although more a video that incorporates game elements than a straight game video, see “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Swords of Jihad – Wilayat al-Iraq, Shamal Baghdad,’” *Jihadology.net*, July 29, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2018/07/29/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-swords-of-jihad-wilayat-al-iraq-shamal-baghdad/> where at 6:51 the action is interrupted so that a vehicle can be transformed into a graphic, complete with all the relevant information about its firepower, cost, and so forth. (Warning: extremely graphic.)
- [12] The quality of Islamic State infographics is well known, but in this case because the background figures are fighters, and are animated, we feel comfortable putting it in the “game” category. These silhouettes resemble CoD Ghost mission introductions. “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Harvest of the Soldiers #1,’” *Jihadology.net*, August 2, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2018/08/02/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-harvest-of-the-soldiers-1/>.
- [13] “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Profit Selling – Wilayat al-Furat,’” *Jihadology.net*, October 4, 2017, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2017/10/04/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-profit-selling-wilayat-al-furat/> where there is, throughout the narrative, a recurrent sepia-hued image with the face to the right and writing, in Arabic and Cyrillic letters, on the left. See 3:40.
- [14] “Metals” starting at 4:35. “Metals” appears to be specifically based on the “World War II” iteration of the Call of Duty franchise.
- [15] Multiple studies have proven empirically that the ultra-violent images that received the greatest attention in the Western media were an exceedingly small percentage of IS output. Charlie Winter, “Fishing and ultraviolence,” *BBC.com*, October 6, 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idx-88492697-b674-4c69-8426-3edd17b7daed> or Aaron Y. Zelin, “Picture Or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9, 4 (2015): 85-97, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/445/876>. Lydia Wilson notes that the persistent focus on the ultra-violent videos “obscured to a Western audience the revolutionary message of idealism and joy that attracts many young people to the cause, which in turn blocks our understanding of and our ability to combat the appeal.” “Understanding the appeal of ISIS,” *New England Journal of Public Policy* 29, 1 (2017): 5, <https://scholarworks.umb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1704&context=nejpp>.
- [16] As a particularly egregious example of the way enemy dead are displayed, see “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘And You Will Not Harm Him At All – Wilayat al-Khayr,’” *Jihadology.net*, February 1, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2018/02/01/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-and-you-will-not-harm-him-at-all-wilayat-al-khayr/>.
- [17] “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Roar of the Lions – Wilayat al-Furat,’” *Jihadology.net*, January 30, 2017, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2017/01/30/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-roar-of-the-lions-wilayat-al-furat/>.
- [18] “New video message from the Islamic State: ‘And God Will Be Sufficient For You Against Them #4,’” *Jihadology.net*, December 10, 2017, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2017/12/10/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-and-god-will-be-sufficient-for-you-against-them-4-wilayat-al-furat/>.
- [19] “New video message from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: ‘Eastern al-Ghutah: A Castle of Steadfastness #2,’” *Jihadology.net*, June 9, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2018/06/09/new-video-message-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5rir-al-sham-eastern-al-ghu%E1%B9%ADah-a-castle-of-steadfastness-2/> is an example of both a video where enemy dead are displayed in relatively bloodless and relatively whole positions, and where enemy dead, when shot, simply fall down. See 8:30 and just after 9:00.
- [20] Emma McDonald, “The Global Games Market Will Reach \$108.9 Billion in 2017 With Mobile Taking 42%,” *New Zoo*, April 20, 2017 <https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/the-global-games-market-will-reach-108-9-billion-in-2017-with-mobile-taking-42/>.
- [21] “Distribution of video gamers worldwide in 2017, by age and gender,” *Statista*, n.d., <https://www.statista.com/statistics/722259/world-gamers-by-age-and-gender/>.
- [22] Players of First Person Shooter games average 4.3%-7.2% female. Nick Yee, “Beyond 50/50: Breaking Down the Percentage of

- Female Gamers by Genre,” *Quantic Foundry*, January 19, 2017 <https://quanticfoundry.com/2017/01/19/female-gamers-by-genre/>.
- [23] Robert Purchase, “100 million people played Call of Duty since COD4,” *Eurogamer*, August 8, 2013 <https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2013-08-13-100-million-people-played-call-of-duty-since-cod4>. He is reporting on an infographic provided by the company (Activision) that produces the game, and he does note that it’s impossible to tell if that’s 100 million different people, or the same people buying different versions of the game year after year. But the company’s press release helpfully points out that whoever these people are, they’ve racked up “2.85 million years playing the game, which is longer than humans have existed for,” and fired “more than 32.3 quadrillion shots,” apparently more than “even the US army (sic) has.”
- [24] Daniel Nye Griffiths, “Activision Boasts \$1Billion ‘Call of Duty: Ghosts’ Day One Sales,” *Forbes*, November 6, 2013 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnyegriffiths/2013/11/06/activision-boasts-1-billion-call-of-duty-ghosts-day-one-sales/#2ed7079611e9>. For unit sales broken down by version of the game, see “All time unit sales of selected games in Call of Duty franchise worldwide as of January 2018 (in millions),” *Statista: The Statistics Portal*, n.d., <https://www.statista.com/statistics/321374/global-all-time-unit-sales-call-of-duty-games/>. It is interesting, though, that we found visual references to Call of Duty in multiple videos, yet Islamic State sympathizers recently released a trailer clearly based on Grand Theft Auto. Leon Watson, “Islamic State mocks up GTA game to recruit young fighters,” *The Telegraph*, October 26, 2018 <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11108676/Islamic-State-mocks-up-GTA-game-to-recruit-young-fighters.html>.
- [25] See Marcus Schulzke, “Video Games and the Simulation of International Conflict,” *E-International Relations*, August 1, 2014 <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/08/01/video-games-and-the-simulation-of-international-conflict/>.
- [26] See Kirstie M. Farrar et al, “Ready, Aim, Fire! Violent Video Game Play and Gun Controller Use: Effects on Behavioral Aggression and Social Norms Concerning Violence,” *Communication Studies* 68, no. 4 (September-October 2017): 369-384. Study results regarding aggression or frustration need to be contextualized by recent research findings that video game violence differs based on skill level: for less skilled players, violence is something that is done *to* you, thus resulting in frustration. For more experienced players, violence is something you do *to* others, thus resulting in increased aggression (and, depending on the game, exposure to gory imagery.) See Nicholas L. Matthews and Andrew J. Weaver, “Skill Gap: Quantifying Violent Content in Video Game Play Between Variably Skilled Users,” *Mass Communication and Society* 16 (2013): 829-846. This maybe the case because games embed the potential for “moral disengagement” – that is, either you are shooting at targets that are not human (aliens, for example), have been intentionally dehumanized, or the game narrative provides you with moral justification for shooting them. See Tilo Hartmann et al, “How Violent Video Games Communicate Violence: A Literature Review and Content Analysis of Moral Disengagement Factors,” *Communication Monographs* 81, no. 3 (September 2014): 310-332. It is also the case that negative experiences, such as losing, may not negatively impact players’ enjoyment of the experience of game play. See Daniel M. Shafer, “Causes of State Hostility and Enjoyment in Player versus Player Environment Video Games,” *Journal of Communication* 62 (2012): 719-737. See the literature reviews of all these articles for the extensive body of research conducted over a period of years on the relationship between video games and violent behavior.
- [27] See the discussion of research in Aaron Delwiche, “From *The Green Berets* to *America’s Army*: Video Games as a Vehicle for Political Propaganda,” in J. Patrick Williams and Jonas Heide Smith eds., *Player’s Realm: Studies on the Culture of Video Games and Gaming* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006), p. 95.
- [28] Delwiche, “From *The Green Berets*,” p. 96.
- [29] Such work may become available sooner than one would think, given the increased popularity of so-called “e-sports.” Literally hundreds of millions of young people, probably mostly male, are now not themselves playing video games, but are watching others play. “First 100 million viewers in the history of esports,” *ESC*, November 8, 2017 <https://esc.watch/blog/post/100M-viewers-esports>. This seems an important direction for subsequent research, but apparently it is too new a phenomenon to have caught the attention of researchers. The only study we were able to find evaluated why people chose to watch e-sports. Juho Hamari et al, “What is e-sports and why do people watch it?” *emerald insight* 27, no. 2 (2017): 211-232 <https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/IntR-04-2016-0085>.
- [30] See the discussion of this camera angle in Cori E. Dauber, “ISIS and the Family Man,” *Small Wars Journal*, July 1, 2015 <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/isis-and-the-family-man> note xxiv.
- [31] We are aware of work coming from the critical/cultural studies perspective, but that work stems from a completely different approach from ours and asks different questions. Much of it focuses on critiques of the games themselves rather than the way actual terrorists are making use of the games.
- [32] See “Let’s Play A Game: Jihadi Propaganda in the World of Electronic Entertainment,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 17 (2017): 1-25.
- [33] Mark D. Robinson and Cori E. Dauber, “Grading the Quality of ISIS Videos: A Metric For Assessing the Technical Sophistication of Digital Video Propaganda,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* available on line, specific issue not yet assigned: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1513693>.

- [34] Our interest is in jihadist groups, but there is no reason why these grids (certainly the first, and hypothetically the second) could not be used for the assessment of the output of other categories of extremist groups.
- [35] “New video message from The Islamic State: ‘Sniping One of the Apostates of the Peshmerga in Daquq – Wilayat Kirkuk,’” *Jihadology.net*, February 2, 2015, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2015/02/02/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-sniping-one-of-the-apostates-of-the-peshmerga-in-daquq-wilayat-kirkuk/>.
- [36] The basis for the scoring system itself (how can you know if the editing of a particular scene should be graded as “guerrilla” or as “Hollywood?”) is not subjective: it may appear that way to an observer who has no training in media production techniques or their application. Our efforts at inter-coder reliability have so far been only preliminary, but they—along with many years of classroom experience—give us confidence that in fact with training this assessment tool can be learned relatively easily.
- [37] For the history of HTS, its development out of Jabhat al-Nusra, and the changes in its relationship with both IS and the Al-Qaeda leadership, see Aymen Jawad al-Tamimi, *From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approach and Future* (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung n.d.) http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_52977-1522-2-30.pdf?180629110003.
- [38] The weakness of Nusra relative to IS videos is discussed in Mark D. Robinson and Cori E. Dauber, “ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style,” Guest Post, *Jihadology.net*, July 6, 2015 <http://jihadology.net/2015/07/06/guest-post-isis-and-the-hollywood-visual-style/>.
- [39] “al-Manarah al Baydā’ Foundation for Media Production Presents a new video message from Jabhat al-Nusrah: ‘Liberation of al-Umiyyah Checkpoint With a Blessed Martyrdom Operation – Rural Eastern Hamah,’” *Jihadology.net*, April 14, 2014, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2014/04/14/al-manarah-al-bay%E1%B8%8Da-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-video-message-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-liberation-of-al-umiyyah-checkpoint-with-a-blessed-martyrdom-operat/>.
- [40] “Al-Manārah al-Bayḍā’ Foundation for Media Production presents a new video message from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah: ‘The Raid And Satisfy the Breasts of a Believing People’ – Besieged Ḥomṣ,’” *Jihadology.net*, April 30, 2014, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2014/04/30/al-manarah-al-bay%E1%B8%8da-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-video-message-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-the-raid-and-satisfy-the-breasts-of-a-believing-people-besieged/>.
- [41] Both of which, it is interesting to note, would have had to be added in post-production. See “New video message from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: ‘Metals of Men,’” *Jihadology.net*, January 24, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin <https://jihadology.net/2018/01/24/new-video-message-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5rir-al-sham-metals-of-the-men/>. It isn’t, interestingly, a sound effect from that specific iteration of CoD, but players would certainly recognize it as from the franchise.
- [42] It’s interesting that both groups are using very subtle references to the games, and they work. When non-official media makers tried this motif, producing a game “trailer” (based on Grand Theft Auto) it “worked” only in the sense that it annoyed anti-ISIS viewers. See Ahmed al-Rawi, “Video games, terrorism, and ISIS’s jihad 3.0,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 30, no. 3 (2018): 740-760.
- [43] “Sniping One of the Apostates.”
- [44] “New video message from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham: ‘100 + Days,’” *Jihadology.net*, February 4, 2018, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2018/02/04/new-video-message-from-hayat-ta%E1%B8%A5rir-al-sham-100-days/>.
- [45] “Sniping One of the Apostates.”
- [46] “al-Manarah al-Bayda Foundation for media production presents a new video message from Jabhat al-Nusrah: ‘The Battle of the Liberation of Western al-Tal al-Ahmar – Rural al-Qunaytrah,’” *Jihadology.net*, April 23, 2014, Posted by Aaron Y. Zelin, <https://jihadology.net/2014/04/23/al-manarah-al-bay%E1%B8%8Da-foundation-for-media-production-presents-a-new-video-message-from-jabhat-al-nu%E1%B9%A3rah-the-battle-of-the-liberation-of-western-al-tal-al-a%E1%B8%A5mar-rur/>.

A Phoenix Rising from the Ashes? Daesh after its Territorial Losses in Iraq and Syria

by Ronen Zeidel and Hisham al-Hashimis

Abstract

This article examines the transformation of Daesh in its post-state period. Having lost the territories in Iraq and Syria, the organization is now limited to a small enclave in the east of Syria and several other pockets in Iraq. However, various factors are helping the organization survive. Paradoxically, the loss of territory also led Daesh back to its terrorist essence. This article will show how in terms of ideology, operations, organization and manpower, Daesh at present is a small, Sunni Iraqi guerilla/terror organization. But unlike the prevailing assumption that Daesh might return to its former strength and that its existence is a sine qua non, this article concludes that the organization is neither invincible nor imperishable.

Keywords: Daesh, Iraq, Syria, ISIS, commanders, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Ideology

In December 2017, Iraqi prime minister Haydar al-'Abadi declared an end to Daesh's presence on Iraqi territory. [1] The announcement came after a series of military battles in which the Iraqi security forces liberated all cities, towns and villages under the control of the so called "Islamic State" in Iraq. Shortly thereafter, a U.S.-led coalition, made of local Syrian forces, drove the organization out of its most significant assets in Syria, including the towns of al-Raqqa, Dayr al-Zor and Albu Kamal. Consequently, by early 2018, Daesh had suffered a considerable defeat. Its claim to run a "state" was no longer valid and its slogan "we remain and expand" (*Nabqa wa Natamadid*) was a sham.

Having dedicated so much to Islamic "state formation", the change must have been harsh and dramatic for the organization. In addition, even its capacities as a terrorist organization were diminished: no major terror attacks were perpetrated in the West during this time. In Iraq, the prime target of Daesh terrorism, the May 2019 terrorist attack in Baghdad was the first in well over a year. The group's diminished capabilities in that country were largely the result of effective counter terrorism by organs of the Iraqi state, particularly the military intelligence and counter-terrorism forces under the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the difficulty of coordinating such attacks from Syria. Even the media output of the organization was seriously hampered due to the deaths of Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani, Abu Maria al-'Iraqi and Abu 'Abd al-Rahman al-Furqan in 2016.

And yet, as recent events have shown, Daesh still survives despite these efforts. Attacks in previously declared "liberated" areas have resumed, particularly at night, and as illustrated by the April 2019 attacks in Sri Lanka, the group is clearly committed to organizing and/or inspiring mass casualty attacks abroad (something that is still very much within its capabilities). Its leadership and command elements were in a small area in the east of Syria, relatively close to the border with Iraq until they were chased out of it in March 2019 by the Syrian Kurds with international support. But in Iraq they maintain a clandestine presence in the Hamrin and Makhul hilly region between the provinces of Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk, in Sharqat and Qiyara south of Mosul and in the western desert. This presence is confined to uninhabited areas, but poses a daily threat to the population in the Sunni periphery. In addition, the prime goal of the leadership in Syria seems to be the reactivation of "sleeping cells" in Iraq and the transfer of combatants through the border into Iraq in order to increase its presence there.

Paradoxically, the recent setbacks suffered by Daesh may bring it some positive impacts, as this article will show. It still survives as a result of the temporary lack of interest that the various belligerents in the Syrian war show in the region in which Daesh remains. This lack of attention—also the result of the alleviation of the terrorist threat in the West—works in favor of the organization and allows it to regroup. Just as significant is the downsizing of the organization from an "Islamic State" and even a Caliphate aspiring to regional and

ultimately global control, to a small armed group operating clandestinely in remote areas of Sunni Iraq and Syria. This seems to be a more suitable framework for the organization. The article will show the various modes of adaptation to being, once more, a clandestine armed group. It will cover the ideological, operational and personnel aspects of the change. In conclusion, the article will evaluate the sustainability of the organization in its new form.

Theoretical Approach

In his recent book *Rules for Rebels*, Max Abrahms provided three rules that terrorist organizations “should” follow in order to succeed and maintain their success over time. His study, although partly focused on Daesh, comprises many terrorist organizations—some, according to him, more successful than others. His rules are “learning to win”, after the victory “restraining to win”, and “branding” the organization as a “moderate” one. Abrahms is very critical of Daesh for not following these rules, while other organizations—Hizbullah for example—do.[2] Indeed, Daesh committed many strategic errors impacting their expansion and management of success. Yet, Abrahms’ thesis should be discussed within a broader discussion on the “true nature” of Daesh. Could an organization that was largely apocalyptic in outlook, attracting fanatics from all over the globe, ever hope to brand itself “moderate”? Could it restrain the drive to expand and practice Jihad that was at the center of its activity? Did it ever want to be an Iraqi Sunni organization?

Underneath Abrahms’ assertions, and a central aspect of research on ISIS, is the expectation that this organization would start to behave according to what western scholars on counter-terrorism consider “reasonable behavior”. In the case of Daesh, this organization is expected to promote the grievances of the local Sunni population in Iraq and Syria, engage more in social welfare, tone down its global jihad and in general adopt a more moderate line. It is expected to be more organic to its environment: the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria, more localized and less global, in order to survive and thrive. In other words, it is expected to be a different organization.

We are not judging Daesh for its failure or for not corresponding to these expectations, nor are we suggesting concrete steps that must be taken to eliminate Daesh or the future threat of the organization in its post-defeat form. However, we do not ignore the significance of the colossal failure by the organization to maintain its initial success. Concentrating on an analysis of the leadership, personnel and organizational structure of Daesh, the article will illustrate how this organization is adapting to its new operational environment. At times, it even follows some of Abrahms’ “rules”.

Methodology

Post-defeat Daesh suffers from the loss of 42 (out of 43) founders and leading commanders, including all the Iraqis who served as officers in the security services prior to 2003. This article examines the organizational makeover in the post-state period. As the organization is not as active as it used to be in Iraq before late 2017 and is not engaged in daily warfare, the information on it is rather limited. Iraqi, Arab and international media do not report on Daesh as often as they used to before 2017. Occasionally, the media reports on the capture of senior Daesh commanders, like the capture (in Turkey) of senior member Isma'il al-'Ithawi in February 2018,[3] the capture of four senior commanders in May 2018,[4] or the testimony of a middle ranking commander from Falluja.[5] The discussion in this article on the ideological change will draw upon IS publication such as the audio recordings of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the news agency “Aa'maq”.

This article could not have been written on the sole basis of published sources. It is the product of cooperation between an Israeli and an Iraqi researcher. The latter collected information and data from sources in Iraq that have never been published before and are known to be accurate. Together, we worked on his very rich database of over 10,000 names of Dawa'ish. The Iraqi researcher had access to information from interrogations of Dawa'ish by the Iraqi security forces and has published that previously in various media,[6] including in Arabic. Security sources pose a problem. By no means are these the sole sources of information. Yet, they cannot be ruled out just because they cannot always be corroborated, while other information in circulation is in use. This information from the interrogations was given to one of the co-authors in good faith and since then it has formed the basis of his research and international credentials. Most of the “classified” information

was corroborated by open sources. Reference source citations are provided wherever possible.

Unlike a previous article,[7] in which the collective profile of commanders in the organization was garnered from hundreds of names, in this article the number of names will be smaller and most are senior commanders. We will use tables examining the same categories to analyze the composition of the personnel and to show the adaptability of the organization to its new disposition. The tables will include the nationality of the commanders, their tribal origins and what they did before 2003. We will compare that to the previous research. In analyzing the names we will rely on information found in real names and “*nommes de guerre*” (*Kuniya*)—i.e., “Abu Mas'ab al-Suri” indicates that this commander is Syrian.

Location

Before its overthrow in March 2019, the organization was based in a remote area in the east Syrian valley of the Euphrates between the villages of Hajeen, al-Sha'fa and al-Susa, north of Abu Kamal. This is where the leadership was hiding [8] and it is the nerve center of whatever remains of the organization. This is the only place in which the organization controlled a contingent piece of land, a poor vestige of the vast territory it controlled before 2017. The region is on the left bank of the Euphrates and in the south reaches the Syrian border town of Abu Kamal, still under control of the Syrian government. Beyond the river, to the south-west, the region borders an area under control of the Syrian government. To the north, it borders an area under control of the Kurdish led Syrian democratic Forces (SDF). Nearby is a border crossing to Iraq, particularly difficult to patrol, in which the Euphrates flows into Iraq through the towns of Abu Kamal (Syria) and al-Qaim (Iraq). This provides a crevice through which Daesh sends forces into Iraq.

In addition, Daesh uses the desert areas south-west of the Euphrates, an enclave within an area supposedly under control of the Syrian government, for training and reorganization. In the post-state period, the organization no longer relies on taxation of populations. The areas under its control in the east of Syria are almost totally uninhabited. Its advantages for Daesh include its remoteness and the fact that it is far less important than other areas to the competing belligerents in this war. This remoteness allowed the organization to be away from the limelight and engage in reorganization. Before its overthrow, Daesh was using the area to gain another advantage: the area is separating the Syrian army and the SDF. Daesh could benefit from the détente between them, and occasionally even used the redeployment of the SDF from some bases to take them.[9] The latter alarmed the Iraqi government and prompted a recent incursion by Iraqi forces (mainly the “Hashd al-Sha'bi”) into Syrian territory around Abu Kamal.[10] Finally, the proximity to Iraq—the central stage for Daesh—is another advantage of the region and a central interest to Daesh.

In Iraq, Daesh still maintains a permanent presence in the Hamrin area near Kirkuk and in the hilly area between the provinces of Salah al Din, Diyala and Kirkuk. The main village there is Mutaibija. This pocket has never been cleansed by the Iraqi security forces. It is a constant threat to larger towns in the vicinity, including the cities of Samaraa and Tikrit. From there—and by incursions through the Syrian border—Daesh expanded its presence to the west of Anbar and to desert areas around Samarra, south and west of Mosul. Particularly dear to Daesh is Wadi Huran (a desert area south of Mosul, in Anbar province), which played a crucial role in the preparation for Daesh to take Mosul in June 2014. Unlike the pocket in Syria, the areas in Iraq do not form a contingent territory. With the Iraqi state maintaining a certain presence in the Sunni countryside, the organization does not control any region there and is forced to conduct underground activity. Significantly, Daesh in Iraq is now confined to the more peripheral villages of the Sunni countryside and not to towns or cities there.

Ideology in the Post-State Period: Ard al-Tamkin

The transition from an “Islamic State” and even a caliphate—with universal aspirations and a strong apocalyptic dimension—into a clandestine organization was harsh on many disciples of Daesh. As we shall see later in the article, manpower thinned out dramatically, with only a hardcore group of fighters and dedicated Jihadis remaining. Israeli commentator Tzvi Bar'el sums it up correctly in claiming that Daesh today “had dissipated into [remote] fragments of land in which it is [still] fighting occasional battles.”[11]

The idea of an “Islamic state” was a central pillar in the ideology of Daesh. The slogan “remains and expands” (*Baqiya wa Tatamadid*) reflected a convergence between two main principles of the organization: Islamic state-building and Jihad. Both suffered heavily as a result of the defeat, but it seems that Jihad prevailed. As Adam Hoffman points out, the organization still calls itself “Islamic State” and refers to its soldiers as “soldiers of the Caliphate” (*Jund al-Khilafa*),[12] yet this seems to be only an imagined simulation of a state.

Nevertheless, the organization shows a considerable capability for ideologically adapting to the new situation. Its ideology is cyclical in the sense that the defeat is a return to what Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani termed “our primary situation” by which he meant pre-2014 Daesh in Iraq.[13] 'Adnani implied, shortly before his death, that the organization failed in its attempt, but it failed in the first attempt and, as the turn of events follows a cyclical form, the believers should not despair as there will be another chance. This theme also appears in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's August 2018 audio in which he promised that “the tides of war change”.[14] This ideological line differs significantly from the apocalyptical and deterministic line that, according to some, characterized Daesh.[15] Currently, Daesh's ideology is practical and not apocalyptic. It is much closer to the matter-of-fact approach of Abu Bakr Naji's manual “*Idarat al-Tawahush*” (*The Administration of Wilderness*, aka *The Management of Savagery*) than to the prophecies about Dabiq.[16] The apocalypse is absent from recent pronouncements and publications. Apparently, it is being deferred to a later stage.

The practicality is expressed in two terms which closely correspond to the organization's mode of operations. The first one, used by Daesh, is “the land of *Tamkin*” (*Ard al-Tamkin*). *Tamkin* is an Arabic term with several meanings-all relevant to Daesh's mode of operation. It could mean strengthening, consolidation, intensification, establishment, enablement and capacitation, but also deepening.[17] In practical terms it means the consolidation of Daesh's presence in remote and uninhabited areas, mostly in Iraq, creating there the capacity to reemerge. This refers to the training in bases in the desert of Wadi Huran, south of Mosul, which preceded and prepared the taking of that city in June 2014. Others areas serving as *Ard al-Tamkin* are Jazirat Samarra, Habaniya lake, the Jazira desert west of Mosul and the west of Anbar and in Syria the land south of Deir al-Zor. The Hamrin area could serve as “*Ard al-Tamkin*” for the reoccupation of nearby towns like Hawija, Baiji, Jalawla. In some of these areas, Daesh's presence needs to be established. Therefore, a major activity is the expedition of members, often across the border from Syria, to these areas. There, they are trained, new recruits are recruited and commanders form contact with “sleeping cells” nearby. The “Lands of consolidation” should be far from the watchful eye of the Iraqi state. They are not permanent and highly mobile.

Another goal is the creation of “triangles of death” (*Muthalathat al-Mawt*) in areas of the Iraqi and Syrian countryside. This is not a term used by Daesh. The idea of creating it goes back to the “triangle of death” created by the Jihadis under Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi after 2003, south of Baghdad. It also echoes Abu Bakr Naji and his book. In remote areas where the state is weak or absent, the organization will establish presence and intimidate the local population. Thus, the local (Sunni) population would quickly despair of getting help from the state and if they like it or not consider the organization as the sole power in the region. This should not be confused with state administration, as even Zarqawi, already in 2006 established small-scale Islamic states in several regions of Iraq. In the newly formed “triangles of death” the organization would not be involved in administration and would only concentrate on guerilla warfare and intimidating violence.

Modes of Operations

To a large extent and given the circumstances, the modes of operation differ between Syria and Iraq. In Syria, the organization is still under attack, especially air strikes, therefore its operations are mostly defensive. Foremost is the hiding of the leadership, headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It is not known if the leadership is stationary or in the move, but it is believed that at least part of it is in the area between Hajeen and al-Susa.[18] As most of the airstrikes are in Syria, this is seriously impeding the movement of the cadres and overall activity there. This activity includes the maintenance of *Madafat* (basic training camps where new recruits are accepted and trained) and underground shelters, occasionally also taking over camps abandoned by other forces, especially SDF. Another aspect is the cooperation with local tribes. Not much is known about it. The area is unpopulated and Daesh does not control any settlement there. Therefore, this aspect does not take a large part of its activity.

Considerably more important is the passage of cadres from Syria to Iraq and, in case of necessity, from Iraq to Syria. The latter serves clearly as “*Ard al-Tamheed*” (preparatory ground) to Iraq, as it did in 2008-2014. The passage to Iraq is a basic interest of Daesh,[19] therefore the location of their last enclave near the border is an asset. Although in this part of the border Iraq built a concrete wall to prevent incursions, the Euphrates river near Abu Kamal creates a crevice through which incursions are possible.[20] The fact that on the Iraqi side only the *Hashd al-Sha’bi* (Popular Mobilization forces, a Shiite militia) is posed is a further advantage for Daesh who threatens local commanders with violence and the latter succumb and allow passage.[21] Sometimes, the passage to Iraq is for defensive purposes and in the event of an offensive by the Coalition on Daesh’s strongholds hundreds might try to cross. Daesh is returning to Iraq by infiltrating their men into internally displaced camps. When these return to their hometowns, the Dawa’ish often return with them. According to uncertified information, members of Daesh returned to their posts in the public service, including the security apparatus and serve as secret eyes and spies for the organization.[22]

Over the last year there was a steady increase in the number of Daesh activities in Iraq. The operation resembles previous terrorist activities, in October 2018, a car bomb exploded in Qiyara, south of Mosul and in November a car bomb exploded in the center of Tikrit, killing and wounding 21 persons. In the two cases, C4 explosive was used, indicating that the organization still holds sufficient quantities of these explosives despite the discovery of most of its depots in Iraq.[23]

The operations in Iraq seem to be more planned than in Syria. They include the targeting of government officials and local collaborators with the government and the security forces in the Sunni countryside. Attacking some villages, Daesh caught the *Mukhtars* (local dignitaries representing the population in its contacts with the government) and executed them on the spot. This act was filmed to extend the circle of fear and to show to other villages that the government would not come to their rescue.[24] Other personal targets are officers in the security services and the *Hashd*, members of local tribes who command tribal units, government officials. These are sometimes killed by the so called “*Saytarat Wahmiya*” (fake checkpoint), whereby IS men disguise themselves in Iraqi army uniforms, put a checkpoint and kill passers by. All these operations are meant to spread terror and establish “triangles of death”.

Most of the operations in Iraq are preparatory. Daesh spots the weakness of the Iraqi security forces in control of the Sunni periphery and orders a return to Iraq. The returning cadres are ordered to contact and reactivate “sleeping cells”, to build *Madafat* and camps in uninhabited desert areas and to start recruiting among the local population. Tunnels are dug in Iraq and across the border to smuggle arms and personnel and for hiding. In mid-2018, the Iraqi military intelligence arrested Kamil al-’Issawi, a new Daesh commander in Falluja. His testimony, published in the Iraqi press, provides information on the organization’s operations in Iraq. According to him, the new *Wali* (IS governor) of Falluja sent orders to Syria calling combatants to return to Iraq. In Falluja they were concentrated in al Karma, north of the city and were instructed to establish *Madafat* in the rural area out of the city, to organize combat units (*Mafariz*) and attack army bases and members of the security forces. They managed to accomplish all of that, using hidden arms.[25] Eventually, all members of his unit were captured. In addition, units of *Inghimasiyun* (cadres who blend into the local population and engage in terror and intimidation) are also increasingly used, indicating a closer connection to the locals. A more difficult task is the connection of all pockets of Daesh in Iraq: Anbar, Center, Hamrin, North of Baghdad. Still unable to accomplish such connection, the organization operates as small enclaves under the command of the leadership in Syria.

A major challenge is the resumption of terrorist attacks in Baghdad or any other major city in Iraq. Such attacks have a much greater resonance than the small-scale warfare and terror in the Sunni backlands, away from the attention of most Iraqis. Baghdad is now encircled by a security belt and obstacles. Yet Daesh, already present in nearby Fallujah and the north of Baghdad, will keep trying to resume presence in Baghdad. It already attacked in the center of Mosul. A solitary car bomb in Baghdad is always a possibility, yet a full-scale resumption of frequent attacks in Baghdad will take more time.

Personnel

It is estimated that the total number of remaining fighters in Daesh is around 25,000, of which 15,000 are in Syria (3,000 active combatants and 12,000 non-active) [26] and 10,000 in Iraq (2,000 active and 8,000 non-active). In addition, it is estimated that 3,000-3,500 unknown fighters returned to Europe.[28] Hoffman quotes a UN report from August 2018 claiming that Daesh still has 30,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria.[27] According to the International Coalition, the number of POWs of Daesh in Iraq and Syria is around 7,000.[29]

Concentrating on commanders, the analysis will follow a previous article on the IS commanders to show the changes.[30] Whereas the previously mentioned article analyzed hundreds of (mostly dead) IS commanders, the current one will examine commanders in 2018, mostly still alive or in Iraqi captivity. I will follow the same methodology and categories used by the author and compare the data. The following table lists the top leadership of Daesh, the so called *al-Lajna al-Mufawada* (Cabinet) under al-Baghdadi.[31]

Table 1: al-Lajna al-Mufawada (IS Cabinet)[32]

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: Caliph, Iraqi
Mithaq Talib al-Janabi (alias: "Abu Omar"): Head of the cabinet and supervisor (<i>Mushrif</i>) of security in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi
Anwar Hamad al-Janabi (alias: "Haji 'Aref"): Deputy head of cabinet. Iraqi
Ahmad 'Abdalla Suweid al-Shammari (alias: "Abu Salih al-Shammari"): Commander of army (<i>Mas'ul Diwan al-Jund</i>), Iraqi
Nashid Fahd al-'Issawi (alias: "Abu Suheib al-'Iraqi"): Head of the security and intelligence (<i>Mas'ul al-Amn wal-Istikhbarat</i>). Iraqi[33]
Rafi Isma'il al-'Asafi (alias: "Abu Sattam"): Head of administration and finance in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi
Mu'taz 'Ali al-'Ithawi (alias: "Abu Yassir al-'Ithawi"): Commander of operations in Iraq. Iraqi
Ibrahim Muhammad al-'Issawi (alias: "Abu Ziyad"): In charge of operations of finance in Iraq. Iraqi
Mustafa Mansur al-Rawi (alias "Abu Talha"): Commander of operations in the Hajeen area. Iraqi
Khidr Ahmad Rashid (alias "Abu Ahmad al-Fanni"): Supervisor of operations in the Iraqi provinces of Nainawa (Mosul) and Salah al-Din. Iraqi
Sukru Tuncer: In charge of operations abroad, French of Turkish origins
Abu 'Ammar al-Sa'udi: Operations abroad, Saudi

Table 2: Nationality of Prominent Commanders [34]

Nationality	#
Iraqi	21
Syrian	3
Saudi	1
European	1

Table 3: Nationality of Commanders

Nationality	#
Iraqi	60
Syrian	4
Kurd	1
Egyptian	1
Saudi	1
European	1
Chechen	1
Uzbek	1
Unknown (most probably Iraqis)	17
Total	88

The previous article also discovered a disproportionate number of Iraqis among the commanders (345 out of 631 among commanders, and 92 out of 129 among prominent commanders). But in 2018 the command of the organization is clearly more Iraqi. The Syrians and the Saudis were almost completely wiped out. The cabinet includes two commanders in charge of operations abroad, showing that Daesh did not lose its interest in global terror (and assigns this to the foreigners), but in general the foreign fighters also faded from the ranks. It is estimated that only one out of 50 fighters (not only commanders) currently is a “*Muhajir*” (foreigner).

Table 4: Pre-2003 Occupations of Iraqi IS Commanders

Occupation	#
Member of Saddam Hussein's security services	4
Religious scholar	1
Unemployed	1
Engineer	1
Physician	1
Fallah	1
Unknown	51

Members of the security services of the Ba'th regime still rank first. During the years 2014-2017 Daesh lost 42 out of its 43 founders, including all the senior officers. The last casualties among the officers were the head of the cabinet Ayad al-'Ubeidi and his deputy Ayad al-Jumaili. They were substituted with much less experienced and charismatic commanders.[35] Two members of the current cabinet were officers under Saddam: Ahmad 'Abdalla al-Shamari, the “chief of staff” and Mu'taz al-'Ithawi, commander of operations in Iraq who is said to specialize in open space warfare. Although no birth dates are available, looking at the pictures of the new commanders, including prominent ones, reveals their young age. Indeed, Iraqi security forces disclose that an increasing number are new recruits and unknown to them. Having members with no significant pre-2003 career indicates that post-2017 Daesh is undergoing a generational change. For these new commanders, the more relevant question is not what they did before 2003, when they were probably too young. Rather, questions of interest include how they joined Jihadi activity after 2003, and when they joined Daesh.

Table 5: Tribal Origin of Iraqi IS Commanders

Tribe	#
Al-Janabiyeen (South of Baghdad and near Tikrit)	5
Jabur (Mosul area)	5
Albu 'Issa (Falluja area)	4
Albu Mar'i (of the Duleim confederation, Rammadi area)	2
Mushahada (north of Baghdad)	2
Zawba' (Falluja area)	2
Albu 'Itha (Rammadi area)	2
Karabla (Al-Qa'im near the border with Syria)	2
Muhamada (Al-Qa'im near the border with Syria)	2
Different tribes (one from each tribe)	20
Unknown	27

Compared to the previous article, this list does not reflect the tribal diversity of Sunni Iraq. The Jabur, possibly Iraq's biggest tribe, lost its prominence: none of the members of the cabinet is a Jaburi. Smaller tribes, notably the Janabiyeen and Albu 'Issa, became more prominent. Significantly, the head of the cabinet and his deputy are from the same tribe, the Janabiyeen[36] and two holders of sensitive positions in the *Lajna* are from the Albu 'Issa. The reasons for the post 2017 prominence of these particular tribes are unknown. In regional terms, the tribes of western Iraq are more represented than other regions, possibly because of the proximity to the Syrian border.

In his article, Zeidel discovered a discrepancy between regional origins of commanders and locations of service: more commanders were serving away from their places of origin. This was particularly noted with foreign fighters and hindered Daesh's ability to effectively govern regions under their control. The available data is not conclusive on this point, but there are indications that the organization—now acting clandestinely and more sensitive to merging in the local environment—is trying to use locals on account of outsiders. Thus, for example, Kamil al-'Issawi, from Fallujah, who was a local commander there before 2018, was instructed to return to Fallujah by the new Wali and restore the organization. His brother, also a Daeshi, remained in Iraq and he contacted him on his return.[37] The list of IS casualties in the January 2019 air raid of the Iraqi air force on the meeting of the military command of the so called "*Wilayat al-Furat*" in the Syrian town Susa allows us to glance at the regional and tribal origins of the commanders: 12 commanders were killed, eight of them Iraqis and of them five were from al-Qa'im, the nearby Iraqi border town. Four of the five were from the two major tribes of al-Qa'im: the Karabla and the Muhammada.[38] This suggests that Daesh is now nominating more locals to operational positions than ever before.

Organization

The survival and persistence of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph is a key element behind the transformation of the organization. At present, Baghdadi is more of a spiritual leader than a Caliph but he represents the ideological core of Daesh and hiding him is a continuous challenge. Al-Baghdadi dedicated a large part of his August 2018 audio recording to organization and warfare, indicating that he is also closely involved in these aspects of activity.[39] His persistence shows an internal cohesion in the ranks of the leadership, prompting Daesh's rivals to undermine it by spreading false information on cracks between al-Baghdadi and some of the leaders.[40] His survival softened the shock of the defeat in Syria and Iraq.

Daesh's 2018 organization gives the impression of slimming. As it is no longer a "state", it is no longer in charge of the various aspects of administration and governance. In 2018 the organization cancelled 14 "ministries" (*Diwan*), including, inter alia, education, agriculture, "spoils of war" (*Ghana'im*), health, services and the moral police (*Hisba*).[41] These "ministries" were, to a large extent, what gave Daesh its unique color. In fact, the *Lajna al-Mufawada* is now playing a more central role. Instead of the "ministries" the organization adopted

a more pyramidal structure, which is highly centralized around the Caliph and the cabinet. The Caliph has a *wali* who serves as his deputy. The *wali* is a member of both of the supreme councils of the organization: *Majlis al-Shura* (The Shura Council) in charge of the ideology and the *Lajna al-Mufawada* (the executive council or cabinet). The *wali* has three deputies:

1. A deputy in charge of security, industry (production of car bombs and artillery) and the special mail and coded communication.
2. A deputy in charge of religious affairs, the pledge of allegiance (*Bay'aa*), jurisprudence and tribes.
3. A deputy in charge of education, services, finance, health and taxes.

Thus, instead of a cabinet of over 14 “ministries”, all these functions are concentrated at the hands of three deputies, under one *Wali*. In addition, Daesh has several “authorities” (*Hay'at*) or bureaus (*Makatib*) in charge of immigration to the “Islamic State”, prisoners of war and martyrs, research, public relations, tribes and connections with distant *Wilayas* (provinces), such as *Wilayat Khurasan* in Afghanistan.[42] It is important to note that Daesh still refers to its organizational structure as a “state”. It may have slimmed the state apparatus, befitting a terror/guerrilla organization, acting clandestinely, but this apparatus still contains all previous functions of the so-called “Islamic State”.

Another important aspect in organization is the *Wilayat* (provinces). In 2016 an IS propaganda film claimed to have 19 *Wilayas* in Iraq and Syria (and 35 *Wilayas* worldwide).[43] Currently, the number of provinces in Iraq and Syria is 18.[44] Not a significant change. Yet, unlike 2014-2017, in most of the provinces, the structure suggests a network of guerrilla fighters and not a local government.[45]

This article is about whatever remained of Daesh in Iraq and Syria. Yet, the fact that the organization still contains some functions of global organization means that it did not lose its global aspirations. Trying to maintain contact with the estimated 3,000-3,500 foreign fighters who returned to Europe is one expression of the survival of the global vision. On the other hand, by 2018 the number of *Wilayas* beyond the core areas of Iraq and Syria was seriously reduced from 16 in 2016 to five: Khurasan (Afghanistan), West Africa, Saudi Arabia (called *al-Haramain*), Yemen and Sinai.[46] From this it would seem that global activity is a secondary priority to Daesh.

Conclusion

To evaluate whether post-2017 Daesh is “a Phoenix” it is important to understand that the organization received a heavy blow in Iraq and Syria. The territorial losses of an organization with a global vision were painful and possibly beyond repair. The losses of able cadres greatly diminished its military and media capabilities. This blow had an impact on the capabilities and the appeal of Daesh in the region and beyond. Daesh certainly did not wish (or expect) to be in this situation. Most of its messages now are meant to preserve whatever is left and prevent a total collapse by promising the cadres to regroup and return, relying on examples from their short history. One should not take this propaganda at face value.

Nevertheless, the organization shows some vitality and considerable steadfastness facing very harsh circumstances, under which other terror organizations would have dissipated. In addition to being a diehard fanatic organization, paradoxically, defeat brought the organization back to its basic essence: a small, marginal Sunni-Iraqi terror/guerrilla force, capable of waging small wars, intimidating populations and carrying out terror attacks in peripheral areas, exploiting the geopolitical and governmental vacuum there. In fact, Daesh became a more practical, matter-of-fact organization. Its organizational changes are impressive. Apparently, this is the heritage of men who served in Saddam Hussein's highly organized security services. The defeat also exposed the fact that Daesh essentially is an Iraqi organization, considering Syria to be only a corridor to “*Ard al-Tamkin*”, Iraq.

As long as the situation in Syria remains as it is and the lethargy of the Iraqi state in providing security to the peripheral Sunni areas continues, Daesh will enjoy more years of survival and might become a more threatening

menace, especially to Iraq. However, Daesh is neither invincible nor imperishable. All sides fighting Daesh are required to improve combat preparation and fighting capabilities in order to keep inflicting further losses upon the organization. There is also a need for better coordination between the various international and local forces, so that a major offensive by the Coalition in Syria would not result in hundreds of Dawa'ish fleeing to unprepared Iraq and posing a grave threat to local security. Iraqi counter terrorism forces have been the best forces to fight Daesh on the ground in Iraq. However, when Daesh withdrew to Syria, this hampered their ability to act. Manning the border with these units and engaging them in operations of "hot pursuit" in Syria will clearly improve the mediocre capabilities of the Iraqi Shiite militias who man the border today. Daesh exploited the war in Syria since its inception. At present, when the Syrian regime (and its allies) seems to have the upper hand, Daesh is cornered in a remote part of the country and is no longer in control of territories in the west and south of the country. As long as the war in the west of Syria is not over, Daesh will continue to use Syrian territories for its endeavors.

In late April 2019, Daesh released a rare video of al-Baghdadi, the second in all. Al-Baghdadi is seen seated in a manner reminiscent of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, Daesh's founder. The video delivered two main messages: that al-Baghdadi is still alive and well, and that the organization is following the path of Zarqawi.[47] Occasionally, the Iraqi military intelligence captures high ranking Dawa'ish, including some who may know on al-Baghdadi's whereabouts.[48] If he hides close to the Iraqi border, he is vulnerable to airstrikes while being moved or to incursions if stationary. If the loss of military commanders such as Abu Omar al-Checheni was irreparable, than the loss of the man who holds Daesh together would be much heavier.

This article contributes to our understanding of how Daesh is adapting to its post-defeat situation.[49] In terms of leadership and personnel, it is now more Sunni Iraqi than international. Attention is given to posting commanders in their home regions. In terms of operations Daesh is a smaller terror and guerilla organization, disposing of the actual governance. In terms of ideology, it is more local and practical and less apocalyptic and global. In terms of organization, it is more pyramidal, although still maintaining pretensions of a “state” and global activity and distribution. The trend certainly is to localization, focusing on Iraq and reverting to clandestine activities. Will the organization pursue this trend to its “logical end” and declare itself a local Sunni Iraqi organization with local claims? If so—and under the leadership of al-Baghdadi this is questionable—it will remain active for some time. However, as such, it would lose the international attention that is so central to Daesh. If not so, its ephemeral existence would finally vanish. We wonder if Daesh is able to accomplish such a basic change of identity.

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Notes

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- [18] Following the taking of the last stronghold of Daesh in Syria in March 2019, none of the leaders, except one, was, captured or killed. The whereabouts of the top leadership is not known and locating al-Baghdadi is one of the top priorities of those who fight ISIS. Hiding the leadership remains a top priority for ISIS.
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- [20] *Almada* (November 24, 2018). Daesh is also digging tunnels under the border in that area. Hisham al-Hashimi, “Taqsir Mawqif Imkaniyat Daesh ‘Aam 2018”, sent to me by email from author
- [21] Hisham al-Hashimi, “Taqsir Mawqif Imkaniyat Daesh ‘Aam 2018”, sent to me via email by author.
- [22] Wa'il Ni'ma, “Mas'ulun: 'Anasir Daesh Ya'udun Li Watha'ifihim al-Hukumiya Wa Rawatibihim al-Mutaa'khira”, *Almada* (March 27, 2019). <https://almadapaper.net/Details/217547/م-س-ب-ت-ا-و-ر-ن-و-م-ل-س-ت-ي-و-ق-و-ك-ح-ل-ا-م-ف-ي-ا-ظ-ول-ن-و-د-و-ع-ي-ش-ع-اد-ر-ص-ان-ع-ن-ول-و-س-م-217547>
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- [25] “Qiyadi fi Daesh Yakshaf Tafaseel lil-Mara al-Ula ‘an Sahat al-Ii'tisam fi al-Anbar”, *New News Iraq*.
- [26] Based on an interview of one of the authors with Iraqi officers in the joint command of the Coalition. With the overthrow of Daesh from its last stronghold in Syria in March 2019, the number of fighters in Syria may have decreased considerably.

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- [30] Ronen Zeidel, "The Dawaish: A Collective Profile of IS Commanders".
- [31] Part of the information in the list was taken from an interview one of the authors did with the director of the Anbar branch of Iraqi military intelligence in February 2019.
- [32] Based on information in the database of Hisham al-Hashimi
- [33] Captured by Coalition forces in east Syria, late March 2019. *Orient-Net* (March 31, 2019). <https://www.orient-news.net/ar/news/show/164836>
- [34] This table will include members of the current cabinet as well as prominent military commanders who are not in the cabinet or were arrested.
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- [36] The supervisor of the *Wilayas* of Dijla, Salah al-din and al-Jazeera and the *Wali* of Salah al-Din in Iraq are also Janabiyeen. Part of the tribe lives in these areas.
- [37] Qiyadi fi Daesh Yakshaf Tafaseel lil-Mara al-Ula 'an Sahat al-Ii'tisam fi al-Anbar", *New News Iraq* (November 7, 2018). <https://newnewsiq.com/view.php?cat=2732> accessed April, 2019.
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- [40] For example, Iraqi sources claimed that al-Baghdadi issued a "death list" of top commanders, blaming them of "treason", *Az-zaman* (October 10, 2018).
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- [45] See tables of the structure of the *Wilayas* of North Baghdad (*Shimal Baghdad*) and Salah al-Din in possession of authors.
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- [48] This was the case of Isma'il al-Ithawi, arrested in February 2018 in Turkey. His last position was the coordinator between Iraq and Syria and in this position, he certainly was involved in hiding al-Baghdadi. This captive was later used by the Iraqi intelligence to lure other high ranking Dawa'ish, captured in April 2018.
- [49] For more analysis on post-defeat Daesh, please see *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. XIII, no. 1 (February, 2019), online at: <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism/archives/2019#volume-xiii-issue-1> (particularly Truls Hallberg Tønnessen's introduction to the special issue, "The Islamic State After the Caliphate"); and Joshua Geltzer, "Why Baghdadi Risked a Video Appearance," *The Atlantic* (May 1, 2019), online at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/baghdadi-video-announces-rebirth-isis/588421/>

Knowing What to Do: Academic and Practitioner Understanding of How to Counter Violent Radicalization

by Daniel Koehler and Verena Fiebig

Abstract

In recent years, the number of counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs has steadily increased, and they belong now to the standard counterterrorism and conflict resolution repertoire of many countries. How is the personnel of these programs trained to perform its duties and what does this tell about the relationship between academic and practitioner understandings of countering radicalization and deradicalization? This article aims at answering these questions by comparing the state of the art in evidence-based radicalization and deradicalization research with a detailed analysis of primary data concerning twelve training courses for personnel in this field. It finds that training courses are significantly disconnected from research. On the other hand, training in this field indicates that the academic literature is not well-grounded in the practical realities of delivering interventions. Both findings reveal the need for a more mutually beneficial relationship that can help improve practitioner training and making (de)radicalization research more practitioner-oriented.

Keywords: Countering Violent Extremism; Personnel Training; Academic & Practitioner Understanding; Conflict Resolution; Deradicalization

Introduction

“Profiling” terrorists has “failed resoundingly”.[1] Scholars studying violent radicalization processes agree that these processes are highly complex and individual, and connected to a range of drivers, influences, and pathways. [2] In the growing field of countering violent extremism (CVE), counter-radicalization and deradicalization initiatives and programs have recently managed to be included in the list of counterterrorism methods and ranked fourth among the top ten future revolutions by Time Magazine in 2008.[3] Some examples include: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2178 (2014) which urges all member states to establish effective rehabilitation measures for returned fighters from Syria and Iraq [4]; the revised “European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy” 2014 which strongly emphasized on “disengagement and exit strategies” [5]; the “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism” presented by the UNSC to the UN General Assembly with more than seventy recommendations including a call to introduce “disengagement, rehabilitation and counseling programs for persons engaged in violent extremism” [6]; the European Commission’s call for the implementation of “de-radicalization” programs under the overall goal to prevent and fight radicalization as an “absolute priority” [7]; and UNSC Resolution 2396 (2017), which continued to call for specific measures to counter terrorism, including CVE activities, such as counter-narrative campaigns and rehabilitation programs.[8]

It is fair to say that programs and strategies that could roughly be described as CVE-specific (i.e., counter-radicalization or deradicalization) or CVE-related (i.e., early prevention), even though vastly different in nature, have gained global significance in the fight against terrorism, recruitment into violent extremism and, by extension, as a key aspect of conflict resolution and peace-making. However, early preventative work is highly complex: “screening and identifying individuals at risk of radicalisation requires training and cannot be carried out as a simple task by teachers or locals without substantially increasing the incidence of false positives.”[9] This holds even more for deradicalization programs. The policy initiatives mentioned above rely necessarily on practitioners capable of recognizing radicalization processes leading to involvement in violent extremism and terrorism (i.e., “violent radicalization”) or the actual degree of radicalization, choosing the adequate intervention strategy and carrying it out effectively with the appropriate tools. However, if the original phenomenon—violent radicalization—is essentially a contested and elusive concept, how can program personnel be trained effectively to counter and reverse it? How deeply is the training rooted in evidence-based research? A comparison between the empirically-informed academic literature on radicalization

and deradicalization processes and detailed primary data on 12 training courses (e.g., course material and curricula) reveals a lack of connection between the two. Training courses are significantly disconnected from evidence-based academic literature and focused on contents that seem more relevant to practice although their effectiveness has never been evaluated scientifically.

On the other hand, current dedicated research does not focus on the contents of training courses. This indicates that the broader academic literature on this topic is not well-grounded in the practical realities of delivering interventions. Research with empirical support in this domain is usually based on interviews and case studies of individuals leaving extremist milieus, rather than on mechanisms and effects of intervention programs. Knowing more about the methods that are deemed necessary by intervention practitioners or training providers can offer policymakers and academics insights on the day-to-day operations and practical realities of this job. These insights can help identify directions for future research that are more relevant for practitioners and aimed at providing political support for counter-radicalization and deradicalization initiatives. Reducing the distance between academic and practitioner understanding of CVE can be mutually beneficial. It can improve and secure sustainable long-term conflict resolution strategies.

The article is structured as follows: first, a review of evidence-based literature in radicalization and deradicalization research will identify the recommended evidence-based components of CVE and deradicalization training courses. Second, after setting forth the methods and sources for data selection and analysis, the sample set of training courses will be presented. Third, both perspectives will be compared and the overlap and discrepancies will be discussed with recommendations to close the gap between the two.

The Academic Perspective: Literature Review and State of the Art

Terms and Definitions

CVE is “an approach intended to preclude individuals from engaging in, or materially supporting, ideologically motivated violence” [10] and comprises “non-coercive attempts to reduce involvement in terrorism.” [11] “CVE” is now widely used in international and national counterterrorism strategies and policies, although it was criticized as being a “catch-all category that lacks precision and focus.” [12] One possible classification used for CVE activities is the “public health model” developed by Caplan [13], which is rooted in clinical psychiatry. “Primary prevention” in this model aims at preventing deviant behavior from occurring in a “non-infected” system. This includes activities aimed, for example, at raising awareness, resilience, or community coherence. It addresses societal issues and is directed to individuals before they get in contact with violent extremist groups and ideologies. “Secondary prevention” aims at averting the consolidation of risk factors (e.g., societal alienation, development of specific grievances, loss of personal significance) or radicalization processes in the early stages. “Tertiary prevention” aims at preventing recidivism to violent extremism or other risk factors in the future, implying that an initial desistance or disengagement has been achieved. Naturally, very different methods and programs fall under these three categories as working with long-term members of extremist groups to induce defection is a completely different task from instructing children about the risks posed by extremist groups.

Although there is no agreement on the inclusion of deradicalization or disengagement within the CVE framework, academics and practitioners have generally included within tertiary prevention activities aimed at achieving defection and avoiding recidivism of (highly) radicalized individuals. [14] Caution regarding this notion was raised, for example, by Koehler [15], who argued that preventing recidivism is just one necessary (and later) part of possible interventions, which should primarily reduce individual physical and psychological commitment to an extremist group and ideology.

Therefore, it would be accurate to see CVE as an umbrella category under which prevention-oriented initiatives (i.e., before a person radicalizes to the point of using violence) and intervention-oriented initiatives (i.e., deradicalization and disengagement of a person who is already radicalized to the point of using violence) are subsumed. Even though the interconnection between radicalization and violence has largely been disputed in the literature, the reference point of violent behavior is nevertheless important for (government funded) P/CVE programs. The first category of initiatives is commonly referred to as “preventing violent extremism”

(PVE) programs and the latter as intervention, counter-radicalization, deradicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, or reintegration programs. This article focuses on the second category, namely, training courses for personnel tasked with intervening on an existing and ongoing violent radicalization process (“counter-radicalization”) and/or guiding the deradicalization and disengagement process of a radicalized person.

Looking at the term “deradicalization,” the most important competing concept is “disengagement,” and both are usually used in combination. Definitions by leading academics show that the main difference between deradicalization and disengagement is the focus on ideology, or more precisely, the psychological side of exiting a violent extremist milieu. Horgan and Braddock [16] define deradicalization as:

the social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues

and disengagement as:

the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change. Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change, that role change may be influenced by psychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced initial involvement. This can lead to a member seeking out a different role within the movement

Braddock [17] points out that deradicalization is a “psychological process through which an individual abandons his extremist ideology and is theoretically rendered a decreased threat for re-engaging in terrorism.”

According to this view, the reduction of ideological commitment (deradicalization) as well as the change of role and consequent decrease in engagement in illegal behaviors (disengagement) are intertwined. However, Horgan [18] notes that even if the goal is reducing the psychological commitment to a violent extremist group, deradicalization does not have to be part of the process and might not even be a likely outcome. Complicating this further, there are two main approaches concerning ideology and its role in entering and leaving extremist milieus: a “narrow” and a “broad” school.[19] Whereas the former wants to achieve the rejection of ideologically-based violence, the latter wishes to dismantle also various other ideological aspects. Furthermore, while it has been argued that disengagement would be more feasible and realistic [20], some scholars have pointed out that in order to reduce recidivism of extremist offenders, it is necessary to address “beliefs and attitudes that drive violent behavior” (Braddock 2014, 60). Not addressing these underlying beliefs and attitudes, as well as the individual’s psychological factors of attraction, might increase the chance of a failed exit process and the risk of re-radicalization.[21]

“Deradicalization” has been used widely to describe both the process of exiting an extremist environment and the wider practical activity conducted through programs or mentors. Prevention- and intervention-oriented tools are used to achieve effects on all levels: preventing further radicalization, decreasing physical and psychological commitment to the radical milieu and thought patterns or ideology, preventing a return to violence and extremism, increasing resilience to extremist ideologies or groups, and assisting in building a new self-sustained life and identity. Given that radicalization is a context-related phenomenon “par excellence” [22], countering it is context-related too, which means that “deradicalisation should not be considered a psychological return to some pre-radicalised state” [23] but as a development of a new identity in itself.

Existing Literature on CVE/Deradicalization Training

The academic literature on CVE and deradicalization has not treated the issue of personnel training in detail so far. Only one previous study briefly discusses the variety of different professions employed in CVE and deradicalization, as well as some of the key problems faced in training the staff for this highly complex task.[24]

Nevertheless, recommendations for policymakers and practitioners, such as “good practice guides,” mention

the need to train CVE and deradicalization personnel in order to achieve the desired effects. In 2013, the “Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders” stated that the quality of any prison-based rehabilitation program for violent extremists is, among other factors, dependent on the level of training received by the personnel.[25] Furthermore, the European Union Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) has also focused on the question of training practitioners, which is seen as “invaluable in any effort to prevent and counter radicalisation.”[26] A dedicated RAN conference on this issue resulted in the 2017 “RAN Handbook on CVE/PVE training programmes,” based on “trainers’ experience of what works and what doesn’t.”[27] It was noted that most of these training programs within the European Union are not evaluated.[28] This RAN handbook covers practical steps in delivering training programs, such as how to select trainers, how to make the program more engaging, or how to embed the training in national strategies. Informal internal and formal external evaluation as part of the quality assurance of these training programs are recommended.[29] The handbook, however, does not provide any recommendations for potential contents or a theoretical basis for designing a course. Instead, it recommends a “good needs assessment” [30] while setting up a new training program, implying that the training should serve to deliver what the target audience requests. The notion that the training contents should be primarily based on the practitioner’s perspective is strengthened further by stating that the trainer should be an “experienced practitioner” (RAN 2017, 7). The handbook states that “multi-agency cooperation (...) is needed to deal with the multi-causal and multifaceted phenomenon of radicalisation.”[31]

Training practitioners has also been considered integral to the quality of both rehabilitation programs for ordinary offenders [32] and deradicalization programs at large.[33] This is where the question of personnel’s training is connected to the more significant and much more contested issue of evaluating the quality and outcomes of CVE and deradicalization programs. It is beyond the scope of this article to review that particular debate, which has been done elsewhere.[34] Here, it suffices to note that the discourse on evaluation, quality standards, conceptual clarity or even a widely shared understanding of goals and contents of CVE and deradicalization activities has only marginally progressed and the overwhelming majority of programs in this field have not been scientifically evaluated.[35] Consequently, this poses a severe problem for basing personnel training contents solely on the practitioners’ perspectives (i.e., a mostly non-evaluated albeit often experience-based opinion) as suggested by the RAN handbook. This clearly shows the necessity of an evidence-based foundation for CVE and deradicalization program personnel training.

Furthermore, the lack of evaluation of practical CVE and deradicalization activities also creates additional problems since “the proposed mechanisms through which these programmes are supposed to work are often vague or rest on untested assumptions despite the fact that “getting it wrong” can have dramatic iatrogenic effects and possibly contribute to further radicalisation.”[36] As more programs with an increasing number of staff members are financed and brought into contact with potentially high-risk subjects, this aspect might even constitute a new security risk on its own (i.e., poorly designed programs with inadequately trained personnel handling potentially dangerous recipients). This is especially true if these programs work without the necessary conceptual basis and quality standards. One particularly worrying aspect is that the demand for specialized personnel has likely outpaced the available pool of experienced practitioners, meaning that the training of CVE and deradicalization personnel has become a key priority and challenge to meet the increasing popularity of CVE and deradicalization programs in counterterrorism, conflict resolution, and peace-making.

Reviewing the State of the Art in Radicalization and Deradicalization Research

Terrorism research in general and studies looking at violent radicalization processes in particular have been criticized for the dearth of empirical evidence through primary data.[37] This situation appears to have changed drastically in the last decade. Schuurman [38] found that “the use of primary data has increased considerably and is continuing to do so.” Echoing this notion, Gøtzsche-Astrup [39] states that “the field has matured to allow for a focus on evaluating theories on their empirical merits.” However, this does not mean that all or even most of the research on violent radicalization processes is evidence-based or derived from solid primary data. Since most practical activities of CVE and deradicalization programs have never been evaluated for effectiveness, it is essential for the field to look for empirical evidence in the existing research literature to provide a solid foundation for those activities. Therefore, we selected meta-studies summarizing the state of

the art in the field based on empirical evidence or those publications based on accumulated primary data for our literature review.

Gøtzsche-Astrup's [40] meta-analysis focusing on internal and external validity of theoretical approaches has identified eight psychological mechanisms of radicalization with strong empirical evidence:

- Radicalization is based on normal psychological mechanisms rather than psychopathology
- Motivational processes rather than instrumental calculations of risk and reward
- Negative life experiences that cause the individual to search for meaning in life and answers to other fundamental questions
- Experience of fundamental uncertainty or loss of meaning or significance
- The shift in social identity toward a single social group rather than many
- Small group dynamics drive the process to behavioral extremes
- Heightened dispositional anxiety, aggression, and impulsivity
- "Sacred values" involved in later stages of radicalization

Gøtzsche-Astrup [41] recommended specific practices for micro-social intervention programs (i.e., CVE and deradicalization), in particular: motivation-focused approaches, mentoring methods to help the subject cope with negative life experiences and protecting against fundamental uncertainty, skill-building to handle fundamental life tasks (e.g., education, employment) to prevent a loss of personal significance, and approaches tailored to individual needs and personalities.

Additional recommendations for practitioner training can be made regarding the small group dynamics for radicalization processes. Detailed knowledge of the subcultural and ideological frameworks used in these extremist milieus and small group contexts is essential. Not only is it necessary to recognize visual signs (e.g., codes and symbols, clothing brands, specific language, activities) of adherence to extremist milieus and ideologies in order to assess the risk and radicalization level of the individual, it is also necessary to understand his/her specific relationship with the group and the collective dynamics involved.[42] Together with the specific ideology of the milieu or extremist group behind a person's radicalization, subcultural products and activities (e.g., rallies, concerts) form a dynamic "radical contrast society," which Koehler [43] defined as "the mechanisms involved in the interactions between a Radical Social Movement and its surrounding environment," which needs to be studied and understood by CVE and deradicalization personnel to hand-tailor, plan, and execute a sustainable exit from that social and ideological environment. A radical contrast society includes the physical recruitment infrastructure on the one hand (e.g., activities like concerts and rallies, clothing, music, codes and symbols) and the ideologically defined goals, methods, and enemies of the radical group on the other. Its relevance is based on the assumption that individual and collective identities can become "fused" in extremism and terrorism and are therefore interdependent.[44] Individual deradicalization counseling cannot be isolated from the group dynamics behind radicalization. Hence, it appears to be essential for CVE and deradicalization program personnel to be able to include in the counseling the social identity perspective of their users and their specific relationship with the group or milieu in question.

While these practical recommendations might be suited for CVE and deradicalization interventions (i.e., targeting a radicalization process while it is ongoing), they do not automatically hold for deradicalization interventions. Gøtzsche-Astrup [45] acknowledges this, saying that "although the two processes may be related, there is no necessary connection between the mechanisms leading to and from radicalisation." Although some studies have found that certain motives involved in the entry process are connected to the decision to leave an extremist environment [46], exiting is not just "reversing the radicalization".[47] The potential recipients for deradicalization interventions are remarkably diverse, and no well-defined profiles exist.[48] Consequently, leaving such milieus is also likely to be a unique mixture of individual factors. Unfortunately, no studies have evaluated the empirical validity of the deradicalization mechanisms on the lines of what Gøtzsche-Astrup [49]

has done for radicalization mechanisms. This shows that studies on radicalization are far more grounded in the empirical evidence than deradicalization studies and that exit processes are still “not well understood”.[50]

Nevertheless, some reviews of empirical studies on deradicalization do exist. Dalgaard-Nielsen [51], for example, was able to identify sixteen academic articles and books published between 1990 and 2012, based on a total of 216 interviews with former members of various extremist or terrorist groups. Daalgard-Nielsen [52] identified three key themes in these studies: “ideological doubt, doubt related to group and leadership issues, and doubt related to personal and practical issues.” Her specific practical recommendations for external intervention providers are that they:

should stay close to the potential exiter’s own doubt, make the influence attempt as subtle as possible, use narratives and self-affirmatory strategies to reduce resistance to persuasion, and consider the possibility to promote attitudinal change via behavioral change as an alternative to seek to influence beliefs directly.[53]

More specifically, this should be done through “humanization of the enemy, de-idealizing violence, leveraging internal strain in the extremist groups, leveraging bad leadership and/or personal and practical issues such as guilt feelings, longing for a normal life, and burnout,” as well as through increased contact with the world outside.[54] These approaches have a correspondence in factors motivating individuals to exit terrorism, and this has been established by empirical research. Altier, Thoroughgood, and Horgan [55] for example identified unmet expectations, disillusionment with strategy or actions, disillusionment with personnel, difficulty with clandestine lifestyle, inability to cope with violence, loss of faith in the ideology, burnout, competing loyalties, employment/educational demands or opportunities, family demands/desires, positive interactions with moderates, financial incentives, and amnesty as the most commonly identified motivational factors in deradicalization research. In a later analysis of eighty-seven autobiographies of former terrorists [56], this list was narrowed down to “disillusionment with the group’s strategy or actions, disagreements with group leaders or members, dissatisfaction with one’s day-to-day tasks, and burnout” as those factors were cited more often by the former extremists. Again, these factors point to practical methods such as communication tools to induce self-awareness and reflection on the disillusionment, psychological counseling to cope with burnouts or other mental health issues and mentoring to provide alternative lifestyles and skills.

Direct confrontational communicative strategies in deradicalization are questionable and carry a high risk of backfiring.[57] Hence, the ability to adapt the counseling communication to the users’ preferences should be a crucial part in the training of CVE and deradicalization program personnel, in order to identify the most effective ways of creating cognitive openings without appearing coercive.

Lessons Learned from Research on Deradicalization Program Activities

In addition to the academic literature focusing on individual entry and exit processes, some empirical evidence exists regarding practical activities of programs intended to counter violent radicalization and facilitate deradicalization. However, comparative studies are rare, also because of the notorious lack of transparency and data accessibility of most of such programs.[58] In one of the first comparative assessments of different approaches to deradicalization, Rabasa et al. [59] found that the programs perceived to be effective by their stakeholders were active on the pragmatic, ideological, and affective levels. While the pragmatic level refers to all physical reintegration methods (e.g., vocational training, trauma therapy, and drug therapy), the ideological level refers to the critical assessment of underlying worldviews or psychological commitment to extremist environments. Finally, the affective level aims to establish a new pro-social emotionally supportive environment around the individual. The notion that holistic approaches to CVE and deradicalization are more effective than single focus interventions has found some support in the literature [60] and is also reflected in the diversity of methods used in CVE and deradicalization work.[61] However, questions such as which methods are more useful in comparison to others, and why, when, and how they are used has not been assessed so far; there are only mostly descriptive accounts of “what is being done” and “what is considered successful by practitioners”. [62] A first systematization of the methods typically used in CVE and deradicalization was done by Koehler. [63] According to his review of programs worldwide, the available methods usually include: 1) ideological/theological deconstruction of extremist worldviews, 2) integration in social work, 3) psychological/psychiatric

counseling or treatment, 4) educational tools (e.g., vocational training or fostering critical thinking skills and background knowledge), and 5) creative arts and sports. The expected effect of each of the tools under these five categories and their purposes remain speculative in most cases.

A necessary precondition for the application of different methods and tools in CVE and deradicalization activities is that the selection of the appropriate method is based on an assessment of the specific needs and risks related to each subject in order to achieve a user-method-match.[64] This essentially mirrors the widely shared notion of the contextual and individual nature of violent radicalization and deradicalization processes, namely, that there is “no one size fits all” approach. Hence, an intake approach identifying individual needs and driving factors or risks for the success of the exit process seems inevitable for every new recipient.[65]

This directly points to the absolute relevance of risk-assessment tools for CVE and deradicalization personnel. By definition, the recipients of CVE and deradicalization activities include, among others, highly radicalized individuals with a previous history of violent crimes and terrorism. These individuals are often seen as high-risk persons for a country’s national security and hence draw significant concern from law enforcement authorities, intelligence, the general public, and policymakers. Risk-assessment is a contested topic within the academia, and the lack of empirical support and evidence resulting in questionable predictive validity is usually and correctly pointed out.[66] A recent literature review of the risk factors associated with terrorism concluded that “there is insufficient evidence (...) that any of these variables are empirically supported risk factors” and that “some widely accepted “risk” factors have limited empirical support for their association with terrorism”.[67] Nevertheless, structured professional judgment tools, such as the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA2-R) or the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG 22+) have been introduced and used widely in counterterrorism and are making their way into CVE and deradicalization activities as well.[68] Independent of the accuracy and scientific support behind such tools, Sarma [69] suggested that

One should not “value” risk assessment solely on its ability to correctly predict those who will and will not become involved in terrorism later. Rather, one should think more broadly about the opportunity to systematize the collection and processing of information.

Hence, the value of the application of risk-assessment tools for CVE and deradicalization programs might be the structured and comparable collection of case manager assessments of factors relevant to the successful rehabilitation during the intake process and monitoring of overall progress. These tools might also help develop better programs in light of scrutiny and fears of stakeholders regarding these high-risk users.

Another aspect identified in this regard is the ability of personnel to handle high-threat scenarios. Individuals (and their affective environment) who quit violent extremist or terrorist groups might become a target of punishment out of revenge or to protect the group’s interests. In theory, this danger to personal safety might also stretch to the personnel of CVE and deradicalization activities. While very little research has been conducted to shed light on the process of social pressure (including punitive violence) toward defectors from terrorism and violent extremism [70], existing studies on the topic indicate the need for CVE and deradicalization personnel to be trained in assessing the specific threat associated with handling specific cases and how to manage those threats (e.g., designing safety protocols and an individual security framework).

This complex and individual nature of deradicalization and the subsequent plurality of methods used is also echoed in recent research portraying sustainable rehabilitation of former extremists as a process spanning multiple aspects of a person’s identity and life. Barrelle [71] based her “pro-integration” model on five distinct change processes: social relations, coping, identity, ideology, and action orientation. Based on the individual preferences, goals and pre-exit background, every subject will, according to Barrelle, achieve different results in each field, creating a more or less unique integration recipe and framework.

Psychological and mental health counselling are also described as a standard part of CVE and deradicalization work.[72] Even though the role of mental health disorders and psychopathologies in violent radicalization processes is very much disputed, for example along the lines of group-based extremists [73] vs. lone actors [74], some studies have suggested specific dominant personality traits among violent extremists and terrorists.[75] It has also been found that membership in terrorist or violent extremist groups can also increase the likelihood of

developing mental health issues.[76] Hence, basic knowledge of recognizing and handling basic mental health problems (e.g., by referral to specialists) seems essential for CVE and deradicalization program personnel.

Finally, based on existing research on some practical aspects of CVE and deradicalization activities, detailed knowledge of the criminal justice system, judiciary processes, criminal procedure or probation system is recommended, in order to give adequate advice and counsel, as well as to be clear about personnel's roles and responsibilities.[77] The role of CVE and deradicalization staff must be differentiated from that of legal counsel. Nevertheless, awareness of the basic legal procedures is essential in CVE and deradicalization activities to ensure responsible collaboration with the criminal justice system wherever necessary.

Synthesis of the Literature Review

Based on the review presented above, it is possible to identify a list of key skills and tasks for practitioners of CVE and deradicalization activities which directly relate to the focus of this article. It is noteworthy that evidence-base and empirical foundations in radicalization and deradicalization research are overwhelmingly considered as comprising interviews with active and former violent extremists and terrorists to assess their trajectories in and out of radicalism. This is not a complete list, in any case.

Practitioners should be trained in:

- Basic legal knowledge (e.g., criminal justice system, criminal procedures, probation system);
- Knowledge regarding the ideological content and subcultural products of the forms of extremism to be targeted;
- Motivational factors in radicalization and deradicalization processes identified in research;
- Psychological processes of radicalization and deradicalization at the individual and collective levels;
- Collective/group psychology and dynamics, fused identities;
- Identifying and handling forms of mental health issues, such as trauma or personality disorders;
- Case management tools such as intake procedures, risk-need-assessment, and threat analysis;
- Communication strategies, argumentation techniques, de-escalation methods, rhetoric;
- Counselling methods, for example, systemic counselling addressing the multi-causality of entry and exit processes;
- Statutory and non-statutory social, educational, and psychological services;
- Knowledge of the potential impact of creative arts and sports;
- Assessment and delivery of pragmatic support (e.g., vocational education, addiction treatment);
- Methods helping increase the subject's sense of recognition, significance, and individual identity;
- Family and pro-social network support (affective environment stabilization).

The Practitioner's Perspective: CVE and Deradicalization Training Courses

Methods, Sources, and Data Sample

This part of the article is based on a collection of primary data from 12 training courses for CVE and deradicalization practitioners of various professions (e.g., law enforcement, prison staff, social workers, teachers, psychologists). The courses were identified through an open source search using relevant keywords (e.g., "training," "CVE," "deradicalization," and "countering extremism"), snowball sampling [78], and a widely disseminated call for recommendations from experienced practitioners and academics in the CVE and

deradicalization landscape (total number of persons contacted: $n=44$) about known training courses. For the purpose of the snowball sampling, experienced practitioners and academics were asked to refer to existing training courses and to provide other contacts, which then led to additional recommended courses and contacts. The sampling was conducted internationally. The criteria for identifying potentially relevant academics and practitioners focused on expertise in the practical aspects of CVE and deradicalization, as demonstrated by a track record of peer-reviewed journal articles or books on this topic published by an academic press, or by the individual's practical involvement in these activities for more than five years.

Only a few contacted practitioners and academics ($n=13$) knew any courses at all, indicating that either only very few training courses for practitioners exist in this field or those courses are largely unknown to the academic and practitioner community. It was also unknown whether their contents and concepts reflected the current state of the art in radicalization and terrorism research or if they were more or less based on widely held assumptions about what "everyone needs to know."

Naturally, the training course designs reflect original goals and aims of each institution behind them, ranging, for example, from "raising fundamental awareness" to "train fully capable case managers." The main requirement for the inclusion in the sample was that the target audience of each training course was expected to perform either CVE or deradicalization duties after the completion of the training, which can be described as 1) identifying cases of existing and ongoing violent radicalization, 2) assessing the situation according to responsibilities and potential risks, and 3) choosing the appropriate course of action (e.g., report, intervene, connect to a third party). This, in our view, formed the basis for comparability, even though the courses naturally differ greatly in scope, length and content. Using these criteria, 12 out of 17 identified training courses were selected for the analysis sample and five courses were excluded because they did not meet the selection criteria (e.g. focused on primary prevention or general awareness). These courses were not exclusively directed at a certain profession in terms of their audience. They were disconnected from particular types of intervention programs. Various professional audiences working on different types of programs (e.g., governmental prison-based, civil society-based exit programs handling self-referrals) as well as those practitioners who were tasked with handling potential radicalization cases within a larger statutory system (e.g., education, mental health, and probation) could attend these training courses.

The underlying training concepts are typically seen as specific skillsets and competitive advantages of certain organizations, some of which see such training programs as their main product and source of financial income. Hence, their detailed course contents are usually not available openly. To address this issue, the anonymity of the institutions carrying out the training was assured and no specific details of the coursework (e.g. names of training providers, list of modules, identification of specific theoretical approach or provider copy righted counseling models) are reported here in order to protect the programs' competitive advantages (e.g., in applying for governmental funding or in competing with other training providers) and to avoid conflicts of interest (e.g. to appear recommending or advertising for certain training courses).

Through that approach, it was possible for the authors to obtain relevant data on the courses such as the specific curricula, training material, evaluation questionnaires (if conducted), and specific module contents or underlying rationale (if existing). The sample included only one training course from each institution, although some were offering different courses for different audiences and with different foci. Even though the sample can, therefore, not be seen as representative of the CVE and deradicalization training landscape in general, we are confident that we were able to assess a sample of the most widely used and known courses in the field since both open search as well as practitioner and academic facilitation did not produce any other courses. Institutions offering more than one training course were asked to share information on their "flagship" or key programs.

For all identified and selected courses, information was collected on the type of program (i.e., governmental, non-governmental, multilateral network [i.e. an international network of governmental and/or non-governmental actors], public-private-partnership [i.e. cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors on a nation state level]), the duration of the course, if any external certification exists, if the program is evaluated (either through internal self-evaluation, by external evaluators, or not at all), if the program targets one specific

extremist ideology or multiple ones, about the delivery method (i.e., online or physical presence or both) and finally, the specific course content, as these factors were deemed essential to assess the characteristics of the training course sample as best as possible. The course material was then transferred into abstract categories (e.g., “specific extremist ideology,” “institution-specific counseling model”) in order to protect potentially sensitive material or concepts. A training module on the Salafi-Jihadist ideology, for example, was categorized as “specific extremist ideology.”

The Data Basis

The 12 training courses in the sample (for an overview, see Table 1) consist of four governmental, three multilateral-network-based, two non-profit/non-governmental, two academic, and one public-private-partnership-based course. Nine of the 12 programs were based on in-class attendance, two were fully online courses, and one used a combination of in-class and online resources.

The duration of the courses ranged from 45 minutes for the entire course (online and self-paced) to 24 days (for those requiring in-class attendance). The average duration (this excluded the two online courses because the duration depended on the trainees themselves) was 8.2 days. Only two of the 12 courses were externally certified for quality control by an education specialist institution or service (e.g., a governmental education ministry or a national board of education providers). Nine out of 12 courses relied on internal self-evaluation. Two courses did not use any formal evaluation method and only one was evaluated by an external and independent organization. Although the majority of courses used some form of evaluation, the sample indicates a lack of high-quality external evaluations in the field of CVE and deradicalization, which mirrors the current situation in the practical field in general.[79] Five courses focused on Salafi-Jihadism as the target form of violent extremism, six included multiple forms of violent extremism with a comparative perspective, and one focused on the extreme right. No course provider outlined how the course contents were tailored to suit different attendees. The process of selecting the training contents remained unclear. It appears likely that contents selection was mainly driven by the providers' discretion.

Table 1: Overview of the Sample Training Courses

No.	Institution	Duration	Externally Certified	Evaluated (Self, External, None)	Target/Main Focus	Delivery
1	Multilateral Network	4 Days	No	Self	Multiple Extremist Milieus	Physical
2	Multilateral Network	10 Days	No	Self	Multiple Extremist Milieus	Physical
3	Multilateral Network	5 Days	No	Self	Multiple Extremist Milieus	Online and Physical
4	Governmental	24 Days	No	Self	Multiple Extremist Milieus	Physical
5	Governmental	4 Days	No	None	Extreme Right	Physical
6	Governmental	Self-Paced, 45 Minutes	No	Self	Multiple Extremist Milieus	Online
7	Governmental	20 Days	No	Self	Salafi-Jihadism	Physical
8	Academic	Self-Paced, 4 Hours	No	Self	Multiple Extremist Milieus	Online
9	Academic	5 Days	Yes	Self	Salafi-Jihadism	Physical
10	Public Private Partnership	3 Days	Yes	None	Salafi-Jihadism	Physical
11	Non-Profit/NGO	9 Days	No	External	Salafi-Jihadism	Physical
12	Non-Profit/NGO	4 Days	No	Self	Salafi-Jihadism	Physical

The translation of the course material into abstract components resulted in the identification of thirty-three categories that can be interpreted as a collection of critical skills and knowledge for CVE and deradicalization personnel in the perspective of either the training providers or the practitioners themselves, who might have requested this specific content. Table 2 presents the thirty-three categories and their distribution across the sample courses. Five content categories appeared in at least half of the sample: the psychology of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism (e.g., motivational factors, entry processes); the psychology of CVE and deradicalization (e.g., motivational factors, exit processes); subcultures and lifestyles (e.g., visual and behavioral indicators, codes and symbols, clothing, music, specific activities); specific counselling methods; and specific extremist ideology (e.g., Salafi-Jihadism, or the extreme right). Focusing on one specific form of violent extremism, teaching about its subcultural environments and identifying its essential elements, explaining entry and exit processes, and then including specific counselling methods, appears to be a straightforward and efficient way to train practitioners in the minimum amount of time.

Except for one training course which entirely specialized on program development, all included a module on radicalization and/or recruitment into violent extremism. However, only eight courses included a module on exit processes, CVE, or deradicalization. In one case, it included a component on specific early prevention processes. Therefore, three CVE and deradicalization training courses were completely missing any specific content on CVE and deradicalization.

As six courses did not focus on a specific extremist ideology but rather included various types, it is also fair to say that a multi-phenomenological approach to CVE and deradicalization training might be quite common. Of the six courses focusing on a single extremist ideology, five targeted Salafi-Jihadism. This might indicate that this ideology represents the most significant security threat or that this is the context in which there is the greatest need to educate program personnel.

Seven courses included specific counseling methods and focused mainly on systemic counseling, which is often deemed essential by intervention practitioners. Other methods included “change talk” and “change psychology,” which are communication methods that form a part of motivational interviewing by trying to capitalize on and strengthening the recipient’s motivation for change.

Only four courses included an institution-specific, sometimes copyrighted, CVE and deradicalization model, which was advertised as a key competitive advantage over other concepts.

Another, albeit rarely used, component in the selected training courses consisted of case exercises or dummy cases to help practice approaches and methods. Only four training courses included this tool, which seems to be a logical way to enhance the educational value and effects of the training.

Table 2. Overview of Training Courses' Contents

Training Course No:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Psychology of Radicalization/Recruitment Processes (Push and Pull Factors)	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Prevention Basics	X		X								X	X
CVE/Deradicalization Processes/Psychology	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X	
Program Specific Model	X			X	X	X						
Good Practices	X											
Case Studies	X			X		X						
Role of Family	X			X								
Legal Basics	X			X	X	X	X					
Safety and Security	X			X								
Program Development		X							X			
Governance				X								
Risk Assessment				X								
Subcultures/Lifestyles (Visual and Behavioral Indicators)			X	X	X	X	X			X		
Social Media			X	X					X			
Case Management/Decision Making				X	X		X					X
Open Source Intelligence				X								
Specific Counseling Methods (e.g., Systemic Counseling, Motivational Interviewing, Change Talk)			X	X	X		X			X	X	X
Monitoring				X			X		X			
Racism					X							
Coping with Resistance					X							
Pluralizing Worldviews				X	X							
Mental Health						X						
Role of the Community/Local Partners				X			X	X	X		X	
Specific Extremist Ideology			X	X			X		X	X	X	X
Service Delivery									X			
Basics Islam				X			X			X	X	X
Case Exercise				X						X	X	X
Gender Specific Issues				X							X	
Argumentation/Rhetoric				X							X	
Foreign Terrorist Fighters				X								X
Groups vs. Lone Actors				X								X
Evaluation Techniques				X			X					
Children and Minors				X								

Comparing the Academic and Practical Perspectives

While comparing the categories used in CVE and deradicalization training programs with the list of recommended contents derived from the academic literature on the topic, it becomes clear that many components with a stiff backing in the academic literature have not been considered in the training courses. Especially, content about collective and group dynamics, creative arts and sports, pragmatic support structures and methods to increase the user's sense of significance are absent from the sample. Other components, which appeared to be significant in the literature were identified only once in the sample, for example, mental health, risk assessment, argumentation, and rhetoric skills. Even the role of the family of recipients only appeared twice in the sample. Nine out of the 14 training content components derived from the academic literature did not appear or only rarely (once or twice) appeared in the sample, indicating that counter-radicalization and deradicalization training courses are significantly disconnected from the knowledge base in research. One reason for this might be that the courses are more attuned to economic constraints and content requested by

the audiences. As pointed out before, such content comes from a mostly unverified field and thereby harbors the risk of including ineffective or even counter-productive practices. On the other hand, a large portion of the training components used in the field did not appear to a significant degree in the academic evidence-based literature, indicating that the wider academic literature is not well-grounded in the practical realities of delivering interventions.

Discussion and Conclusions

This paper tackled the issue of delivering adequate CVE and deradicalization program personnel training, and investigated the relationship between the academic literature on the topic and the contents of personnel training courses. When revisiting one of the core assumptions of this article—that identifying individuals at risk of radicalization and intervening appropriately is no simple task and requires significant expertise—the average training course duration of 8.2 days and the fact that many courses are limited to rather general knowledge make it hard to conclude that this kind of specialized knowledge (i.e., beyond rudimentary awareness) can be effectively gained within such trainings. Even the most extensive course (spanning 24 days) seems insufficient to acquire the skills and knowledge to effectively “deradicalize” a hard-core extremist. This directly points to a significant structural problem in the CVE and deradicalization field and underlines the need for more extensive and better structured training.

While comparing the 33 identified categories used in 12 training courses with the list of recommended contents derived from the evidence-based research literature, it becomes clear that many components recommended in the academic literature are not included in the training courses. Hence, it appears that existing courses are significantly disconnected from the academic state of the art but also that research in this area does not address the practical realities and needs of the intervention providers. This points to a shortcoming in this research field: empirical studies have mostly focused on personal narratives of active or former extremists and terrorists and have derived their findings and recommendations from this material. Recommended practices for intervening on violent radicalization do not, however, automatically follow from these accounts, since the focus lies on individual experiences and not the user-program relationship. The interaction between the intervention programs, their staff, and the final recipients represents an analytical level that is significantly different from what the majority of research in this field has considered thus far. Even if certain practices can be recommended based on individual accounts of former terrorists, this does not imply that the recommendations can be generalized. The background of the program (e.g., governmental), the personality and training of the mentor, even the way a specific approach is communicated toward the final users, might fundamentally alter the actual effects of the approach. If, for example, finding a new job would be advisable for a subject, the simple fact that this suggestion comes from a governmental intervention program might determine psychological reactance from that subject, who is used to an environment that is hostile to the government. In sum, the program-tool-recipient nexus with its logic and interactions must become the focus of CVE and deradicalization research to understand how exit processes from terrorism and violent extremism can be facilitated more effectively.

These findings, however, are subject to some limitations. First, the small data sample of 12 CVE and deradicalization training courses is only partly representative of the training landscape and does not allow for general conclusions. More detailed research on personnel’s training in this field is needed. Even though the method used in this study to search for courses did not yield more than 17 courses, it is likely that there are, in fact, more courses. Furthermore, the present assessment is based on the information provided by the training institutions themselves. Feedback from the participants regarding the value of the training programs and the long-term applicability and practicability in CVE and deradicalization activities might prove very insightful to complement the findings from this article. A third limitation lies in the connection between the training courses and the academic literature. It is difficult to determine whether it is more beneficial for course providers to base the course contents on the state of the art in the academic literature or on the demands of the training participants, for example, simply out of economic reasons. As shown by the 33 identified components, which are largely absent from the relevant research literature, there is a gray zone constituted by what practitioners (or training providers) believe to be necessary for their work, and what the empirical research has identified as relevant. Nevertheless, as pointed out throughout this article, it is our firm stand that CVE and deradicalization activities (in fact, all CVE work) should be evidence-based to avoid counter-productive effects and to “do-no-

harm.” Since most of the practical activities in this field have not been scientifically evaluated for their effects so far, we see no alternative than basing program personnel training on the components that have a strong empirical base.

This does not mean that there should be no room for the practical realities and demands of the intervention practitioners. On the contrary, this article has identified a range of components widely used in the training courses, providing an insight into what is considered essential practical knowledge in the field. Based on these insights, it is possible to formulate key recommendations for future research to become more relevant for practitioners.

An essential strategy to professionalize existing programs and make their practical experiences transferrable consists in encouraging a more in-depth exploration and assessment of specific methods and activities within CVE and deradicalization programs according to their type, target groups, and effects. Recent studies by Williams et al. [80] or Webber et al. [81] provide first still rare examples of how specific methods used in CVE and deradicalization activities can be experimentally tested and assessed. It would be worthwhile, for example, starting with the thirty-three identified training components from the existing sample and assess their roles and effects for CVE and deradicalization, in order to move the research closer to the practical field. Furthermore, the actual distribution of these training components in the field should be explored. It might be the case that those methods and components taught through the training courses do not have much application in the practical work, which would add another layer of investigation to the research question of what is being done by CVE and deradicalization activities and why.

This article’s results directly contribute to filling the knowledge gap between academic and practitioner understandings of CVE and deradicalization and the day-to-day operations involved in it. By learning more about how program personnel are trained it is possible for academics to get a sense of the practical methods that are deemed essential. This identifies activities and methods that need empirical validation to make research more relevant for practitioners. Intervention providers on the other hand, learned about the academic state of the art in relation to their own practical field and whether their practices are based on the empirical evidence used in research literature. It is finally strongly recommended to make the research outputs in this domain more accessible for practitioners and to provide more evaluative and comparative research methods to test the actual value of the strategies introduced in the training courses and potentially used in the field.

The main practical implication of this article’s findings is to ground program staff training in evidence-based content as far as possible without compromising on the practical relevance for the course audiences. The findings imply that practical recommendations derived from individual pathways out of violent extremism and terrorism do not necessarily hold much relevance for intervention providers as their activities appear to form a heretofore unexplored realm of mutual interactions between the program and the recipient. Finally, in order to effectively address the practical issues arising from the findings presented here, the creation of university level B.A. or M.A. degree-based courses focused on practical CVE and deradicalization seems highly advisable. This would allow for a sufficient time span to acquire the necessary knowledge, as well as include an adequate quality assurance mechanism (e.g., course content designed, conducted and supervised by senior academics and/or practitioners, written and oral examinations, research assignments and final theses). It would furthermore allow for the opportunity to gain field experiences—for example, through internships or fieldwork with P/CVE programs. In any case, the current situation in the CVE and deradicalization field regarding professionalization and quality assurance is inadequate and worrying, given the specific challenges and risks of the clientele.

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Blurred Lines: The New ‘Domestic’ Terrorism

by Gregory D. Miller

Abstract

The apparent growth of lone wolf violence, combined with the increased use of social media to recruit new members, contributes to a blurring of the line between domestic and international terrorism. Where a relatively simple distinction used to suffice for scholars, we are seeing more frequent attacks, traditionally classified as domestic terrorism, but that receive inspiration from a foreign ideology or global movement. This article examines some of these trends related to social media and solo perpetrators, and suggests the use of the term “transnational terrorism”, to account for the growing incidence of terrorist attacks that do not fit properly into either existing category.

Keywords: domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, lone wolf, self-radicalization

Introduction

Research on political violence often distinguishes between two categories of terrorism: domestic and international. For example, the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset focuses exclusively on international attacks between 1968 and 2015,[1] while the Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) focuses on domestic attacks in just one region, between 1950 and 2004.[2] Scholars use these, and similar databases, to study relationships between terrorism and a variety of other factors, sometimes to explain the causes of terrorism and other times to examine its consequences. Because domestic and international terrorism often involve different types of actors, different motivations and goals, and even different tactics, it is important to capture the characteristics that are unique to each category of terrorism.

The problem is that while the nature of terrorism remains enduring, several elements are working together to alter its character, including how terrorist groups recruit individuals and then use them to carry out attacks. Because of this change, the line between domestic and international terrorism is becoming blurrier, and it is insufficient to think of terrorism only in terms of this dichotomy. There is a danger for both academics and law enforcement in not recognizing changes in the separation between domestic and international terrorism or the existence of a separate, third category. If scholars fail to capture the real divisions between categories, research that relies on those typologies will lead to flawed results. For law enforcement, several government agencies distinguish between domestic and international terrorism, yet these distinctions may no longer be valid. Also, because courts often treat violent acts differently according to the perpetrator’s citizenship, as well as their pathway to radicalization, we need to understand how these categories are evolving.

The purpose of this article is to generate discussion on the challenges associated with the changing character of terrorism. In particular, with the growth of social media and the internet, as well as what some refer to as lone wolf terrorism, the line between domestic and international terrorism is growing thinner. If the distinction is still relevant, and evidence suggests it is, scholars need to rethink how they define a domestic attack, and develop other labels for attacks that are neither clearly domestic nor international. This article suggests “transnational terrorism” as a label to occupy that blurry middle ground. In an era of terrorism where ideologies appear more global, where groups can recruit and individuals can radicalize online, and where an organization is less important for carrying out an attack, our understanding of terrorism must grow to account for these changing characteristics.

The remainder of this article is organized into five sections. The first discusses some of the existing scholarship that makes use of the distinction between domestic and international terrorism, highlighting some of the problems with that simple approach. The next two sections focus on trends that suggest the character of terrorism is changing. One of these trends is the increase of attacks by individual perpetrators; the other is the growth of social media use by terrorist groups. The next section examines three illustrations of these trends that also

highlight the problems that arise from using a simple distinction between domestic and international terrorism. The final section provides some conclusions and implications, for scholars and for policymakers.

Domestic versus International Terrorism

Typologies often help explain variations in a phenomenon, though not all typologies are equally useful. Joseph Young and Michael Findley make a case for distinguishing between domestic and international terrorism, by suggesting these events are the result of two different processes.[3] While domestic terrorism should be a function of variables within the state where an attack occurs, international terrorism can be the result of factors in both the target state and the originating state. If the two categories of terrorism arise for different reasons, that is important for scholarship in its own right. In addition, if the causes of domestic and international terrorism are different, then the best policies to counter each category should also vary. Even that understanding is an oversimplification of terrorism, because conditions outside the state where an attack took place increasingly inspire many of the acts typically labelled as domestic terrorism. The burden is on scholars to have a complete and accurate understanding of what constitutes domestic versus international terrorism. Otherwise, mislabeling attacks could lead to poor theories, and to even worse policy recommendations.

A common method to distinguish domestic from international terrorism relies on three variables: the nationality of the perpetrator; the nationality of the victim; and the location of the attack. When all three of these variables are the same, scholars typically label that a domestic attack. All other cases, they classify as international. For example, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, which Timothy McVeigh intended to start a war against the U.S. government, occurred in the U.S., perpetrated by U.S. citizens, and directed against other U.S. citizens. That is the prototypical domestic terrorist attack.

If the attacker is not a citizen of the country in which an attack took place, but the location and victim nationality are the same (for example, the 9/11 attacks), common sense suggests that is an act of international terrorism. If the distinction between domestic and international terrorism is so important, do those differences arise simply by changing the perpetrator's nationality, without any consideration for their motivation? What about attacks where all three variables are different, such as when a member of Germany's Bader Meinhoff Gang joined with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in December 1975, to attack an OPEC meeting in Vienna, Austria?[4] That too is international terrorism, but why does variation across all three variables not lead to its own label?

All of these questions indicate the possibility of several different categories of terrorism, beyond the simple dichotomy of domestic versus international, and should be part of a larger discussion. This article focuses primarily on instances when all three variables are the same, suggesting domestic terrorism, but the motivation for the attack is based on a goal or motivation that is global rather than national. These types of attacks, which scholars typically label domestic terrorism, are foreign-inspired and so, they represent something distinct from domestic terrorism. One example is the 7 July 2005 London attacks. Three of the four perpetrators were British-born, while the fourth was born in Jamaica, but was a British citizen since the age of five. Given the nationality of the attackers, most databases would identify it as a domestic event—British citizens attacking other British citizens, in London. Yet the motivation for the attack has more in common with 9/11 than it does with domestic incidents, like Oklahoma City.

Distinguishing between domestic and international terrorism in practice is less straightforward than it might appear. The ITERATE and TWEED datasets differ on their definition of domestic terrorism. TWEED defines it in terms of the perpetrator's nationality, as long as the act occurred in Western Europe,[5] making victim nationality less relevant than in ITERATE and in other databases. As a result, some of the incidents listed in TWEED as domestic terrorism, appear in ITERATE as international terrorism, many of which might be more accurately included in a separate, third category, referred to here as transnational terrorism.

Because of these challenges in defining the categories and the fact that many databases only focus on one category, one of the biggest weaknesses of statistical scholarship on terrorism is when scholars use only one category in testing their theories, without controlling for the possible effects of the other category. Jacob Ravndal

uses TWEED to develop a typology of right-wing terrorism in Western Europe.[6] Using TWEED restricts his findings to only domestic actors, but since right-wing causes are typically national, this is unlikely to be a significant problem for his results. A more significant issue for scholars using TWEED is that some events in the database are not truly domestic terrorism if they are foreign-inspired.

Other statistical studies attempt to link terrorism to political factors, but rely exclusively on either domestic or international terrorism, without controlling for the effects of both. Tony Addison and Syed Murshed tie international terrorism to internal conflict.[7] Brian Lai suggests that a state's inability to control its own territory leads to terrorism overseas, but relies exclusively on international events.[8] Similarly, Quan Li links international terrorism to domestic economic and political systems.[9] One might excuse such problems when there were no reliable datasets on domestic terrorism, as was the case before 1996.[10] Scholars now have that data. We just need a better understanding of the different categories of terrorism that exist, and to account for the possibility of additional categories.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) catalogs all incidents from 1970 to 2017, but does not clearly distinguish domestic from international attacks.[12] To illustrate, of the 77,312 attacks in GTD between 1970 and 2010, 65,591 involved at least one victim who was a citizen of the country where the attack took place. Ideally, we would also know the nationality of the perpetrator (or at least the home country of the attacking group) as well as the purpose of the attack (minimally whether it has local or global intent). But no such information exists in the current version of GTD.

Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibullov propose a method to separate GTD data into domestic and international events. They then take this a step farther and use the distinction to draw relationships between the two categories.[13] They find that there are three to four times more domestic than international events in GTD, and that domestic terrorism can spill over into international terrorism. The problem is that an increasing number of those domestic events are the result of a global ideology, a trend that is ignored using the simple domestic versus international distinction.

There are other examples of scholars trying to distinguish between the two categories. Gary Lafree, Sue-Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw focus on 53 groups between 1970 and 2004 deemed dangerous for the U.S., but find that the vast majority of attacks were outside U.S. territory, and overwhelmingly against domestic rather than U.S. targets.[11]

Sandler, Daniel Arce, and Enders suggest domestic terrorism should be free of foreign involvement or sponsorship, but then their work does not address the role of foreign motivations.[14] Only in those cases of a location, perpetrator nationality, and victim nationality being the same, and the act being carried out for national purposes, is it purely domestic terrorism. Even when location, perpetrator nationality, and victim nationality are the same, if a foreign cause or global movement inspires the attack, then that is something other than domestic terrorism. In fact, I contend that the motivation for an attack is more critical than the citizenship of the perpetrator, for identifying an attack as domestic, international, or something else.

According to GTD, between 1970 and 2010, a U.S. victim was attacked on U.S. soil 1,961 times.[15] Of these, 664 were carried out by either unknown perpetrators or those whose motivations are unclear. For the remaining 1,297, GTD does not provide the citizenship of the perpetrators, but by my estimates, the attacks with foreign motivations include, very conservatively: 80 out of 461 attacks by revolutionary groups, 20 out of 279 attacks by national-separatist groups, 7 out of 106 attacks by reactionary groups, and 17 out of 84 attacks by religious groups.[16] In summary, about 123 of the 1,297 attacks are something other than purely domestic terrorism, given their link to a foreign cause or a global movement. That means at least 6.27% of attacks in the U.S., that would be coded as domestic terrorism, either have more in common with international terrorism or are a separate type of terrorism altogether. If that number holds across countries, then of the 65,591 attacks in GTD from 1970 to 2010, at least 4,114 incidents, traditionally considered domestic terrorism, are not really domestic if we account for global motivations.

One other issue is that scholars often use the terms transnational and international synonymously, even within

the same work,[17] but there is a difference between the terms. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye refer to “transnational interactions” as those not involving state actors or agents of the state (e.g., NGOs and multinational corporations).[18] It makes sense, then, that we would refer to global ideologies crossing borders and radicalizing otherwise domestic actors as transnational. Only in cases where the perpetrator, victim, and location are of the same country, and where the motivation of the attack is national, would we have purely domestic terrorism.

The above issues relate to the larger problem that there is no agreed-upon definition of terrorism.[19] Many scholars stopped trying to create a common definition. The U.S. government does not have just one definition of terrorism, with the Departments of State and Defense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigations all adopting different definitions, essentially to help them fulfill their missions and responsibilities.[20] If different agencies in the U.S. government cannot use a common definition, it should not be surprising that states have different definitions and that there is no United Nations definition.[21] Acceptance of a transnational label that is separate from domestic and international terrorism does not solve the definitional problem, but if our categories of terrorism are more accurate depictions of the events and the processes that lead to those events, that at least reduces some of the challenges of not having a consensus definition.

The next two sections examine some of the ways that the character of terrorism is changing, blurring the distinction between domestic and international terrorism, and requiring a third category of terrorism. One is the perceived growth of lone wolf attacks. The other is the increased use of social media and the Internet by terrorist groups.

Lone Wolf Terrorism Isn't

Several scholars write about lone wolf terrorism, some even claiming that it represents the newest wave of modern terrorism.[22] Michael Becker suggests that lone wolf attacks are increasing and that there are identifiable patterns to their choice of targets.[23] Ramon Spaaij contends that lone wolf terrorism is more common in the U.S. than in any other country, and that a lone wolf often creates their own ideology.[24] Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf discuss the difficulty of preventing lone wolf attacks.[25] Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko, and Benjamin Van Son argue that lone wolf attackers have certain traits in common with assassins and school attackers.[26] Spaaij and Mark Hamm also identify several issues plaguing current research on lone wolf terrorism, such as definitions and methodology.[27]

Other scholars oppose use of the term as a distinct category of terrorism. Bart Schuurman et al. criticize the use of the “lone wolf” label for several reasons.[28] Several authors point out the connection between a supposed lone wolf and larger networks.[29] Even Spaaij confirms that lone actors often draw on communities of belief and ideologies from extremist movements. If the perpetrator is part of a community of beliefs, then they cannot truly be a lone wolf. Moreover, if those communities of belief are foreign or based on a global ideology, then seemingly domestic attacks may have more in common with international terrorism.

The problem is not with the term itself, but in its overuse, especially in its application to events that either are not terrorism or are not the work of a solo actor. Although many solo-perpetrated attacks might appear to be domestic terrorism, much of what scholars and journalists classify as lone wolf terrorism does not qualify as terrorism, and probably is not an actor operating entirely on their own.

Many instances of lone wolf violence should not qualify as terrorism because they do not have the political motivation necessary to fit the definition. Terrorism is a result of an extreme belief in a philosophy or ideology that leads to violence, and should require at least one follower to subscribe to that same belief. One person acting on their own merely has an opinion or a delusion, so attacks carried out by that person are more accurately labeled as vigilantism or pathological violence. Joel Capellan contends that there is a difference between the lone wolf terrorist and someone who is mentally unstable.[30] But the distinction is more complicated than that, because a lone actor may be sane and violent for what seem to be political reasons to the perpetrator, but if he or she has no contact with others to voice opinions and share views, then that act is still pathological rather than political.

Three types of violent acts are often incorrectly labeled as lone wolf terrorism.[31] One involves a perpetrator

of violence who does not have a political motivation, and is better described as either a vigilante or mentally disturbed. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman make the distinction between political violence and other forms of violence, including pathological and vigilante.[32] The September 2014 beheading of a woman in Moore, Oklahoma by Alton Nolen fits here. So too does the Alphabet Bomber, Muharem Kurbegovic, whom Jeffrey Simon considers a lone wolf terrorist “ahead of his time,” even though the book refers to Kurbegovic as “emotionally disturbed”.[33]

The second is violence orchestrated by someone who has a political cause in the broadest sense, but one that nobody else adheres to or follows; they operate entirely on their own. Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, falls into this category. Both of these types of violence are misapplications of the terrorism label. Both cases may be terroristic acts in that they cause fear and involve violence, but if the perpetrators are not motivated by a political goal, or are acting entirely without any supporters or followers, then it is not terrorism.

The third type is when a person carries out a politically-motivated attack on their own, but subscribes to an ideology or belief that is held by others, and (importantly) communicates with those others in-person or online. This person may be engaged in terrorism (if their activities fit the rest of the definition of terrorism) but they are not a lone wolf. Then the question becomes, if they are engaged in terrorism, is it domestic, international, or something else?

Lars Erik Berntzen and Sveinung Sandberg argue that lone wolf terrorists often act as part of larger social movements.[34] When true, is it valid to consider them lone wolves, or to lump them together with those who act entirely on their own? President Barack Obama used the term lone wolf to describe the married couple who carried out the 2 December 2015 San Bernardino attack, that killed 14 and injured 22.[35] If we are to consider an act carried out by two people as a lone wolf attack, then that label loses any value it might have had. More relevant for the argument in this article, concerns how we should classify this act. Was it domestic terrorism, since the husband was an American citizen born in Chicago, even though the perpetrators’ ideology grew out of the global, Islamic extremist movement?[36] The global nature of a perpetrator’s ideology often suggests a form of transnational, rather than domestic, terrorism.

Another problematic case for the lone wolf label is the 28 November 2014 attack on a federal courthouse in Austin, Texas, by Larry Steve McQuilliams. McQuilliams was a self-proclaimed “High Priest” of the Phineas Priesthood. If he were a member of the organization, had contact with other members, and carried out the attack because of those shared beliefs, then this should not qualify as a lone wolf act. On the other hand, if he simply claimed to belong to the organization, but had no real contact with its members, then he would be a lone wolf, but then it would not be terrorism. Because the Phineas Priesthood is a domestic group in the U.S., then if it is terrorism this attack would be considered domestic terrorism. The standard methodology classifies both above examples as domestic terrorism, yet McQuilliams’ domestic motivation should distinguish his attack from the San Bernardino attack, carried out for global reasons. Now we simply need to identify what this new type of “domestic” terrorism should be called.

One possibility is to use the term “homegrown terrorism.” The Heritage Foundation defines homegrown terrorism as having one or more actors who are “American citizens, legal residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States.”[37] The “homegrown” label is imperfect, because while it implies someone radicalized at home, it often refers to attacks carried out elsewhere.[38] For instance, sources often attach the “homegrown” label to someone radicalized in the U.S. who went to fight for al-Qa’ida, even if there is no evidence they attempted to carry out an attack on American soil. It is not clear to me that “homegrown” is a separate category of terrorism as much as it is a separate pathway to radicalization, radicalizing in one’s home country rather than in a foreign terrorist training camp. An example of this is Muhanad Mahmoud Al Farekh, a U.S. citizen who joined al-Qa’ida, helped in a January 2009 attack against a U.S. Army base in Afghanistan, and was convicted in 2017.[39] Considering this attack took place in a location different from the nationality of both the perpetrator and the victims, we would already label this international terrorism. So using the term “homegrown” to apply also to foreign-inspired, domestic acts only adds to the confusion.

A similar label is “self-radicalized” terrorism, which Rodger Bates uses.[40] He contends that this type of vio-

lence is most common among right-wing and jihadist terrorists, though we see examples of self-radicalization in Marxist-Leninist and national-separatist groups as well. In other words, self-radicalization is not exclusive to domestic action, to Islamic extremism, or to actors operating on their own, and is one element contributing to the changing character of terrorism, discussed more below. This is also an imperfect term both because it describes a pathway, and because it implies no contact to a larger organization or movement, which is either unlikely or if true would make the act something other than terrorism.

This article contends that to engage in terrorism requires at least some sharing of ideology, thoughts, and intentions with others, even if the actors only interact digitally. Although a true lone wolf cannot be a terrorist by this definition, many of the solo-perpetrator attacks are still terrorism because many of these “lone wolves” are not truly acting on their own. Ultimately, the label we use is less important than the fact that we identify the need for a category that distinguishes these types of attacks from domestic and international acts. I suggest the transnational label because of its common connection to the terms domestic and international, but other labels can be just as effective at making the point and improving research results.

This gets us to the role of social media and cyber activities, as it pertains to the ability of groups to recruit members globally, and then how that affects our understanding of domestic and international terrorism.

Social Media and Global Recruitment

Several scholars draw links between the growing technological interconnectedness of the world and political violence.[41] Regardless of whether or not technological changes lead to more terrorism, some terrorists are heavy adopters of social media and the internet because it provides them with significant advantages.[42] The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) Twitter use is well documented,[43] but even before ISIS, al-Qa'ida used the internet to recruit, provide training videos, and communicate with members of the organization all over the world.[44] Other Islamic extremist groups use various tools to spread their ideology, like al-Qa'ida of the Arabian Peninsula's *Inspire* Magazine.[45] And an earlier example of terrorist use of technology is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) cyber unit, which used the internet back in the 1990s to raise funds, provide information about their cause, and disrupt government systems.[46]

This article makes two arguments about the increasing role of social media and then ties it back into the larger issue of defining domestic and international terrorism. First, because of the nature of the internet and social media, many solo attackers are mislabeled as lone wolves. Many of them are linked to an organization or ideological movement; their connections are simply digital rather than physical. Even if they carry out a solo attack, they are not alone in their beliefs. Second, because of the ability of groups to communicate and operate digitally, combined with the global nature of some ideologies, an increasing number of domestic events are motivated by global rather than national causes. This is not new, nor is it only about Islamic extremism. Global movements motivated some Cold War attacks carried out by Social Revolutionary groups, though many of these groups focused on domestic issues, like the Weather Underground's fight against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam as well as social injustice.

This does not mean all self-radicalized terrorists are international actors. The same medium that allows Islamic extremists to spread their ideology, is also used by single-issue and racist groups to recruit within their own countries. The Stormfront forum online is a haven for those sharing beliefs in white supremacist ideology. [47] Before the U.S. government shut it down, the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) website offered numerous examples of ways someone could carry out an ELF attack.[48] The point is not that the internet creates more international terrorism. The internet and social media enhance the ability of all terrorist groups to spread their message and potentially recruit on a global level. What the internet does is further blur the lines between domestic and international terrorism because more attacks can take place, carried out by perpetrators that never leave their home country, yet become radicalized online by a cause foreign to their home country. This is why it is increasingly important to understand the difference between truly domestic terrorism and terrorism that appears to be domestic based on just three variables, but is more accurately described as transnational because it is inspired by a foreign ideology or movement.

Cases of “Domestic” Terrorism

To illustrate some of the challenges presented above, involving the relevance of the lone wolf label and the role of technology, as well as a blurring of the distinction between domestic and international terrorism, this section examines three brief cases. While the first case involves racist terrorism, the other two involve religious terrorism. All three might be labeled lone-wolf terrorism, based on current methods for identifying the categories of terrorism, but the first two cases are about individuals who self-radicalized, while the third involves radicalization through physical contact with a terrorist organization, and therefore the U.S. government and courts treated it differently. Although all three cases fit the most common measures of domestic terrorism, only the first one qualifies as a purely domestic incident, since it is the only case with a national motivation. The second and third cases both involve a global ideology, and therefore are more accurately considered transnational terrorism.

Self-Radicalization with Domestic Goals

Dylann Roof was 21 years old when, on 17 June 2015, he killed nine people at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. He carried out the attack for racist reasons, and appears to have radicalized almost entirely online. This is an example of pure domestic terrorism, but is not a lone wolf attack because his digital interaction with others holding similar racist beliefs suggests that he was not alone.

Roof’s manifesto referred to the Council of Conservative Citizens website, which often cites black-on-white crime, to suggest that whites are under attack. In one passage, he wrote, “We [South Carolina] have no skin-heads, no real KKK, no one doing anything but talking on the internet. Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.” And, “this [the shooting of Trayvon Martin] prompted me to type in the words ‘black on White crime’ into Google, and I have never been the same since that day.”[49] The Southern Poverty Law Center also suggests that Roof was a reader and commenter on the white nationalist news website, *The Daily Stormer*. [50]

Roof confessed that he committed the shootings to ignite a race war.[51] There is little proof that he physically met others with the same beliefs, but evidence suggests that Roof self-radicalized because of the information he found online. Thus, while he carried out the attack alone, he should not be considered a lone wolf since it was merely one act in a larger movement. However, it does fit other key elements required for an attack to be terrorism—politically motivated violence, intended to generate fear in a wider audience. The fact that a solo actor carried out an attack may be important in comparative terms to attacks carried out by a group of people. Likewise, violence by a self-radicalized actor may be different from violence by those radicalized in person. More research should be conducted on these points, but neither of these variables is sufficient to label an act as lone wolf terrorism. Instead, this is a case of self-radicalized, domestic terrorism.

Self-Initiated Radicalization with Global Goals

On 15 April 2013, two pressure cooker bombs detonated near the finish line of the Boston Marathon, killing three people and injuring more than 200. Police killed the older of the two brothers responsible for the attack, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, during a shoot-out four days later. That same day, police arrested the younger brother, Dzhokhar. Despite being a U.S. citizen, several U.S. senators advocated for Tsarnaev to be tried as an enemy combatant.[52] For any members of the U.S. government to advocate such measures suggests a difference between this case and Roof’s. Even though Roof’s actions resulted in the death of more people, the global nature of Tsarnaev’s motivation differentiates it from Roof’s domestic-inspired attack.[53]

Tsarnaev’s case is similar to Roof’s in many ways. While Tsarnaev likely was influenced by his older brother’s radicalization, both brothers self-radicalized through interaction with radical Islamist documents.[54] According to the investigation, Tsarnaev’s laptop contained writings by radical clerics, copies of *Inspire* magazine, and audio clips and videos by the radical Yemeni cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki.[55]

Where the two cases are dissimilar is in the purpose of the attacks. Roof intended for his attack to start a race war in the U.S., while the goal of the Boston Marathon bombing was (at least in the brothers’ minds) to defend

Islam,[56] specifically retaliating for U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The important distinction for improving our understanding of terrorism's causes and intended effects is not based on skin color or religion, but rather the domestic vs. global inspiration of the attacker's motivations. The focus here is on the importance of this distinction for terrorism scholarship, but these differences are also important for law enforcement and for the courts.

Although U.S. laws define domestic terrorism and international terrorism separately, and although actors engaged in political violence can receive a terrorism enhancement as part of their sentence, there is no U.S. law for engaging in an act of domestic terrorism.[57] There are laws against providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. But for law enforcement and prosecutors, if an individual is radicalized by a foreign movement, that has different implications for investigation and prosecution than for a person motivated by a domestic issue.[58] In other words, the perpetrators of acts that fit the definition of domestic terrorism are not tried as terrorists. This may explain some of the reluctance of U.S. law enforcement to apply the terrorism label in cases of domestic attacks.[59]

Foreign Radicalization with Global Goals

Then there is the U.S. citizen, Jose Padilla, who radicalized while out of the country and attempted to carry out an attack in the U.S. Authorities arrested Padilla in 2002 for plotting to detonate a dirty bomb in the U.S.[60] Born in New York, he traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2001-2002. He also traveled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq prior to returning to the U.S.[61]

Unlike the Tsarnaev and Roof cases, authorities arrested Padilla prior to an attack, so there were no casualties because of his actions. Yet the U.S. government held Padilla as an enemy combatant for more than three years before transferring him to a civilian jail and trying him in court.[62] Is this difference, even compared to the Tsarnaev case, solely because of his meetings and training with members of al-Qa'ida? Was it because of the nature of the attack? A dirty bomb is potentially more deadly than Roof's attack on the church, but also might not injure as many people as the pressure cooker bombs used by the Tsarnaev brothers. Therefore, something about the perpetrator's motivation and/or path to radicalization led the government to treat it differently, even though a successful attack would have met all the standard criteria for labelling it domestic terrorism.

The important aspect of the above cases is that scholars would traditionally code all three of them as domestic terrorism (or planned domestic terrorism in the Padilla case). Yet there are critical differences between the intent of Roof's attack and the intent of Tsarnaev and Padilla (beyond simply the Islamic extremist elements). All three were U.S. citizens, yet only the first two self-radicalized, and because of the global nature of the motivation in the Tsarnaev and Padilla cases, only the Roof case is truly domestic terrorism.

The second and third cases, though having much in common with other Islamic extremist attacks, also do not quite fit common conceptions of international terrorism. They were carried out (planned in the Padilla case) by U.S. citizens, against U.S. citizens, on U.S. soil. The Tsarnaev case was self-radicalization but hardly lone wolf, not only because it involved brothers, but also because of the global ideology that inspired their attack. Likewise, although Padilla was operating alone at the time of his arrest, his previous contact with al-Qa'ida members challenges the validity of both the lone wolf and the domestic terrorism labels.

The best way to address these types of local attempts with global inspiration is to treat them separately from both domestic and international terrorism. The simplest option is to have a third category, made up of cases that are otherwise domestic terrorism but are inspired by a foreign cause or global movement.

Implications and Conclusions

Domestic terrorism is not just an attack where the perpetrator and victim nationality align with the location of the attack. The first step towards properly classifying an event is to identify the purpose of the attack. If it is based on national issues—racial divides, ethno-nationalism, a specific government policy or law—then it is appropriate to consider that act domestic in nature. If an attack is carried out in the name of a global belief or movement, then even if the attacker and victim nationality and location are the same, the domestic terrorism

label simply does not fit.

There is no reason to believe that future attacks will fall into simple categories of domestic and international, given the changing character of terrorist recruiting, particularly the global reach of terrorist movements and ideologies. Scholars must account for this in future research, if we hope to develop a better understanding of the various types of terrorism that exist. Specifically, scholars need a new label that captures these incidents and addresses the blurring of the line between domestic and international terrorism.

Some might view this as a purely academic argument, but there are real world implications to these labels being incomplete or flawed. Law enforcement officers and the court system behave differently towards someone who interacts with a foreign terrorist organization, compared to someone who has no foreign contacts. Since this has implications for due process and the legitimacy of a nation's rule of law, scholars need to develop a better understanding of the differences between these categories, as well as the value and challenges of incorporating additional labels.

There will still be gray areas, and additional challenges, such as identifying when a domestic ideology transforms into a global one. Several left-wing groups operating in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s were inspired by Marxist ideas, and perhaps even sponsored by the Soviet Union. But many of their activities were in response to national social and political issues. How should we categorize independence movements in one country, supported by a diaspora living elsewhere, such as Canadian Tamil supporting the LTTE in Sri Lanka? There are no simple solutions to these issues, but the purpose of this article is to highlight these challenges, and to suggest that a first step is to move beyond the simple dichotomy of domestic and international terrorism, because the line between the two categories is blurring.

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The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect the position or policy of the Air University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Notes

[1] Mickolus, Edward F.; Sandler, Todd; Murdock, Jean M.; Flemming, Peter A., 2013, "International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), 1968-2015", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/TH4ADJ>, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:qOKbszOm-Kr4ZeL4qMlkKdw== [fileUNF].

[2] Jan Oskar Engene, "Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The TWEED Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 44:1 (2007), 109-121, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343307071497>.

[3] Although they use the term transnational rather than international, their argument about the distinctions with domestic terrorism are still valid. Joseph Young and Michael Findley, "Promise and Pitfalls of Terrorism Research," *International Studies Review* 13:3 (September 2011), 411-431, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2011.01015.x>.

[4] "Terrorism – Libya Public Diplomacy (07/17/1986) (2)," Judy Mandel Files, Box 91721, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections, <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smf/nsc-communicationsandinformation/mandel/91721/terrorism-libyapublicdiplomacy7-17-1986-2.pdf>. Other sources suggest German participation was through the Revolutionary Cells, a rival to Baader Meinhof. Martin Jander, "German Left Terrorism and Israel: Ethno-Nationalist, Religious-Fundamentalist, or Social-Revolutionary?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38:6 (June 2015), 456-477, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2015.1006451>.

[5] Engene, "Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe".

[6] Jacob Ravndal, "Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe," *Journal for Deradicalization* 3 (Summer 2015), 1-38.

- [7] Tony Addison and Syed Murshed, "Transnational Terrorism as a Spillover of Domestic Disputes in Other Countries," *Defence and Peace Economics* 16:2 (2002), 69-82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242690500070078>.
- [8] Brian Lai, "'Draining the Swamp': An Empirical Examination of the Production of International Terrorism, 1968-1998," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24:4 (September 2007), 297-310, <https://doi.org/10.1080%2F07388940701643649>.
- [9] Quan Li, "Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49:2 (April 2005), 278-297, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002704272830>; Quan Li and Drew Schaub, "Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48:2 (April 2004), 230-258, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002703262869>.
- [10] It was only after the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing that governments and scholars began to pay more attention to domestic terrorism. Data collection on such events was spurred by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, and its Terrorism Knowledge Base, most of which was later incorporated into databases at the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).
- [11] Gary LaFree, Sue-Ming Yang, and Martha Crenshaw, "Trajectories of Terrorism: Attack Patterns of Foreign Groups that have Targeted the United States, 1970-2004," *Criminology and Public Policy* 8:3 (2009), 445-473, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00570.x>.
- [12] GTD is one product from the University of Maryland's START Center. While GTD provides data on the location of the attack and the nationality of up to three victims, it does not provide the perpetrator's nationality, making it difficult to classify each attack as domestic or international. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.
- [13] They offer a five-step solution for separating the GTD from ITERATE data, but even then it is unclear, without data on the nationality or motivation of the attacker, how many of those events listed as domestic incidents are truly about an issue local to the country in which the attack occurred. In other words, even if we accept their method for separating out the international events, what events remain may still fall into two separate categories: purely domestic and foreign-inspired, or what this article refers to as transnational. Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Khusrav Gaibullov, "Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and dynamics," *Journal of Peace Research* 48:3 (2011), 319-337, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343311398926>.
- [14] Todd Sandler, Daniel Arce, and Walter Enders, "Transnational Terrorism," CREATE Research Archive, Published Articles & Papers, Paper 139 (2008), 8, <http://create.usc.edu/research/publications/2729>.
- [15] GTD.
- [16] I classify all 367 single-issue attacks as domestic in nature. This data uses a motivation variable added to GTD, which identifies perpetrator goals according to five main types (national-separatist, revolutionary, reactionary, religious, and single-issue) and several sub-types within each category. Gregory D. Miller, "Exploring the Fourth Wave: Is the New Terrorism about Religion?" unpublished article.
- [17] See for example: Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, "Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (March 1999), 145-167; Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002-03), 30-58; James Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?" *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (September 2008), 469-488, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x>.
- [18] Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," *International Organization* 25:3 (Summer 1971), 329-349, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300026187>.
- [19] Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman counted 109 different definitions of terrorism. Alex Schmid, Albert Jongman, et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988).
- [20] The Department of State's definition comes from 22 U.S. Code § 2656f(d)(2) "Annual Country Reports on Terrorism": "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents". The Department of Defense defines terrorism as, "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political." Joint Publication 3-07.2 Antiterrorism (14 March 2014). The Department of Justice derives its definition from 18 U.S. Code § 2331, which distinguishes between domestic and international terrorism primarily based on the location of the attack ("primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").

- [21] Various proposals for definitions have been made in the UN, but all failed to receive support because of the various interests of the member states. One of the biggest debates is over whether a definition should include or exclude acts committed by nationalist movements, like the Palestinians. In addition, some members want a definition that allows states to be defined as engaging in terrorism, while other members oppose any such definitions. The Security Council did propose a definition in Res. 1566 "On Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts" (8 October 2004), but that resolution lacks legal authority and is non-binding on member states. Alex Schmid, "The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6:2 (May 2012): 158-159.
- [22] Jerrold Post, "Terrorism and Right-Wing Extremism: The Changing Face of Terrorism and Political Violence in the 21st Century: The Virtual Community of Hatred," *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy* 65:2 (April 2015): 242-271; Jeffrey Simon, *Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2013). This idea of the new wave is based on David Rapoport's theory regarding the waves of modern terrorism. We are currently in a Religious Wave, but depending on when that wave began (most scholars point to the 1979 Iranian Revolution or the end of the Cold War), it may be close to breaking, to be replaced by a new, Fifth Wave. David Rapoport "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History* 100:650 (December 2001).
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Research Note

The Utility of Disabled Fighters in the Islamic State^[1]

by Chelsea Daymon

Abstract

Traditionally, terrorism and individuals with disabilities are portrayed in roles of victimization with disabled individuals being either the target or decoy in attacks. The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has altered this concept by using individuals with disabilities for recruitment, propaganda, and mobilization purposes. This Research Note explores ISIS's use of disabled fighters through an analysis of online content, consisting of videos collected off the encrypted messaging platform Telegram, along with open-source Internet sites, bearing in mind the concepts of Entertainment-Education and the use of persuasive messaging. I argue that ISIS is using its own method of Entertainment-Education, employing persuasive narrative aimed at disabled individuals, while also using them as propaganda tools. Additionally, highlighting disabled fighters in their media products, offers disabled individuals a collective identity consisting of usefulness and agency in the group, either as recruitment spokesmen, shaming able-bodied individuals into action, or as attackers.

Keywords: Islamic State, terrorist recruitment, propaganda, disabled individuals

Introduction

Historically, individuals with disabilities have been observed in roles of victimization.^[2] However, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has changed this notion, using individuals with disabilities for propaganda, recruitment purposes, and as attackers.^[3] Since the battle of Mosul, an increased use of disabled fighters, as foot soldiers, and SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) attackers has been observed.^[4]

From a disability studies standpoint, we could extrapolate that disabled individuals in ISIS maintain an appearance of usefulness within the group, fulfilling a number of roles and purposes. As Gruenewald, Karlamangla, Greendale, Singer and Seeman note, "social relations and activity may be important sources of feelings of usefulness,"^[5] in this case, potentially increasing thoughts of empowerment in individuals with disabilities, who may feel marginalized or unsure of their role in the militant group.

Alternatively, from a terror group's perspective, individuals with disabilities provide operatives presumed to be less detectable. In 2008, two women with Down's syndrome were used in remote-controlled suicide attacks on Baghdad markets, attributed to al-Qaeda,^[6] while Comalli, on Boko Haram argues that individuals with disabilities "were often used in suicide missions because they were less likely to attract attention," thus using disabled individuals provides the benefit of surprise.^[7]

This Research Note seeks to explore ISIS's use of disabled fighters through an analysis of online content, consisting of videos and audience engagement, collected off the encrypted messaging platform, Telegram. Videos and images from open-source Internet sites were also collected. Furthermore, concepts of Entertainment-Education and the use of persuasive messaging are assessed, since the group uses these approaches to frame disabled individuals in their media. I argue that ISIS is using their own form of Entertainment-Education, utilizing persuasive narratives to provide disabled individuals in the group with usefulness and agency, while also using them as propaganda tools to recruit and mobilize able-bodied individuals into action.

Telegram

Telegram is a cross-platform, cloud-based[8], instant messaging service, enabling users to send chats, self-destructing messages, documents, videos, photos, gifs, stickers, audio files, and other content all embedded in the application (app). Internal file sharing features allow up to 1.5 GB per file, offering one of the largest file sharing sizes on social media and messaging platforms.[9] Telegram has channels, operating one-way (unidirectional), with central administrators (admins) controlling the dissemination of content. Channel members can only view this material, cannot interact with it, and are not privy to who the other channel members are. Alternatively, Telegram groups are multi-directional, enabling members to interact with other members, share material, comment on posts, and view other members in the group. Telegram also offers the “Secret Chat” option, where users can interact with one another on a one-to-one basis. This option allows users to create a timer where once read; a secret chat will automatically self-destruct on both the sender and recipient’s end. Furthermore, Telegram does not store secret chats, offering a secure messaging option.[10] Because of these features and the security Telegram offers, it has become ISIS’s communication platform of choice.[11]

Methods

Online content featuring disabled fighters was collected off the encrypted messaging platform, Telegram, as well as open-source Internet sites. This content consists of videos, images, and supporter posts from pro-ISIS Telegram groups. These posts appeared shortly after the release of the videos analyzed in this study, offering examples of audience engagement, along with how certain elements in videos were received.

Six videos featuring disabled fighters were considered. While they most certainly do not represent all ISIS content featuring disabled individuals, with the findings of this research note not being generalizable to the overall population, they do provide an understanding of the utility of disabled fighters in the group. This assumption is made on the basis that each video was analyzed looking at how disabled individuals were portrayed (in what roles), along with the narrative content (when available) used.

The videos span from 2015 – 2018, including “From Who Excused to Those Not Excused,” (2015), “Inside the *Khilafah* (Caliphate) 6,” (2017), “Inside the *Khilafah* 7,” (2018), a video released from the Yemeni *Wilayat* (province or governorate), Bayda, (2018), “The Assault of the *Muwahideen* (the monotheists),” (2018), and “The Assault of the *Muwahideen* 3,” (2018). Even though “From Who Excused to Those Not Excused,” (2015), is the earliest example in the collection, it was included because it shows a shift in how disabled individuals are represented from then (in more municipal roles) and now (more combative roles).

All content was analyzed bearing in mind the concepts of Entertainment-Education and how persuasive messaging is used, looking for thematic patterns and roles attributed to disabled individuals in the group.

Disabled Fighters

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines a disability as something that impairs, limits activity, or constrains an individual’s participation.[12] The U.S. federal government defines an individual with a disability as, someone who has a physical or mental impairment that confines one, if not more of their life behaviors, is known to have such an impairment, and has a record of it.[13] Bearing in mind these classifications, this article will use the WHO’s definition of a disability, considering a disability as something that impairs, constrains, and restricts an individual’s participation in activity. Thus, ISIS fighters with visual or perceivable impairments, such as the loss of limbs, the use of wheelchairs, crutches, along with other impairments, such as deafness, will be considered.

Conventionally, when a soldier or fighter becomes disabled, his career on the battlefield tends to be over. Meh-rullah Safi’s case is a good example. His career as an Afghan soldier ended when a rocket-propelled grenade exploded near him, severing his leg.[14] To make a living, he found work selling mobile phone cards on the streets, expressing that he served his country without regrets, however “when I see my wounds have no value for my government, then I do regret it.”[15]

Social identity theory suggests that individuals distinguish themselves based on their group memberships and that these memberships offer pride, belonging, and self-esteem.[16] Additionally, notions of self become categorized within the group, fostering in-group unity at the expense of an out-group.[17] Conflicts are prime examples where concepts of in-groups and out-groups are prevalent. Group membership or someone's "organizational identity may be more pervasive and important than ascribed identities based on gender, age, ethnicity, race, or nationality,"[18] likely fostering a desire to define individualistic roles within groups, along with usefulness to them. As Safi's case displays, serving his country (his in-group) against an out-group was a source of pride. After his injury, he saw himself as useless to the organization (his government), which he identified with, creating feelings of regret and resentment towards his in-group.

The psychological process of group cohesion usually bonds individuals to a group and the members within it. However, since social identity is based on positive intergroup experiences, when there is a loss of cohesion, conflict, or feelings of ostracization, an individual's initial in-group can become an out-group.[19] Safi's circumstances demonstrate this. When considering groups with nefarious intentions, group cohesion and in-group identity is of great importance. Thus, an organization will benefit in the long-run by utilizing all of its members in ways that solidify group cohesion and feelings of usefulness.

History has shown that with a lack of able-bodied combatants, groups sometimes resort to unconventional fighters. Six weeks into the battle of Mosul, Iraqi forces estimated that close to 1,000 ISIS fighters were killed,[20] however with continued fighting and more concern regarding the civilian death count, the actual number of ISIS losses is unknown. Nonetheless, an increased use of unconventional fighters by ISIS was witnessed during the battle of Mosul onwards, including the use of older adults and children.[21]

During the American Civil War, the Union army experienced a lack of men for the front lines. Due to scarcity in manpower, in 1863 the "Invalid Corps" was established with over 24 regiments made mostly of men disabled by injuries or sickness.[22] The Corps was sectioned into two battalions grounded on member's physical abilities.[23] The First Battalion consisting of men with disabilities that were less severe, with responsibilities, such as combat and garrison duty, while the Second Battalion, contained men with disabilities of a higher severity, offering opportunities to clerk, nurse, and cook for the army.[24] As Reznick argues, the story of the Invalid Corps represents "the broader experience of disability during and after the Civil War, addressing such questions as how the nation responded to the human wreckage of the conflict and how members of the Corps themselves fought not only to restore the Union but also to retain their dignity as Americans and as human beings." [25]

This outlook aligns with the core values of critical disability studies, which aim to alter established views on individuals with disabilities as victims "who should adjust to the world around them." [26] While, the cultural model of disability looks at the experience of individuals from a societal context, understanding how the experience is perceived culturally, along with the positives, negatives, discriminatory, physical, or psychological pain associated with having a disability.[27] Murphy, an anthropologist by trade and someone who suffered from "a paralytic illness," [28] argues that "disability is defined by society and given meaning by culture," making it a "social malady." [29] Capitalizing off ostracizing feelings, by providing positive reinforcements of usefulness within a society, while fostering group cohesion of all its members, creates a persuasive tool, whereby disabled individuals are given utility and functions within a group. Mobilizing individuals into different roles is also achieved by encouraging disabled individuals to take part in various actions, while shaming those that are able-bodied for not.

When studying persuasive narratives, O'Keefe notes that function-matched narratives have a higher likelihood of persuasion, as opposed to unmatched narratives, because these messages are relatable to their audience and "speak to what people want." [30-32] By highlighting fighters with disabilities, using relatable characters, and showing their usefulness to the group and its goals, ISIS is using a persuasive narrative playbook, similar to narrative persuasion techniques found in entertainment education.

Entertainment-Education and Social Cognitive Theory

Entertainment-Education (E-E) is a tool used to establish social change[33] often in health communication campaigns, or campaigns aimed at changing people's behavior. E-E is assumed to "stand on its own" when considering its narrative quality, with successful campaigns attracting audiences because of the captivating stories they tell, as opposed to their educational or persuasive nature.[34] These stories can be in the form of fiction or nonfiction,[35] using a subtle balance of educational information woven into entertainment,[36] the aim being to influence the behavior of individuals through relatable accounts. The advantages of E-E narratives are that they target individuals on a personal level, as well as at the group level, intertwining individualistic notions with social identity.

Social cognitive theory (SCT)[37] is usually used to explain the impact of entertainment-education on the behavior, beliefs, and attitudes of individuals.[38] SCT holds that changes in behavior are enacted via an individual's sense of personal control or self-efficacy.[39] If an individual perceives that they can take actions to resolve an issue, seeing that the behavior is in their reach, they are more likely to try, and in the process develop a greater sense of commitment to their choice.[40-41] By persuasively using E-E to empower individuals toward a desired outcome, there is a higher likelihood viewers will sense that they have the self-efficacy to act, obtaining desired results.

Additionally, through the use of entrancing stories, E-E utilized persuasive messages without making the persuasion obvious. As Green, Brock, and Kaufman suggest, a major element of a media production is its ability to transport an individual away from everyday life and into the story being told.[42] ISIS media employs the persuasive concepts found in E-E, to positively reinforce roles for disabled individuals in the group, while also using them as propaganda tools, imparting messages to supporters and opponents alike.

ISIS Online Content

Six videos featuring disabled fighters were analyzed, looking at how the disabled individuals were portrayed, and the narrative content used. Many of the videos feature disabled individuals in roles of active battle, whether on the battlefield, or about to commit an SVBIED attack. Others feature disabled members of ISIS as municipal workers, recruiters, or executioners. The earliest video in the collection, "From Who Excused to Those Not Excused," highlights disabled individual in more municipal roles, while later videos emphasize disabled individuals in more militaristic roles, displaying a shift in how they are portrayed in propaganda.

From Who Excused to Those Not Excused

In March of 2015, two deaf fighters were featured in a video titled "From Who Excused to Those Not Excused," where they direct their message to "the deaf and mute" of the "Islamic world." The fighters mention that they are brothers who work as traffic police in the self-proclaimed Islamic State, with the video showing them going about this job. One of the brothers, Abu 'Abdur-Rahman, declares "to the Muslims in Europe, both Arab and non-Arab, the way is open before you for you to come to the land of the *Khilafah* (Caliphate), and the Islamic State is expanding." [43] March of 2015 was a time when recruitment, the encouragement of migration (*hijrah*), and state building were still goals of the Islamic State[44] with Abu 'Abdur-Rahman's statement reflecting this.

Further in the video, the brothers are featured in military roles where they are shown launching missiles at Peshmerga barracks. Thus, the video not only attempts to recruit individuals who are deaf and mute to the Islamic State, but also shows the various roles available to disabled individuals who might consider migration.

Inside the Khilafah 6

"Inside the *Khilafah 6*," released in December of 2017,[45] and one of eight videos in a series (as of December 2018), features Abu Salih al-Amriki, an amputee, American fighter (according to his *kunya* or nom de guerre). Instead of being portrayed as a victim, al-Amriki is the star in the four minute and 16 second video, where he calls on individuals with disabilities to "rise with one leg or no legs. Rise from your sitting and strike the *kufar* (unbelievers/infidels)." [46] He goes on to challenge "brothers" with or without limbs "to a race towards

the gates of *jannah* (paradise),” while he threatens Trump and calls on supporters in America to do attacks at home.[47] This video utilizes al-Amriki in a role of mobilization to action. By highlighting a disabled fighter in a position of strength, the video seeks to encourage other individuals to commit attacks where they are. This not only displays a persuasive message of mobilization, but also reflects a shift in ISIS’s military strategy from encouraging immigration to the Islamic State, to urging supporters to take actions ‘at home.’

Inside the Khilafah 7

In the next installment of the series, five disabled individuals appear in “Inside the *Khilafah 7*,” released in February of 2018.[48] The beginning of the video frames the overall context of the narrative when the narrator states that “the sons of the *Khilafah* rose as one body despite their wounds in response to the call of *jihad*.”[49] Around the beginning of the 20 minute and 20 second video a fighter is pushed in a wheelchair, while his companion calls on others to “support” the religion and move “onwards towards *jannah* (paradise),” while battle-field images of amputee fighters on crutches are featured throughout the film, in addition to what appears to be a women fighting on the battlefield.[50] At 50 minutes and 50 seconds into the video, Abu ‘Abdillah al-Shami, a wheelchair-confined fighter is featured with the video’s narrator stating that al-Shami was “a man among the men of resolve. He was not held back by obstacles, nor by the tears of a loved one, nor the hopeful plea of an affectionate and merciful companion,”[51] the “obstacles” presumably being his disability. Further in the segment, it is al-Shami’s personal statement that offers insight on disabled fighters in the Islamic States:

“I advise you to fear Allah, and I advise you to be steadfast, my brothers. By Allah, by Allah, the best path and the quickest path to Jannah (paradise) is to carry out an istishhadi (martyrdom) operation. I advise you to carry out istishhadi operations. I advise you to march forth behind Amirul-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful). Go after the atheist and apostate PKK. Deal with them and with all the religions of Kufr (unbelievers/infidels), my brothers. By Allah, we are not suffering hardships. By Allah, we are enjoying blessings that no one knows of except Allah. It’s true that I’m disabled, but I’ve been given a lot of suggestions in terms of areas I could work in. By Allah, I’m not doing this out of weakness, or because of any anguish or suffering. By Allah, it is only due to my desire to meet Allah (emphasis added).”[52]

Al-Shami’s words point to him having been directed towards roles within the group, appropriate to his disabled status. In this case, his role was to carry out a SVBIED attack.

The Assault of the Muwahideen and The Assault of the Muwahideen 3

The first installment of “The Assault of the *Muwahideen*,” was released in October 2018, while “The Assault of the *Muwahideen 3*,” was released in December 2018. Both videos come from the Barakah province and show disabled individuals actively fighting on the frontlines. The first video features six disabled fighters with the more memorable scenes being a one-legged man who looks to be in his 20s, getting into an armored vehicle destined for the frontlines, while in a different scene, a one-armed fighter operates an automatic weapon during an attack. In “The Assault of the *Muwahideen 3*,” a man with a prosthetic leg is shown fighting on the battlefield among his brothers in arms. The two videos are actively highlighting disabled fighters, while portraying their utility in roles of combat, where able-bodied members of ISIS fight side-by-side with disabled fighters.

ISIS is also using individuals with disabilities as executioners. A handful of images and videos, for example images released in 2016 by the *al-Hayat* media wing out of the Libyan *Wilayat* of Sirte, purportedly shows a wheelchair-bound fighter executing an alleged spy by crucifixion,[53] while a video released in May of 2018, from the Yemeni *Wilayat*, Bayda, also displays a wheelchair-bound fighter executing a prisoner by gunshot.[54] These images and videos display individuals with disabilities in roles of power where notions of victimhood are reversed.

Furthermore, they offer visual narratives that incorporate empowering, persuasive messaging aimed at a specific audience through a modification of E-E. By displaying fighters with disabilities in roles that are not only useful, but in some cases powerful, these videos employ influential messaging, incorporating social identity and group cohesion. Moreover, these media products imply that disabled fighters present aspects of utility to


ISIS, whether as martyrs, spokesmen, or in other roles, in turn providing disabled individuals with feelings of usefulness and a collective purpose.

Audience Engagement

After the release of “Inside the *Khilafah* 7,” audience engagement in Telegram groups was observed by the author. Supporters shared screenshots and montages of disabled fighters featured in videos and official ISIS propaganda releases. These images were accompanied by sentiments reflecting praise, pride, along with shaming able-bodied individuals who were not answering the call to *jihad*.

A post on February 14, 2018 in the *Dabiq* group, shows three images of an amputee fighter on crutches with the remark, “A slap in the face of anyone who left *jihad* without (a valid) excuse,” (see Figure 1) while another post on March 18, 2018, in the *Ansar-ul-Haqq* group features an image of Abu ‘Abdillah al-Shami and praises “Inside the *Khilafah* 7” (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: Example post in the *Dabiq* group, February 14, 2018



“A slap in the face of anyone who left *jihad* without (a valid) excuse.”

Figure 2: Example post in the *Ansar-ul-Haqq* group March 18, 2018

“Release: Inside 7 (is) the most stupendous, words cannot describe it, it shows the (wonders of) giving, sacrifice, redemption, and great (rare) heroic acts rarely found elsewhere except within the Islamic State that makes (real) men...”

These posts suggest encouragement of mobilization into action, along with mobilization of ideas and shared beliefs. Concepts of heroic deeds, what makes “real men,” as well as shaming those who are able-bodied for not taking up arms, is implied. The persuasive messages within “Inside the *Khilafah* 7” have not been lost on the audience, who not only advance the narratives within the video, but also enforce similar messages in real time among like-minded individuals. Supporters encourage the mobilization of able-bodied individuals through tactics of shame, while disabled fighters are revered for their courageous efforts towards the cause.

Implications and Future Trends in Terrorism

ISIS’s use of disabled fighters implies that disabled individuals present aspects of utility to the group, in turn delivering feelings of usefulness and identity to disabled members. While there could be a number of reasons why this is taking place (loss of able-bodied fighters or an “all hands on deck” scenario), it is clear that ISIS is increasingly capitalizing on the use of disabled individuals in their media, something not seen in such a capacity with other terror organizations. Groups like the Taliban and Boko Haram are known to use disabled individuals as suicide attackers, however in Taliban propaganda, the perpetrators are not featured in the group’s media products[55] and in many cases their identities remain unknown.[56] This suggests that for ISIS, the utility of disabled individuals goes beyond cannon fodder and into the realms of propaganda tools.

In Aggarwal’s analysis of “The Caravan/Procession of Lights 2,” another video featuring a disabled fighter, he argues that disabled individuals exemplify ISIS’s “value of steadfastness despite affliction.”[57] This could also be said about the ways in which disabled fighters are presented in “From Who Excused to Those Not Excused,” “Inside the *Khilafah* 6,” “Inside the *Khilafah* 7,” “The Assault of the *Muwahideen*,” “The Assault of the *Muwahideen* 3,” along with videos showing disabled executioners. These videos not only provide examples of roles within the group that disabled individual might seek to explore, but send powerful messages to opponents, as well as supporters.

Narratives aimed at supporters suggest that disabled fighters are exemplified for their heroic actions despite their afflictions, while they are also used as a shaming mechanism to recruit able-bodied individuals into action. The overall message sent to opponents is that ISIS, regardless of its loss of territory and manpower, remains

a viable threat, since all members, including those that might be deemed unconventional fighters, are willing to answer the call. Furthermore, there is no indication that ISIS utilizes disabled individuals in high-ranking, decision-making processes,[58] implying that their main utility falls within the realms of propaganda, recruitment, and as battlefield replacements for able-bodied combatants.

When considering future trends in terrorism, ISIS's use of disabled individuals marks a new trend in terrorism, where the typical profile of a fighter, has changed. Horgan, Bloom, Daymon, Kaczkowski, and Tiflati demonstrate that ISIS is also using older adults as suicide bombers, in SVBIED attacks, and for recruitment purposes, particularly with the onslaught of the battle of Mosul.[59] ISIS is also known for its unprecedented mobilization of children in martyrdom operations.[60] Thus, the group is utilizing individuals in roles not normally associated with common conceptions of fighters. This in part may be due to a high loss of fighters on the battlefield and the Coalition's attempts to eradicate ISIS, producing an "all hands on deck" effect.

Research shows that terror groups learn from one another, applying organizational learning to further their agendas, gain news skills, recruit, and become better equipped in their terror tactics.[61] This suggests that future groups may apply similar strategies, utilizing disabled individuals and other unconventional fighters in the group, in their media products, and as attackers. Exploiting all members of an organization; the young, old, and disabled, offers increased manpower, especially when a group has suffered losses.

From a security standpoint, ISIS's use of disabled and unconventional fighters poses a threat not customarily associated with terrorism, thus providing thoughtworthy implication to current security measures. Take for example the expedited Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) screening measures at airports for passengers that are 75 years or older. They allow seniors to leave their shoes on, along with a light jacket during the screening process.[62] For individuals with disabilities, the TSA permits them to also leave their shoes on during screening procedures, while further accommodations are made on a case-to-case basis.[63] Additionally, as Comalli displays, the threat that individuals with disabilities present is often overlooked, consequently providing an advantage in attack planning, which includes the element of surprise.[64]

ISIS's use of unconventional fighters, including disabled individuals, should be considered when reviewing security procedures since they present new complications to measures already in place. Finally, the group's increased use of children, older adults, and disabled fighters into roles of mobilization, signals an age where conventional fighters are not the only ones carrying out operations, thus opening the door to further study on this phenomenon.

From a counter-messaging perspective, ISIS's use of disabled individuals offers a challenging undertaking, since they are drawing on a marginalized community in the Middle East where having a disability is taboo.[65] By offering disabled individuals with useful roles, giving them agency, purpose, and a sense of belonging, ISIS is challenging conventional norms, even if the groups' main purpose is utilizing disabled individuals as propaganda tools or suicide attackers. A means of countering these media products is to highlight the use of disabled fighters as a sign of desperation. If a group resorts to using its most vulnerable members, it sends a signal that it has lost many of its able-bodied fighters, consequently showing weakness. From a recruitment standpoint, no one wants to join a losing battle.

While this study is limited in its scope of analyzed content, it highlights ISIS's use of disabled fighters and the many roles they play. Examining a larger collection of media content, across a greater span of time, would allow for more generalizable results, however with violent extremist content being flagged and taken down fairly quickly, many resources that were once available to researchers online no longer exist, making the task difficult.

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Notes

[1] This research was partly conducted and funded from the Minerva Research initiative Documenting the Virtual Caliphate Minerva #N00014-16-1-3174 and the office of naval research. All opinions are exclusively those of the author and do not represent the Department of Defense or the Navy. I would also like thank J.M. Berger, Dr. Mia Bloom, Dr. Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Dr. William McCants, Dr. Weeda Mehran, and Dr. Craig Whiteside for advising and/or discussing issues on this topic with me, Dr. Tillman Russell for assistance on the first draft, and Dr. Hicham Tiflati for translation support.

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Resources

Bibliography: Islamic State (IS, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) [Part 5]

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2019-4]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Islamic State (IS / ISIS / ISIL / Daesh) and its predecessor organizations. To keep up with the rapidly changing political events, the most recent publications have been prioritized during the selection process. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing through more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Islamic State; IS; ISIS; ISIL; Daesh; Al-Qaeda in Iraq; AQI

NB: All websites were last visited on 18.05.2019. This subject bibliography is conceptualised as a multi-part series (for earlier bibliographies, see: [Part 1](#), [Part 2](#), [Part 3](#), and [Part 4](#)). To avoid duplication, this compilation only includes literature not contained in the previous parts. However, meta-resources, such as bibliographies, were also included in the sequels. – See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites, or author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of pre-prints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).

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Bibliography: Boko Haram

Compiled and selected by Judith Tinnes

[Bibliographic Series of Perspectives on Terrorism – BSPT-JT-2019-5]

Abstract

This bibliography contains journal articles, book chapters, books, edited volumes, theses, grey literature, bibliographies and other resources on the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram. While focusing on recent literature, the bibliography is not restricted to a particular time period and covers publications up to May 2019. The literature has been retrieved by manually browsing more than 200 core and periphery sources in the field of Terrorism Studies. Additionally, full-text and reference retrieval systems have been employed to broaden the search.

Keywords: bibliography, resources, literature, Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP, Abubakar Shekau, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Nigeria, Lake Chad region

NB: All websites were last visited on 18.05.2019. - See also Note for the Reader at the end of this literature list.

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Note

Whenever retrievable, URLs for freely available versions of subscription-based publications have been provided. Thanks to the Open Access movement, self-archiving of publications in institutional repositories, on professional networking sites, or author homepages for free public use (so-called Green Open Access) has become more common. Please note, that the content of Green Open Access documents is not necessarily identical to the officially published versions (e.g., in case of preprints); it might therefore not have passed through all editorial stages publishers employ to ensure quality control (peer review, copy and layout editing etc.). In some cases, articles may only be cited after obtaining permission by the author(s).

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Counterterrorism Bookshelf: 62 Books on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism-Related Subjects

Reviewed by Joshua Sinai

So many books are published on terrorism and counterterrorism-related subjects that it is difficult to catch up on a large backlog of monographs and edited volumes received for review. In order to catch up on this backlog, this column consists mostly of capsule Tables of Contents of 62 books, including also several books published less recently but still meriting attention. Some of these books will be reviewed in future issues of 'Perspectives on Terrorism' as stand-alone reviews.

The following capsule overviews are arranged topically under the headings "Terrorism – General," "Terrorist Groups," "Country Studies," "Counterterrorism - General," "Counterterrorism – Countering Violent Extremism," "Counterterrorism – Conflict Resolution," "Counterterrorism – Intelligence," and "Counterterrorism – Legal."

Terrorism—General

Alain Badiou, *Our Wound is Not So Recent* (Medford, MA: Polity, 2016), 80 pp., US \$ 9.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5095-1493-9.

The text is a transcript of a speech by the author on November 23, 2015 at the Theatre de la Commune d'Aubervilliers in Paris, France. It discusses the implications of the wave of Islamist terrorist attacks in Paris, which the author attributes to a malaise connected to the supremacy of global capitalism and new forms of imperialism leading to the weakening of states under their domination which have become breeding grounds for a new form of nihilism that seeks revenge against such domination.

Mia Bloom with John Horgan, *Small Arms: Children and Terrorism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), 248 pp., US \$ 27.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8014-5385-5.

Table of Contents: (1) What Is a Child?; (2) Child Soldiers versus Children in Terrorist Groups; (3) Learning to Hate: Socialization and Cultural Influences; (4) Pathways to Involvement: Coercion; (5) Pathways to Involvement: Consensus and Cultures of Martyrdom; (6) Experiences, Apprenticeships, and Careers in Terror; (7) Leaving Terrorism Behind; (8) An End or a New Beginning?

Stephanie Dornschneider, *Whether to Kill: The Cognitive Maps of Violent and Nonviolent Individuals* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 328 pp., US \$ 79.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4770-1.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) A Cognitive Mapping Approach to Political Violence; (2) Interviewing Violent and Nonviolent Individuals; (3) A Short History of the Individuals' Groups; (4) Constructing Cognitive Maps About Political Violence; (5) A Computational Analysis of Violent and Nonviolent Activism; (6) Alternative Worlds Without Violence; Conclusion; Appendix 1: Chapter 1: Pearl's Definition for Causal Models and Counterfactuals (Pearl 2000); Appendix 2: Alternative Worlds Without Violence.

Maik Fielitz and Laura Lotte Laloire (Eds.), *Trouble on the Far Right: Contemporary Right-Wing Strategies and Practices in Europe* (Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript Verlag, 2016), 208 pp., US \$ 30.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-3-8376-3720-5.

Table of Contents: Part I: To Begin With; (1) Trouble on the Far Right: Introductory Remarks; (2) Europe's Far

Right in Flux; Part II: At the Ballot Box; (3) No One-Trick Ponies: The Multifaceted Appeal of the Populist Radical Right; (4) The Far Right in Austria: Small on the Streets, Big in Parliament; (5) The Turning Fortunes of Romania's Far Right: The Rise and Fall of Greater Romania Party; (6) Svoboda and the Restructuring of Ukrainian Nationalism; Part III: On the Street; (7) Don't Call me Right!: The Strategy of Normalization in German Right-Wing Extremism; (8) On Patrol with the New German Vigilantes; (9) CasaPound Italia: The Fascist Hybrid; (10) Who Are 'They'? Continuities and Changes in the Discourse of CasaPound Italia on Migration and Otherness; (11) What's in the Mind of the Neo-Nazi Next Door?: A Personal Reflection on the Rise and Persistence of Golden Dawn in Greece; Part IV: Over Cultural Hegemony; (12) Preparing for (Intellectual) Civil War: The New Right in Austria and Germany; (13) The Strategy of the French Identitaires: Entering Politics through the Media; (14) Arguing with the Nouvelle Droite: Substantive Debate, Partisan Polemics or Truth Seeking? (15) Black Sheep in a Far-Right Zoo?: Fethullah Gülen's Strategy of 'Non-Violence'; (16) Women and their Rights in the Nationalists' Strategies: Abortion as a Contentious Issue in the Polish 'Culture War'; Part V: Underground; (17) A Warfare Mindset: Right-Wing Extremism and 'Counter-State Terror' as a Threat for Western Democracies; (18) Right-Wing Terrorism and Hate Crime in the UK; Part VI: Within; (19) Patterns of Far-Right and Anti-Muslim Mobilization in the United Kingdom; But – Where Do These People Come From?: The (Re)Emergence of Radical Nationalism in Finland; (20) The Far Right in Latvia: Should We Be Worried?; (21) The Achilles' Heel of Bulgaria's Patriotic Front; (22) The Changing Face of Neo-Nazism.

James Fitzgerald, Nadya Ali, and Megan Armstrong (Eds.), *Terrorism and Policy Relevance: Critical Perspectives* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 154 pp., US \$ 155.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 49.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1388-9486-0.

Table of Contents: (1) Editors' introduction: critical terrorism studies: reflections on policy-relevance and disciplinarity; (2) Critical terrorism studies, victimisation, and policy relevance: compromising politics or challenging hegemony; (3) Terror from behind the keyboard: conceptualising faceless detractors and guarantors of security in cyberspace; (4) 'Read it in the papers, seen it on TV...': the 1981 Libyan hit squad scare as a case of simulated terrorism in the United States; (5) Ask the audience: television, security and Homeland (6) Interrogating representations of 'militants' and 'terrorists' in the United States' Militant Imagery Project and the Counterterrorism Calendar; (7) To be or not to be policy relevant? Power, emancipation and resistance in CTS research; (8) Dialogue, praxis and the state: a response to Richard Jackson; (9) Counter-radicalisation policy across Europe: an interview with Maarten van de Donk (Radicalisation Awareness Network); (10) Frontline perspectives on preventing violent extremism: an interview with Alyas Karmani (STREET UK).

Timothy Howe and Lee L. Brice (Eds.), *Brill's Companion to Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2016), 372 pp., US \$ 184.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-0042-2235-9.

Table of Contents: Series Foreword; Preface; Part 1: (1) Introduction; Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient World, Grounding the Discussion; Part 2: The Ancient Near East; (2) Insurgency and Terror in Mesopotamia; (3) Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Assyrian Empire during the Late Eight Century BCE; (4) Fourth Century Revolts against Persia: The Test Case of Sidon (348-345 BCE); Part 3: Classical Greece and the Hellenistic World; (5) Spartan State Terror: Violence, Humiliation, and the Reinforcement of Social Boundaries in Classical Sparta; (6) Alexander and 'Afghan Insurgency': A Reassessment; (7) Insurgency in Ptolemaic Egypt; Part 4: The Roman World; (8) Insurgency or State Terrorism? The Hispanic Wars in the Second Century BCE; (9) Roman Counterinsurgency Policy and Practice in Judaea; (10) From Batavian Revolt to Rhenish Insurgency; (11) Gallic Insurgencies? Annihilating the Bagaudae; (12) Epilogue: Looking Ahead.

Noriyuki Katagiri, *Adapting to Win: How Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign States in War* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 312 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4641-4.

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Randall D. Law, *Terrorism: A History* [Second Edition] (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016), 378 pp., US \$ 84.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 26.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-9090-6.

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Barak Mendelsohn, *Jihadism Constrained: The Limits of Transnational Jihadism and What it Means for Counterterrorism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 176 pp., US \$ 80.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 34.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5381-1848-1.

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Thomas M. Nichols, *Eve of Destruction: The Coming Age of Preventive War* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 192 pp., US \$ 45.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4065-5.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) A New Age of Prevention; (2) Humanitarian Intervention, Sovereignty, and Prevention; (3) The End of Deterrence; (4) International Perspectives on Preemption and Prevention; (5) After Iraq; (6) Governing the New Age of Prevention; Afterword Now What?

Chiara Ruffa, *Military Cultures in Peace and Stability Operations: Afghanistan and Lebanon* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 204 pp., US \$ 65.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-5018-3.

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Martin Shaw, *What is Genocide?* [Second Edition] (Medford, MA: Polity, 2015), 232 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 26.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-8707-0.

Table of Contents: Preface to the Second Edition; (1) Introduction: The Importance of Definition; Part I: The Genocide Idea; (2) Raphael Lemkin and the Idea of Genocide; (3) The Concept After Lemkin; (4) The Holocaust Standard; (5) The 'Cleansing' Euphemism; (6) The Many 'Cides' of Genocide; Part II: Agency and Structure in Genocide; (7) From Internationality to a Structural Concept; (8) The Structure of Genocide Conflict and War; (9) Actors and Process in Genocidal Conflict; (10) Structural Contexts: Explaining Modern Genocide; (11) Conclusion: New Definitions.

Thomas W. Simon, *Genocide, Torture, and Terrorism* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 244 pp., US \$ 109.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-1374-1510-3.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I: Comparing Injustice: The Centrality of Genocide; (1) Comparing Wrongs; (2) Comparing Genocides; (3) Rwanda: Undervalued Injustice; Part II: Comparative Applications: War on Terror's Distortions; (4) Torture: Undervalued Injustice; (5) Terrorism: Overvalued Injustice; Part III: From Theory to Practice: Humanitarian Intervention Revised; (6) Universal Wrongs: *Jus Cogens*; (7) Duty to Act: Beyond Responsibility to Protect; Conclusion; Appendix A: "Genocide, Torture, and Terrorism Compared; Appendix B: International Crimes Compared.

Lisa Stampnitzky, *Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented "Terrorism"* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 246 pp., US \$ 125.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 29.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1076-9734-8.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) The Invention of Terrorism and the Rise of the Terrorism Experts; (3) From Insurgencies to Terrorists, Experts, Rational Knowledge, and Irrational Subjects; (4) Disasters, Diplomats, and Databases: Rationalization and its Discontents; (5) 'Terrorism Fever': The First War on Terror and the Politicization of Expertise; (6) 'Loose Can(n)ons' From 'Small Wars' to the 'New Terrorism'; (7) The Road to Pre-Emption; (8) The Politics of (Anti-)Knowledge: Disciplining Terrorism After 9/11; (9) Conclusion: The Trouble With Experts.

Chris E. Stout (Ed.), *Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism: New Psychology to Understand, Face, and Defuse the Threat* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger/ABC-Clio, LLC, 2017), 357 pp., US \$ 58.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4408-5192-6.

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John Schwarzmantel, *Democracy and Political Violence* (Edinburgh, Scotland, UK: Edinburgh, 2011), 224 pp., US \$ 120.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 39.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7486-3796-6.

Table of Contents: (1) Conflict and Community; (2) The Forms and Nature of Political Violence; (3) The State and Violence; (4) Democracy and Terrorism; (5) Ethnic and Nationalist Violence and Democracy; (6) Violence and the Installations of Democracy; (7) Culture, Violence and Democracy; (8) Democracy in Times of Risk and Uncertainty.

Mathias Thaler, *Naming Violence: A Critical Theory of Genocide, Torture, and Terrorism* (Columbia University Press, 2018), 248 pages, US \$ 65.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-2311-8814-2.

Table of Contents: (1) Political Theory Between Moralism and Realism; (2) Telling Stories on Art's Role in Dispelling Genocide Blindness; (3) How to Do Things with Hypotheticals: Assessing Thought Experiments About Torture; (4) Genealogy as Critique: Problematizing Definitions of Terrorism; (5) The Conceptual Tapestry of Political Violence.

W. Kip Viscusi (Ed.), *The Risks of Terrorism* (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 152 pp., US \$ 149.99 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4020-7734-0. (Published as special issue of the *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, Vol. 26, Numbers 2/3, March/May 2003).

Table of Contents: Part I: Risk Beliefs: (1) Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks; (2) Terrorism and Probability Neglect; (3) Judged Terror Risk and Proximity to the World Trade Center; Part II: Insurance Market Effects; (4) Catastrophic Events, Parameter Uncertainty and the Breakdown of Implicit Long-Term Contracting: The Case of Terrorism Insurance; (5) Insuring September 11th: Markets Recovery and Transparency; Part III: Policy Responses; (6) The Ecology of Terror Defense; (7) Interdependent Security.

Anna Zizola and Paolo Inghilleri, *Women on the Verge of Jihad: The Hidden Pathways Towards Radicalization* (Milan, Italy: Mimesis International, 2018), 120 pp., US \$ 14.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-8-8697-7131-6.

Table of Contents: An Introduction: Clear Actions, Hidden Mechanisms; (1) The Active Role of Women in the Jihad; (2) From the Mind to the Politics: Main Causes of Women Radicalization; (3) Women and Islamist Online Propaganda; (4) Case Studies of Western Female Jihadists; (5) Women in Counter-Terrorism Programs; (6) Conclusions.

Terrorist Groups

Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), 340 pp., US \$ 79.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 36.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-4296-3.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) We Deal with Allah Directly; (2) In the Path of al-Qassam; (3) Sowing; (4) The First Intifada; (5) Oslo and 'Vain Endeavours'; (6) The Second Intifada; (7) The Qassam Brigades; (8) The Martyrs Syndrome; (9) Harvesting; (10) Women; (11) A House Divided; (12) Bullet and Ballot; (13) Hamastan; (14) Inferno.

Country Studies

Chechnya

James Hughes, *Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 296 pp., US \$ 26.50 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4013-9.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) The Causes of Conflict; (2) Russia's Refederalization and Chechnya's Secession; (3) A Secular Nationalist Conflict; (4) Dual Radicalization: The Making of Jihad; (5) Chechnya and the Meaning of Terrorism; (6) Chechnya and the Study of Conflict; (7) Conclusion.

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Darren Kelsey, *Media, Myth and Terrorism: A Discourse-Methodological Analysis of the 'Blitz Spirit' in British Newspaper Responses to the July 7th Bombings* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 226 pp., US \$ 119.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 99.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1374-1068-9.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction: The Politics of Remembering and the Myth of the Blitz; (2) Journalism, Storytelling and Ideology: A Discourse-Mythological Approach; (3) Media and the War on Terror; (4) Statistical Analysis of British Newspapers after the 7 July Bombings; (5) London Responds: Wartime Defiance and Front-Line Heroism; (6) The FTSE Fights on: Discourses of the City, the Stock Market and the Economy; (7) Rituals of National Narration: The Symbolic Role of Commemorative Events and the Royal Family; (8) Discourses of International Unity: The 'Special Relationship' and Western Foreign Policy; (9) Soft-Touch Justice: Blaming Human Rights and Multiculturalism; (10) Conclusion: Mythologies of the Past, Present and Future.

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Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) The Emergence of Islamist Communities in Britain; (2) Crevice: The Fateful Decision to Attack Britain; (3) Theseus: The London Bombings; (4) Vivace: The Failed Copycat London Bombings; (5) Overt: The Transatlantic Airlines Liquid Bombs Plot; (6) Getting the Story Straight.

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Bidyut Chakrabarty and Rajat Kumar Kujur, *Maoism in India: Reincarnation of Ultra-Left Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 264 pp., US \$ 165.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 59.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-4155-3352-2.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Maoism, Governance and the Red Corridor; (2) Genesis of Maoism in India; (3) Maoism: The Roadmap for Future India; (4) Growth and Consolidation of Maoism in Orissa; (5) Maoism in Orissa: Socio-Economic Indicators; (6) The Maoist Organization and State Response; (7) Maoism: Articulation of an Ideology and its Future; Conclusion; Appendix 1: Left-Wing Extremist (Naxalite) Affected Areas; Appendix 2: Party Constitution of the Communist Party of India (Maoist); Appendix 3: Programme and Constitution of the People's Guerrilla Army; Appendix 4: The Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy of the Government of Orissa; Appendix 5: CPI (Maoist Central Committee); Appendix 6: Naxal-Influenced Districts of Orissa.

Durba Ghosh, *Gentlemanly Terrorists: Political Violence and the Colonial State in India, 1919-1947* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 290 pp., US \$ 93.99 [Hardcover], US \$ 29.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-3166-3738-8.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) The Reforms of 1919: Montagu-Chelmsford, the Rowlatt Act, Jails Commission, and the Royal Amnesty; (2) The History of Revolutionary Terrorism Through Autobiography; (3) After Chauri Chaura: The Revival and Repression of Revolutionary Terrorism; (4) After the Chittagong Armoury Raid: Revolutionary Terrorism in the 1930s; (5) From Political Prisoner to Security Prisoner; (6) Revolutionary Autobiographies: Postcolonial Tellings of Nationalist History; Conclusion.

Sarab Jit Singh, *Operation Black Thunder: An Eyewitness Account of Terrorism in Punjab* (Thousand Oaks,

CA: Sage Publications, 2002/2014), 364 pp., US \$ 32.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-8-1321-1794-0.

Table of Contents: Foreword; Preface; (1) The Golden Temple: In the Eye of the Storm; (2) The Sikh Heritage and the Punjab Problem; (3) The Rajiv-Longowal Accord: The 'Secret' Healing Touch; (4) S. Barnala's Government: The Healing Touch Impaired; (5) Governor Ray's Tenure; (6) The Politics of the Clergy; (7) January—March 1988: The Killings Increase; (8) April—May 1988: Measures to End the Killing; (9) Operation Black Thunder; (10) The Militants Surrender; (11) Trial at Midnight; (12) Restoring the *Maryada*; (13) Demoralisation Versus a Gun Battle; (14) The SGPC's Dilemma; (15) Jasbir Singh Rode's Dismissal; (16) The Corridor Plan; (17) Jasbir Singh Rode Resurrected; (18) *Panchayat* Elections Postponed: Missed Opportunities; (19) The Militants and the Police: Between the Two Terrors; (20) The 'National Games'; (21) A New Government at the Centre; (22) The 'Civil Face' of Governor Mukherjee's Administration; (23) Governor Varma's Tenure; (24) 1990: The Killings Continue; (25) Governor Malhotra Takes Charge; (26) Attempts to Restore Democracy; (27) Delhi's Inconsistent Punjab Policy; (28) Elections by February 1992; (29) From President's Rule to an Elected Government: The Return of Democracy; (30) In Retrospect.

Israel

Alexander Bligh, *Israeli Prisoner of War Policies: From the 1949 Armistice to the 2006 Kidnappings* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2017), 312 pp., US \$ 110.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-7391-9471-3.

Table of Contents: Part I: The Legal, Intelligence, and Policy Sources of the Israeli Policies; (1) The Internationally Agreed upon Standards for Recognizing POWs/MIAs and the Israeli Working Definitions; (2) The Intelligence Dimension of Taking and Losing POWs; (3) Early Indications of an Emerging Policy: Strategic Defeats and Tactical Successes, 1949-1955; Part II: Israel and the Arab Nation States: The Emergence of POW Rules in Light of the Regional Battlefields, 1955-1967; (4) De Facto Policy in the Shadow of a Coming War, 1955-1956; (5) Israel Extends Its Own Working Interpretation of the Term POW: Prisoner Issues in the Wake of the 1956 Conflict to late 1962; (6) New Regimes, Old Policies, and the Connection between Regime Changes and the Fate of Israeli Agents in Hostile Hands, 1963-1967; (7) The 1967 War: Extending the Israeli Definition of POWs; Part III: Israel, the State Actors, and the Subnational Players: New Rules, Parallel Systems, and the Merging of the Two – the Fourth Generation; (8) The 1967–1970 Crucial Interregnum: The Challenging Legacy of the War of Attrition; (9) Black September, Sub-National Actors, and the Early Internationalization of the Hostage/POW Issue, 1970–1973; (10) The 1973 War as a Watershed Line and the Dramatic Shift to Defensive POW Policies; Part IV: Fourth-Generation Approaches Taking Over: POWs and Hostages as a Means for Smaller Powers to Gain Parity with Israel; (11) The Palestinian Sub-State Actors Taking Over: From POWs to Hostages? The Effect of Fourth Generation Players on the Making of POW Policies, 1974 -1985; (12) Sub-National Actors Taking Center Stage in the POW Context: 1986 to 2011; Conclusion.

Thomas E. Copeland, with Alethia H. Cook and Lisa M. McCartan (Eds.), *Drawing A Line in the Sea: The 2010 Gaza Flotilla Incident and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011/2013), 200 pp., US \$ 92.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 44.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7391-8807-1.

Table of Contents: Introduction: Understanding the Gaza Flotilla Incident; Part 1: The Scenario; (2) Ethnic and Religious Dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian Struggle; (3) Why There? The Origin, Evolution, and Historical Significance of the Gaza Strip; (4) Iran and Weapons Proliferation in Lebanon and Gaza; (5) Ethical Considerations and Israeli Policy towards the Palestinians; Part 2: The Players; (6) Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Mavi Marmara Incident as its Statement; (7) Hamas - Ideology, Elections, and Governance in Gaza; (8) Charity Begins (and Ends?) at Home: The Nexus between Islamic Social Welfare and the Funding of Terrorism; (9) RMA's, Hybrid Wars, and the Gaza Flotilla Incident; Part 3: The Incident and Its Aftermath; (10) Tactical Ethics: An Evaluation of the Israeli Naval Commando Assault on the MV *Mavi Marmara*; (11) Playing Offense and Defense: Examining the Effectiveness of Israel's Counterterrorism Strategies; (12) Understanding American Media Reaction to the Gaza Flotilla Incident; (13) US-Israeli Relations in the Wake of the Flotilla Incident; (14) Drawing a Line in the Sea: What the Gaza Flotilla Incident Means; Glossary of Terms.

John Ehrenberg and Yoav Peled (Eds), *Israel and Palestine: Alternative Perspectives on Statehood* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 396 pp., US \$ 89.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4422-4507-5.

Table of Contents: Introduction: The Picture; Part I: Overviews; (1) Facing the Music: Israel, Palestine, and the Politics of Partisan Delusions; (2) Making Sense of the Nakba: Ari Shavit, Baruch Marzel, and Zionist Claims to Territory; (3) Israel and the Closing of the American Jewish Mind; (4) The Root Causes of Enduring Conflict: Can Israel and Palestine Co-Exist?; (5) Reclaiming Human Rights: Alternative Paths to an Israeli/Palestinian Peace; Part II: Two States; (6) Not Exactly Apartheid: Between Settler Colonialism and Military Occupation; (7) The One-State Delusion; (8) To What Extent Reconciliation? An Analysis of the Geneva Accord between Israelis and Palestinians; (9) One Country Two States: Planning Alternative Spatial Relations between Palestine and Israel From Back to Back to Face to Face; Part III: The One-State Alternative; (10) The Way Forward in the Middle East; (11) The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects; (12) A One-State Solution? From a 'Struggle Unto Death' to 'Master-Slave' Dialectics; (13) Past and Present Perfect of Israel's One-State Solution; (14) Toward a Shared Vision of Israel and Israel/Palestine; (15) Neither One nor Two: Reflections about a Shared Future in Israel-Palestine; (16) Between One and Two: Apartheid or Confederation for Israel/Palestine?; (17) Beyond Traditional Sovereignty Theory in Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Israel/Palestine; Conclusion: Out of the Darkness.

Raphael D. Marcus, *Israel's Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation Under Fire* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 320 pp., US \$ 110.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 36.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-6261-6611-0.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I: Strategic Adaptation; Introduction to Part I; (1) IDF 'Routine Security' and the Evolution of Hezbollah (1985-92); (2) Deterrence, Guerrilla Warfare, and the Establishment of the 'Rules of the Game' (1993-99); (3) A Change in the Strategic Equation: The IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000); (4) The Erosion of Deterrence, the 2006 War, and the Dahiya Doctrine (2000-17); Conclusion to Part I; Part II: Operational Adaptation; Introduction to Part II; (5) The Origins of the RMA in Israel; (6) The RMA in Action: IDF Operations in Lebanon and Hezbollah's Adaptation in the 1990s; (7) The Rise of the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute and Systemic Operational Design; (8) The 2006 Lebanon War: Military Adaptation and Counteradaptation; (9) The Blame Game: A Reappraisal of the IDF's 2006 Operational Concept; Conclusion to Part II; Conclusions; Afterword: Back to the Future: IDF Force Planning and Hezbollah's Military Adaptation in Syria; Chronology.

Tamara Neuman, *Settling Hebron: Jewish Fundamentalism in a Palestinian City* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 256 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4995-8.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Orientations; (2) Between Legality and Illegality; (3) Motherhood and Property Takeover; (4) Spaces of the Everyday; (5) Religious Violence; (6) Lost Tribes and the Quest for Origins; Conclusion: Unsettling Settlers.

Gershon Shafir, *A Half Century of Occupation: Israel, Palestine, and the World's Most Intractable Conflict* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 296 pp., US \$ 26.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-5202-9350-2.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) What is the Occupation; (2) Why Has the Occupation Lasted This Long?; (3) How has the Occupation Transformed the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?; Appendix: List of Israeli Prime Ministers, PLO Chairmen, and Palestinian National Authority Presidents and Prime Ministers.

Jessie Blackbourn, *Anti-Terrorism Law and Normalising Northern Ireland* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 212 pp., US \$ 160.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 53.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1382-0196-5.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Resolving the Constitutional Question; (2) Devolution and Decommissioning; (3) The 'Normalization of Security' I: The Removal of Emergency Powers; (4) The 'Normalization of Security' II: The Military in Northern Ireland; (5) Normalizing Policing and Justice; (6) Paramilitary Prisoners; (7) Northern Ireland: The New Normal?

Pakistan

Jawad Syed, Edwina Pio, Tahir Kamran, and Abbas Zaidi (Eds.), *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 546 pp., US \$ 169.99 [Hardcover], US \$ 169.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-3499-4965-6.

Table of Contents: Introduction: An Alternative Discourse on Religious Militancy; (2) Could Pakistan Have Remained Pluralistic?; (3) The Genesis, Evolution and Impact of 'Deobandi' Islam on the Punjab: An Overview; (4) Covering Faith-Based Violence: Structure and Semantics of News Reporting in Pakistan; (5) Historical Roots of the Deobandi Version of Jihadism and Its Implications for Violence in Today's Pakistan; (6) Experiences of Female Victims of Faith-Based Violence in Pakistan; (7) Marked by the Cross: The Persecution of Christians in Pakistan; (8) Pakistan: A Conducive Setting for Islamist Violence Against Ahmadis; (9) Barelvi Militancy in Pakistan and Salmaan Taseer's Murder; (10) The Shias of Pakistan: Mapping an Altruistic Genocide; (11) The Intra-Sunni Conflicts in Pakistan; (12) Genealogical Sociology of Sectarianism: A Case Study of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; (13) Islamization and Barelvis in Pakistan; (14) Fighting the Takfiris: Building an Inclusive American Muslim Community by Countering Anti-Shia Rhetoric in the USA; (15) The 'Othering' of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh; (16) Hidden in Plain Sight: Deobandis, Islamism and British Multiculturalism Policy; (17) Violence and the Deobandi Movement; (18) Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: A Critical Overview.

Counterterrorism—General

Christopher Baker-Beall, *The European Union's Fight Against Terrorism: Discourse, Policies, Identity* (Manchester, England, UK: Manchester University Press, 2016), 216 pp., US \$ 120.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 37.50 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7190-9106-3.

Table of Contents: Introduction: the Language of the European Union's 'Fight Against Terrorism'; (1) Investigating the Language of EU Counter-Terrorism: Analytical Techniques; (2) Constructing the Threat of Terrorism in Western Europe and the European Union: a Genealogy; (3) Constructing the 'Terrorist' Other: a 'New' and 'Evolving' Threat to the European Union; (4) Constructing the 'Migrant' Other: Globalisation, Securitisation and Control; (5) Constructing the 'Muslim' Other: Preventing 'Radicalisation', 'Violent Extremism' and 'Terrorism'; (6) Conclusion: The 'Fight Against Terrorism' Discourse and the EU's Emerging Role as a Holistic Security Actor.

T. Hamid al-Bayati, *A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Why the World Failed to Stop al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL, and How to Defeat Terrorists* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017), 280 pp., US \$ 75.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4408-4687-8.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I: Why the World Failed to Stop Al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL; (1) U.S. Presidents' Counterterrorism Strategy; (2) Why the World Failed to Stop Al Qaeda; (3) Why the World Failed to Stop ISIS/ISIL; (4) Funding Terrorism; (5) Terrorists Exploit the Internet; (6) Lone Wolf Terrorists; (7)

Terrorist Groups Attract Foreign Fighters; (8) Terrorist Groups' Ideology; Part II: A New 12-Step Counterterrorism Strategy to Defeat Terrorists; (9) Strategy to Stop Terrorists' Funding; (10) Strategy to Stop Internet Terrorism; (11) Strategy to Stop Lone Wolf Terrorists; (12) Strategy to Stop Foreign Fighters; (13) Strategy for the War of Ideology; (14) Strategy to Stop Future Terrorism; (15) Conclusion: The New 12-Step Counterterrorism Strategy to Defeat Terrorists.

James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 528 pp., US \$ 26.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7006-1240-6.

Table of Contents: Preface; Introduction; (1) Biplanes and Bandits: The Early U.S. Airpower Experience in Small Wars; (2) Colonial Air Control: The European Powers Develop New Concepts of Air Warfare; (3) The Greek Civil War and the Philippine Anti-Huk Campaign; (4) The French Colonial Wars, 1946-1962: Indochina and Algeria; (5) The British Colonial Wars, 1945-1973: Malaya, South Arabia, and Oman; (6) Airpower in South Vietnam, 1954-1965; (7) Airpower and Counterinsurgency in Southern Africa; (8) Protracted Insurgencies: Latin American Air Forces in Counter guerrilla Operations; (9) Intervention in the Mideast, 1962-2000: Three Counterinsurgency Campaigns; (10) Conclusion.

Kathleen Gleeson, *Australia's 'War on Terror' Discourse* (New York, NY: Ashgate Publishing 2014/Routledge, 2016), pp., US \$ 165.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 59.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1382-7202-6.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Analyzing the 'war on terror' Discourse; (2) Interpretation and Response; (3) The Architecture of the Discourse; (4) Australia's 'war on terror': Phase One; (5) Australia's 'war on terror': Phase Two; (6) A Genealogy of Dissent; Conclusion: From Self to Other.

Hendrik Hegemann, *International Counterterrorism Bureaucracies in the United Nations and the European Union* [A publication of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg] (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos/Bloomsbury, 2014), 320 pp., US \$ 90.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4742-4315-5.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Analyzing International Bureaucracies: A Theoretical Framework; (3) Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and International Cooperation: Surveying an Ambivalent Field; (4) The United Nations and the European Union in the Fight against Terrorism; (5) Case Study 1: The United Nations Secretariat; (6) Case Study 2: The UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate; (7) Case Study 3: The European Commission; (8) Case Study 4: The EU Counterterrorism Coordinator; (9) Conclusion.

Dorle Hellmuth, *Counter Terrorism and the State: Western Responses to 9/11* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 392 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-8122-4743-5.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) The Conceptual Debate: Setting the Stage for Structural Analysis; (2) Case Study I: The United States; (3) Case Study II: Germany; (4) Case Study III: Great Britain; (5) Case Study IV: France; (6) Comparative Analysis of Structural Effects on Counterterrorism Decision-Making; Summary of Findings and Conclusion.

Isaac Kfir and Georgia Grice (Eds.), *Counterterrorism Yearbook 2019* (Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 2019), 146 pp., no price [Paperback], https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-03/ASPI%20Counterterrorism%20YB2019_acc_1.pdf?VWvpiCRC_om4gXFvmBHvSn-0NIDNOOrMvM.

Table of Contents: Preface; Introduction; Australia; Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia; China: Repression at Home, Extension Abroad; Bangladesh and India; Afghanistan and Pakistan; The Middle East and Counterterrorism; East Africa; West Africa and the Sahel; Western Europe; After the Caliphate: New Developments

in Response to Foreign Terrorist Fighters; The Future of Countering Violent Extremism; Negotiating With Terrorists; Counterterrorism in Cyberspace; Social Media and Counterterrorism; Countering Terrorism Financing: An Australian Case Study; Assessing Innovations and New Trends in Counterterrorism.

Mark M. Lowenthal, *The Future of Intelligence* (Medford, MA: Polity, 2018), 160 pp., US \$ 59.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 19.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5095-2029-9.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) What this Book is About; (2) Technology Vectors; (3) Analysis Vectors; (4) Governance Vectors; (5) Looking Ahead (Includes a discussion of the role of intelligence in counterterrorism).

Kevin McGrath, *Confronting al Qaeda: New Strategies to Combat Terrorism* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 336 pp., US \$ 42.95 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-5911-4503-5.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) The Framework of the U.S.-Al Qaeda Struggle; (2) A Game of Twister: Al Qaeda Strategy; (3) Herding Cats: Al Qaeda Post 9/11 Modus Operandi; (4) The Heart of the Conflict: The U.S.-Al Qaeda Struggle's Political Dimension; (5) A Question of Importance: The Obama Administration and Iraq; (6) A Question of Priorities: The Obama Administration; (7) A Question of Leverage: The Obama Administration and Pakistan; (8) A Question of Willpower: The Obama Administration and Afghanistan; Conclusion: The Obama Administration and the Way Forward.

William Nester, *America's War Against Global Jihad: Past, Present, and Future* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 404 pp., US \$ 120.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4985-7530-0.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part I: The Ways of War; (1) The Islamic Way of War to 9/11; (2) The American Way of War to 9/11; (3) Revolution and Counterrevolution; (4) Terrorism and Counterterrorism; Part II: The Primary Fronts; (5) Afghanistan and Pakistan; (6) Iraq and Syria; Part III: The Secondary Fronts; (7) Hezbollah and Iran; (8) Hamas and Israel; (9) The Arab Spring and Fall; (10) Jihad and the Wider Muslim World; Part IV: The Ways Ahead; (11) Global Jihad; (12) Nightmares and Dawns.

Bryan C. Price, *Targeting Top Terrorists: Understanding Leadership Removal in Counterterrorism Strategy* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2019), 288 pp., US \$ 90.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 30.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-2311-8823-4.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Organizations and Leaders; (3) Leadership in Terrorist Organizations; (4) Quantitative Analysis of Leadership Decapitation in Terrorist Groups; (5) The Effects of Leadership Decapitation on Hamas; (6) Conclusion: Policy Implications and Future Research; Appendix: Terrorist Groups by Category.

G r me Truc [translated by Andrew Brown], *Shell Shocked: The Social Response to Terrorist Attacks* (Medford, MA: Polity, 2018), 280 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 28.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5095-2034-3.

Table of Contents: Preface; Introduction: Terrorist attacks as a test; Part I: What is happening to us; (1) Under attack (9/11 live: accident, terrorist attack, or act of war?; The view from Europe: from Western solidarity to a cosmopolitan perspective); (2) Experiencing your 'own' 9/11 (11 March attacks like a 'new 9/11'; 7 July 2005, a 'British 9/11?'); (3) To show, or not to show, violence (The place of the dead; The ethics of iconographic decisions); (4) Demonstrating solidarity (The attacks as a 'time to demonstrate'; Why demonstrate after an attack?); (5) Observing silence (A ritual of collective mourning; A problem of moral equivalence); Part II: What touches us; (6) Terrorist attacks and their publics (From written reactions to the concerned publics; In what capacity an attack concerns us); (7) The meanings of 'we' (Above and below the level of the nation; World cities and the test of terrorism); (8) The values at stake (Reactions to terrorist attacks as value judg-

ments; The banal pacifism of the Europeans); (9) The attacks in persons (The singularization of the victims; Reacting as a singular person); (10) Solidarity in the singular (The attachment to place; The coincidence of dates; The homology of experiences); Conclusion: 'There's something of Charlie in all of us'; Afterword to the English edition.

Counterterrorism—Countering Violent Extremism

Kawser Ahmed, Patrick Belanger, and Susan Szmania. *Community-Focused Counter-Radicalization and Counter-Terrorism Projects: Experiences and Lessons Learned* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 20180, 132 pp. US \$ 85.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4985-5776-4.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Community Projects and Collaborations; (2) What Drives Radicalization? Perspectives from the Field; (3) Challenges of Community-Based Projects; (4) Community Resilience; (5) Toward a 'Complex-Adaptive' Model.

Counterterrorism—Conflict Resolution

Nina Caspersen, *Peace Agreements: Finding Solutions to Intra-State Conflicts* (Medford, MA: Polity, 2017), 224 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-8027-9.

Table of Contents: Introduction; Part 1: Content; (1) Territory; (2) Security; (3) Power; (4) Justice; (5) A Post-Cold War Blueprint for Peace?; Part 2: Context and Process; (6) Internal Dynamics: A Right Time for Peace; (7) External Involvement: Opportunities and Constraints; Conclusion.

Christopher Coker, *Can War Be Eliminated?* (Medford, MA: Polity, 2014), 120 pp., US \$ 45.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 12.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-7923-5.

Table of Contents: Prologue; (1) Evolution; (2) Culture; (3) Technology; (4) Geopolitics; (5) Peace; (6) Humanity.

Oliver Ramsbotham, *When Conflict Resolution Fails* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 256 pp., US \$ 69.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-8799-5.

Table of Contents: Preface; Part I: The Argument: (1) Learning from Failure; (2) Conflict Resolution and its Enemies; (3) Why Conflict Resolution Fails; (4) Promoting Strategic Engagement; Part II: Case Study: The Israeli-Palestine Conflict; (5) Strategic Thinking for Possessors: Israelis; (6) Strategic Thinking for Challengers: Palestinians; (7) Strategic Engagement within, across and between Conflict Parties; (8) The Kerry Initiative and the Role of Third Parties; Part III: (9) Other Phases, Other Levels, Other Conflicts; (10) Exploring Agnostic Dialogue; Conclusion: Living with Radical Disagreement.

Eric Y. Shibuya, *Demobilizing Irregular Forces* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 208 pp., US \$ 59.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 19.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-7456-4886-6.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) The History and Evolution of DDR; (3) Disarmament: The Ephemeral Beginning; (4) Demobilization: The Real Heart of the Matter; (5) Reintegration: The End of the Beginning; (6) Challenges and Conclusions.

Counterterrorism—Intelligence

Atin Basuchoudhary, James T. Bang, Tinni Sen, and John David, *Predicting Hotspots: Using Machine*

Learning to Understand Civil Conflict (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018), 178 pp., US \$ 90.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-1-4985-2067-6.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) An Overview of the Literature on Conflict; (2) Machine Learning Methods; (3) The Variables; (4) Preparing the Data; (5) Implementing Machine Learning to Predict Conflict Using R; (6) Models and Results; (7) Choosing from Among Seminal Models of Conflict Theory; (8) Choosing Among Microeconomic Models of Conflict; (9) Bargaining Failure, Commitment Problems, and the Likelihood of Conflict; (10) Toward a Predictive Theoretical Model of Civil Conflict: Some Speculation.

Thomas E. Copeland, *Fool Me Twice: Intelligence Failure and Mass Casualty Terrorism* (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 292 pp., US \$ 130.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-9-0041-5845-0.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center; (3) April 19, 1995: Oklahoma City; (4) June 25, 1996: Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia; (5) August 7, 1998: U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; (6) September 11, 2001: The Twin Towers; (7) Surprise, Again and Again; Appendix: Government-Imposed Restrictions on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations.

Loch K. Johnson, *National Security Intelligence* [Second Edition] (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017), 314 pp., US \$ 74.95 [Hardcover], US \$ 24.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-5095-1305-5.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) National Security Intelligence: The First Line of Defense; (2) Intelligence Collection and Analysis: Knowing about the World; (3) Covert Action: Secret Attempts to Shape History; (4) Counterintelligence: The Hunt for Moles; (5) Safeguards against the Abuse of Secret Power; (6) National Security Intelligence: Shield and Hidden Sword of the Democracies.

Counterterrorism—Legal

Helen Duffy, *The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law* [Second Edition] (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1070 pp., US \$ 165.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 82.00 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1076-0172-7.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; Part I: Terrorism and Responsibility; (2) ‘Terrorism’ in International Law; (3) International Responsibility, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism; Part II: Responding to Terrorism: Legal Framework and Practice; (4) Criminal Justice; (5) The Use of Force; (6) International Humanitarian Law; (7) International Human Rights Law; Part III: Case Studies; (8) Case Study I: Guantanamo Bay Detentions Under International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law; (9) Case Study II: Osama bin Laden – ‘Justice Done?’; (10) Case Study III: Extraordinary Rendition; (11) The Role of the Courts: Human Rights Litigation in the ‘War on Terror’; (12) Conclusion.

Christopher J. Finlay, *Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015/2017), 354 pp., US \$ 113.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 35.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1076-1256-3.

Table of Contents: (1) Introduction; Part I: Theory and Principles; (2) Justice, Oppression, and the Right to Resist; (3) Rights worth Killing for; (4) The Codes of Resistance; (5) Rights Worth Dying for: Distributing the Costs of Resistance; Part II: Wars of Liberation: Fighting Within the Standard JIB; (6) Non-State Groups and the Authority to Wage War; (7) Guerrilla War, Discrimination, and the Problem of Lawful Irregulars; Part III: Fighting Beyond the Law of War; (8) The Partisan *jus in bello*: Resistance Beyond the Laws of War; (9) Terrorist War; (10) Back to the Start: The Ethics of Beginning; Conclusions.

Michael L. Gross, *The Ethics of Insurgency: A Critical Guide to Just Guerrilla Warfare* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 337 pp., US \$ 97.99 [Hardcover], US \$ 35.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1076-8464-5.

Table of Contents: Preface; (1) Just Guerrilla Warfare: Concepts and Cases; Part I: The Right to Fight; (2) The Right to Fight: Just Cause and Legitimate Authority; (3) The Right to Fight: Who Fights and How?; Part II: Hard War; (4) Large-Scale Conventional Guerrilla Warfare: Improvised Explosive Devices, Rockets, and Missiles; (5) Small-Scale Conventional Guerrilla Warfare: Targeted Killing and Taking Prisoners; (6) Human Shields; Part III: Soft War; (7) Terrorism and Cyberterrorism; (8) Economic Warfare and the Economy of War; (9) Public Diplomacy, Propaganda, and Media Warfare; (10) Civil Disobedience and Nonviolent Resistance; Part IV: Concluding Remarks; (11) Just War and Liberal Guerrilla Theorizing.

Jonathan Hafetz, *Punishing Atrocities Through a Fair Trial: International Criminal Law from Nuremberg to the Age of Global Terrorism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 202 pp., US \$ 110.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 32.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1070-9455-0.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Creating the Template: Nuremberg and the Post-World War II International Prosecution; (2) International Criminal Law's Revival and the Challenges of Implementation; (3) The Creation of a Permanent International Criminal Court; (4) Procedure and Fairness in a Decentralized System; (5) The Selectivity Challenge in International Criminal Law; (6) Accountability and Fairness: A Window into the Recurring Debate over Treating Terrorism as a Crime under International Law; Concluding Remarks.

Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, *Battling Terrorism: Legal Perspectives on the Use of Force and the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Ashgate Publishing, 2005/Routledge, 2016), 218 pp., US \$ 165.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 59.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1382-7655-0.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) The Development of the Law Relating to the Use of Force in International Law; (2) Countering Terrorism: An Evaluation of the Law Enforcement and Conflict Management Approaches; (3) The Cold War Era: Terrorist Action and Reaction; (4) Jumping the Gun – An Old Problem as a Solution for New Threats?: Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond; (5) Striking the Enemy's Lair: The War on Terror and State-Sponsored Terrorism; (6) The War on Terror: Rattling International Law with Raw Power?

Mary L. Volcansek and John F. Stack Jr. (Eds.), *Courts and Terrorism: Nine Nations Balance Rights and Security* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011/2014), 284 pp., US \$ 113.00 [Hardcover], US \$ 47.99 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-1-1076-1431-4.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Detentions and Security versus Liberty in Times of National Emergency; (2) One More Casualty of the 'War on Terror'; (3) State Secrets and Democratic Values; (4) What Lessons Can Be Drawn from a *Sui Generis* Case?: The Global 'War on Terror' and Northern Ireland; (5) The British Experience with Terrorism: From the Iraq to Al Qaeda; (6) Detention and Treatment of Suspected Terrorists under the European Convention on Human Rights; (7) Australia's Commonwealth Model and Terrorism; (8) Judicial Rejection as Substantial Relief: The Israeli Supreme Court and the 'War on Terror'; (9) Preserving Rights and Protecting the Public: The Italian Experience; (10) Squaring the Circle: Fighting Terror while Consolidating Democracy in Spain; (11) From Exception to Normalcy: Law, the Judiciary, Civil Rights, and Terrorism in Colombia, 1984-2004; Conclusion: Lessons Learned.

Noah Weisbord, *The Crime of Aggression: The Quest for Justice in an Age of Drones, Cyberattacks, Insurgents, and Autocrats* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 240 pages, US \$ 35.00 [Hardcover], ISBN: 978-0-6911-6987-3.

Table of Contents: Introduction; (1) Is Law Dead?; (2) Timeslip: Invasion of the Crimea, Collapse of the

League of Nations; (3) The Nuremberg Avant-Garde Moment; (4) Cold War *Jus ad Bellum*: Law of Force vs. Rule of Law; (5) Nuremberg Renaissance: The 1990s; (6) The Crime of Aggression: From Rome to Kampala; (7) Judging Wars; (8) Sci-fi Warfare; (9) You're under Arrest, Mr. President; (10) Activation.

About the Reviewer: Dr. Joshua Sinai is the Book Reviews Editor of 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. He can be reached at: Joshua.sinai@comcast.net.

Book Reviews

J.M. Berger, *Extremism* [The MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series] (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018), 216 pp., US \$ 15.95 [Paperback], ISBN: 978-0-2625-3587-8.

Reviewed by Daniela Scerri

J.M. Berger is a prolific writer, publishing in both scholarly and journalistic media. *Extremism* is one of his latest scholarly writings. The book provides a concise introduction about what extremism is, how extremist groups form and develop, how extremist narratives and ideologies are constructed, and why extremist groups become violent, including the intricacies of how in-groups and out-groups develop and how extremism is sustained.

In chapter one, Berger addresses the definitional problem of extremism, highlighting the conflation that exists with aspects of both radicalisation and terrorism. In his view, “*defining extremism is not a casual matter*” (p.21). Using chronological examples of events from history that could be labelled ‘extremist’, he takes us back to the city of Carthage in the second century BC, to the apocalyptic Jihad of Al Qaeda, America’s new “alt-right,” and the anti-Semitic conspiracy tract “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”. In doing so, Berger highlights the many old and modern faces of extremism. In the second chapter Berger questions what extremism is, and in simple terms, offers three insights; “*Extremism is rarely simple. Extremism is not the province of any single race, religion, or political school. Extremism can be profoundly consequential in societies*” (p.23).

What is particularly distinctive in *Extremism* is that Berger does not focus on one ideological or religious frame but uses various examples of extremism from history across the entire social spectrum. Throughout, he applies the social identity approach of Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner to illustrate how people categorize themselves and others as members of competing social groups. Using this theory, Berger develops his central argument and explains in detail the inter-group dynamics of in-groups and out-groups—“*us versus them*” (p.24) and what occurs when extremism escalates.

Subtly, Berger revisits the definitional problem of extremism, violent extremism, and radicalisation, highlighting differences. Whilst disentangling terrorism from extremism, stating that extremism is a belief system, he goes on to develop his own working definition of extremism; “*Extremism refers to the belief that an in-group’s success or survival can never be separated from the need for hostile action against an out-group. The hostile action must be part of the in-group’s definition of success. Hostile acts can range from verbal attacks and diminishment to discriminatory behavior, violence, and even genocide*” (p.44). According to Berger, both structure and content of extremist ideologies are key.

Chapter three examines how identity movements define and sub-divide in-groups and out-groups. Establishing a collective identity made up of beliefs, traits and practices are central in defining the in-group. Berger points out how a hostile attitude towards the out-group is “*defined through a narrative process of identity construction that parallels the construction of the in-group definition*” (p.57). Rigid boundaries are set up between in-groups and out-groups, “*almost universally framed by the belief of its own purity...*” (p.64).

In chapter four, Berger provides the reader with a detailed analysis of crises and solutions that drive violence and other hostile interactions amongst collectives. The most common crisis narratives used by extremists, include impurity, conspiracy, dystopia, existential threat, apocalypse and triumphalism. Being outside ordinary politics, extremist groups only seek to resolve conflicts through “*crisis-solution constructs*” (p.99) leading to the use of hostile actions. Terrorism is only one possible tactic available to extremists.

Chapter five is dedicated to the concept of radicalisation. Berger views the “*process of adoption*” [of an ideology as] “*more instructive than the contents of the ideology.*” (p.119) Grievances are described as “*common elements in extremist arguments and rationalizations*” (p. 127). Using the Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and modern-day jihadist foreign fighters as examples, Berger indicates that there are two potential cross-ideological drivers of radicalisation. These are, “*the effects of categorisation and learning bias, and the effects of disruptions to the status quo*” (p.132). According to Berger, one very effective strategy adopted to cope with uncertainty is

a group identity that is distinctive and clearly defined. Moreover, extremist ideologies work when they provide *entitativity*, which is defined as “*the property of a group, resting on clear boundaries and internal homogeneity, social interaction, clear internal structure, common goals and common fate*” (p. 139).

In his concluding remarks, Berger reminds us that extremism is not a new phenomenon. Countering it is no easy feat but without clear definitions, solutions remain elusive. Therefore, more efforts need to be made to understand what is meant not only by extremism, but also by radicalisation and other muddled concepts.

Elegantly written, the book provides a lucid discussion of a contested concept, with illustrating examples from right-wing, left-wing, and religious terrorism. For anyone new to the extremism landscape, it is an excellent introductory text to better understand political extremism. John M. Berger is a publisher at Intelwire.com, as well as co-author of the critically acclaimed volume *ISIS: The State of Terror* with Jessica Stern (New York: Harper-Collins, 2015).

About the Reviewer: Daniela Scerri is a postgraduate research student at the School of Law, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK.

Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects

Compiled and selected by Bert Jongman

Most of the items included below became available online between April and June 2019. They are categorized under the following headings:

1. Non-Religious Terrorism
2. Religious Terrorism
 - 2.1. *Al-Qaeda and Affiliates*
 - 2.2. *Daesh (IS, ISIL, ISIS) and Affiliates*
 - 2.3. *Other Organizations*
3. Terrorist Strategies and Tactics
4. Conflict, Crime and Political Violence other than Terrorism
 - 4.a. *Organized Crime Group*
 - 4.b. *Hate Crimes, Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, Xenophobia*
 - 4.c. *Extremist and Radical Groups*
 - 4.c.a. *Right-wing Extremism*
 - 4.c.b. *Left-wing Extremism*
 - 4.c.c. *Islamist Extremism*
 - 4.c.d. *Single Issue Extremism*
5. Counter-Terrorism - General
6. Counter-Terrorism Strategies and Operations
 - 6.a. *General*
 - 6.b. *Foreign Fighters and their Families*
 - 6.c. *Prosecution, Sentences*
7. State Repression, Gross Human Rights Violations, and Clandestine Warfare
 - 7.a. *Arbitrary Arrest/Detention*
 - 7.b. *Extrajudicial Killings, Executions*
 - 7.c. *Forced Disappearance*
 - 7.d. *Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity*
 - 7.e. *State Repression by Extended Surveillance Capabilities*
8. Prevention, Preparedness, and Resilience Studies
9. Intelligence
 - 9.a. *Organizations*
 - 9.b. *Operations*
10. Cyber Operations

10.a. General

10.b. Cyber Crime

10.c. Cyber Warfare & Espionage

11. Information Warfare

11.a. Internet Governance - General

11.b. Internet Regulation/Censorship/Removal of Harmful Content

11.c. Counter-Narratives

11.d. Strategic Communication/Information Warfare/Influence Operations

11.e. Internet Jihad

12. Risk and Threat Assessments, Forecasts, and Analytical Studies

12.a. Analytical Studies

12.b. Terrorism Databases

12.c. Specific and National Threat Assessments/Warnings

12. d. Forecasts

13. Also Worth Reading

N.B.: 'Recent Online Resources for the Analysis of Terrorism and Related Subjects' is a regular feature in 'Perspectives on Terrorism'. For past listings, see 'Archive' at <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism>.

1. Non-Religious Terrorism

V. Pabst. Die blutige Geschichte der griechischen Stadtguerilla wirft ihren Schatten über Athen. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 22, 2019. URL: <https://www.nzz.ch/international/griechenland-solidaritaet-fuer-anarchisten-ld.1483481>

T. Hershco. France and the urban guerrilla warfare of the Black Blocs. *BESA Center Perspectives*, #1,180, *The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*, May 22, 2019. URL: <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/france-black-blocs/>

I. Akeregha. Ethnic nationalities vow to set up militia against killer herdsmen, Boko Haram terrorists. *The Guardian*, May 20, 2019. URL: <https://guardian.ng/news/ethnic-nationalities-vow-to-set-up-militia-against-killer-herdsmen-boko-haram-terrorists/>

Colombia will not allow Venezuela border to be rebel sanctuary – Duque. *Reuters*, May 10, 2019. URL: <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-colombia-rebels-venezuela/colombia-will-not-allow-venezuela-border-to-be-rebel-sanctuary-duque-idUKKCN1SG20W>

Nigeria's Civilian JTF militia releases 900 child recruits. *The Defense Post*, May 10, 2019. URL: <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/05/10/nigeria-civilian-jtf-releases-900-child-soldiers/>

V. Kaura. India's unsolved Maoist terrorism problem. *The Diplomat*, May 3, 2019. URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/indias-unsolved-maoist-terrorism-problem/>

J. McDermott. Op-Ed: Could the FARC peace process in Colombia still fail? *InSight Crime*, April 26, 2019. URL: <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/op-ed-could-the-farc-peace-process-in-colombia-still-fail/>

M. Solmaz. PKK feeds on lawlessness: media outlets, Amnesty office raided in London. *Daily Sabah*, April 29, 2019. <https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2019/04/29/pkk-feeds-on-lawlessness-media-outlets-am>

nesty-office-raided-in-london

S.A. Mansour. Are Turkey and Qatar supporting terrorism in Libya? *European Eye on Radicalization*, April 26, 2019. URL: <https://eeradicalization.com/are-turkey-and-qatar-supporting-terrorism-in-libya/>

P. Rogers. We already know who will win the war in Libya – western arms dealers. *Open Democracy*, April 18, 2019. URL: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/we-already-know-who-will-win-the-war-in-libya-western-arms-dealers/>

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2. Religious Terrorism

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115+ Academic Theses (Ph.D. and MA) on the Role of the Internet in Facilitating and Combating Radicalization, Extremism, Terrorism and Cyber-Terrorism, written in English between 1995 and 2019

Compiled and selected by Ryan Scrivens

Abstract

This bibliography contains doctoral dissertations (Ph.D.) and Master (MA) Theses on issues relating to the role of the Internet in facilitating and combating radicalization, extremism, terrorism and cyber-terrorism. Titles were retrieved manually by browsing the Open Access Theses and Dissertations (OATD) database using various combinations of search terms, including – but indeed not limited to – ‘online radicalization’, ‘online extremism’, ‘online terrorism’, and ‘cyber terrorism’. More than 1,600 entries were evaluated, of which 118 were ultimately selected for this list. All theses are open source. However, readers should observe possible copyright restrictions. The title entries are ‘clickable’, allowing access to full texts.

Keywords: bibliography, theses, Internet, online, radicalization, extremism, terrorism, cyber-terrorism, prevention

Bibliographic entries are divided into the following sub-sections:

1. *Terrorists’ and Extremists’ Use of the Internet*
2. *Combating Terrorists and Extremists on the Internet*
3. *Intersection of Gender, Terrorism, Extremism and the Internet*
4. *Machine Learning to Explore Terrorists’ and Extremists’ Use of the Internet*
5. *Cyber-Terrorism*

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About the Compiler: Ryan Scrivens (Associate Editor for Theses) is an incoming Assistant Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University (MSU). His tenure-track appointment commences in August 2019. He is currently a Horizon Postdoctoral Fellow at Concordia University with Project SOMEONE, a Visiting Researcher at the VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, and a Research Associate at the International CyberCrime Research Centre (ICCRC) at Simon Fraser University (SFU). Ryan received his Ph.D. in Criminology from SFU.

Conference Monitor/Calendar of Events

(June – September 2019)

Compiled by Reinier Bergema

The Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), in its mission to provide a platform for academics and practitioners in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism, compiles an online calendar, listing recent and upcoming academic and professional conferences, symposia and similar events that are directly or indirectly relevant to the readers of *Perspectives on Terrorism*. The calendar includes academic and (inter-) governmental conferences, professional expert meetings, book launches, civil society events and educational programs. The listed events are organised by a wide variety of governmental and non-governmental institutions, including several key (counter) terrorism research centres and institutes.

We encourage readers to contact the journal's Assistant Editor for Conference Monitoring, Reinier Bergema, and provide him with relevant information, preferably in the same format as the items listed below. Reinier Bergema can be reached at <r.bergema@icct.nl> or via Twitter: [@reinierbergema](https://twitter.com/reinierbergema).

June 2019

When All Else Fails: The Ethics of Resistance to State Injustice

CATO Institute

3 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@catoinstitute](https://twitter.com/catoinstitute)

Achieving Durable Solutions for Returnee Children

Danish Institute for International Studies

3 June, Copenhagen, Denmark

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@diisdsk](https://twitter.com/diisdsk)

Is America Experiencing Europe's Growing Anti-Semitism?

Hudson Institute

4 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@HudsonInstitute](https://twitter.com/HudsonInstitute)

Book Launch Event: The Three Pillars of Radicalization

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)

5 June, College Park, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@START_umd](https://twitter.com/START_umd)

The Future of US Security Institutions Under Trump

Chatham House

5 June, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ChathamHouse](https://twitter.com/ChathamHouse)

RAN Multi-Agency Meeting: Connections, Roles and Quality Review of Rehabilitation, Resocialisation and Exit Activities

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EXIT-P&P

5-6 June, Budapest, Hungary

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](https://twitter.com/RANEurope)

The Conduct of Hostilities and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges of 21st Century Warfare*TMC Asser Institute*

6 June, The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@TMCAsser](#)**Understanding Extremism in Northern Mozambique***Center for Strategic & International Studies*

6 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@csis](#)**Encrypted Extremism: A Discussion on Islamic State Exploitation of Telegram***George Washington University Program on Extremism*

6 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@gwupoe](#)**Everyone's Land. Non-State Actors and Fragmented Security in the MENA Region***Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)*

6 June, Geneva, Switzerland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ispionline](#)**RAN Multi-Agency Meeting: Extremists Being Released From Prison—Community and Family Acceptance***Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YF&C – P&P*

6-7 June, Budapest, Hungary

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)**Webinar: Hash Sharing and Identifying Terrorist Content at Scale***Tech Against Terrorism*

7 June, Online

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@techvsterrorism](#)**Verdiepingsleergang Terrorisme, Recht en Veiligheid [Advanced Course on Terrorism, Law and Security, in Dutch]***Leiden University*

6-7 June [and 23-24 May], The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@UniLeiden](#)**GLOBSEC 2019 Bratislava Forum***GLOBSEC*

6-8 June, Bratislava, Slovakia

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@GLOBSEC](#)**VOX-Pol Summer School 2019: Topics in Violent Online Political Extremism***VOX-POL*

10-14 June, Dublin, Ireland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@VOX_Pol](#)

RAN Steering Committee*Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)*

11 June, Brussels, Belgium

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)**The Push for Peace: Ending the Syrian Conflict***The Institute of International and European Affairs*

11 June, Dublin, Ireland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@iiea](#)**Conflict in the 21st Century: Statelessness, Criminality, and Civilian Victimization***International Institute for Strategic Studies*

11 June, New York, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IISS_org](#)**The Evolution of al-Qaeda Over Three Decades: Lessons Learned for the Future***International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT)*

12 June, The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ICCT_TheHague](#)**The Future of Conflict: Carnegie Junior Fellows Conference 2019***Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*

12 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@CarnegieEndow](#)**VSE Annual Conference 2019: Victim Recovery – A Road of Many Routes***Victim Support Europe*

12-13 June, Strasbourg, France

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@VictimSupportEU](#)**ASPI International Conference: War in 2025***Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)*

12-14 June, Canberra, Australia

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ASPI_org](#)**Secrecy and Method in Security Studies***TMC Asser Institute*

13 June, The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@TMCAsser](#)**Armed Conflict Survey 2019: IISS-Americas Book Launch***International Institute for Strategic Studies*

13 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IISS_org](#)

After the Caliphate: The Islamic State and the Future Terrorist Diaspora*Spui25*

13 June, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@spui25](#)**Schools and Challenging Far Right Extremism***Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU*

13-14 June, Berlin, Germany

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)**2019 National Security Conference: Sharpening America's Edge***Center for New American Security (CNAS)*

14 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@cnasdc](#)**Tech Against Terrorism at RightsCon 2019***Tech Against Terrorism*

14 June, Tunis, Tunisia

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@techvsterrorism](#)**The Syrian Refugee Crisis From the Perspective of Neighbouring Countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq***Danish Institute for International Studies*

14 June, Copenhagen, Denmark

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@diisdsk](#)**Data Revolution and Terrorism Studies in Belgium: Bringing Academics and Practitioners Together***Egmont Institute*

14 June, Brussels, Belgium

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@Egmontinstitute](#)**Electronic Warfare Technology Conference***Cranfield University*

17-20 June, Cranfield, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@CranfieldUni](#)**Arab Spring 2.0? The Shifting Sands of MENA Politics***Brookings Institute*

18 June, Doha, Qatar

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@BrookingsInst](#)**Tech Against Terrorism and GIFCT Jordan Launch***Tech Against Terrorism*

18 June, Amman, Jordan

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@techvsterrorism](#)

Understanding Cybercrime for Better Policing: Regional and Global Challenges*Chatham House*

18 June, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ChathamHouse](#)**Leadership Targeting: Terrorists, Criminals and Consequences***International Institute for Strategic Studies*

18 June, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IISS_org](#)**Tyranny Comes Homes: The Domestic Fate of U.S. Militarism***CATO Institute*

19 June, Washington DC, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@catoinstitute](#)**Unpacking the Responsibility Gap(s) Arising from AI Applications in Weapon Technologies***TMC Asser Institute*

19 June, The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@TMCAsser](#)**India's Modi Government 2.0 – Foreign and Security Priorities***International Institute for Strategic Studies*

19 June, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IISS_org](#)**Cyber 2019***Chatham House*

20 June, London, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ChathamHouse](#)**Preparation Remembrance Day 2020***Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) EDU*

20-21 June, Bilbao, Spain

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)**Society for Terrorism Research 13th Annual International Conference: The Data Revolution in Terrorism Research: Implications for Theory and Practice***Society for Terrorism Research, Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo & the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI)*

20-21 June, Oslo, Norway

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@CrexUiO](#)**After the Caliphate: the Islamic State and the future terrorist movement***Egmont Institute*

25 June, Brussels, Belgium

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@Egmontinstitute](#)

Terrorism and Social Media: An International Conference*Swansea University*

25-26 June, Swansea, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ctp_swansea](#)**July 2019****Peace, Conflict and Pedagogy***Liverpool Hope University*

2 July, Liverpool, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@LiverpoolHopeUK](#)**Criminal Justice Platform Europe – Summer Course***Criminal Justice*

2-5 July, Barcelona, Spain

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a***Narratives and Strategies of FRE and Islamist Extremists***Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P*

4 July, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)**ECPR Standing Group on Organised Crime, General Conference***European Consortium for Political Research*

5-6 July, Sofia, Bulgaria

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ecpr](#)**Executive Certificate Program in Counter-Terrorism Studies***International Institute for Counter-Terrorism*

7-26 July, Herzliya, Israel

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ICT_org](#)**TSAS Summer Academy 2019***Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS)*

8-11 July, Waterloo, Canada

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@TSASNetwork](#)**Book Talk: Farah Pandith “How We Win”***National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)*

9 July, College Park, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@START_umd](#)**MENA Think Tank Forum: Migration and Diaspora***ORSAM Center for Middle Eastern Studies*

9-10 July, Ankara, Turkey

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@orsamtr](#)

Violence: An Inclusive Interdisciplinary Project*Progressive Connexions*

15-16 July, Verona, Italy

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ProgConnex](#)**Summer Workshop on Pandemics, Bioterrorism, and Global Health Security: From Anthrax to Zika***Schar School of Policy and Government*

15-18 July, Arlington, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@CSPS_GMU](#)**Seminar on the Protection of Public Spaces***European Forum for Urban Security*

17 July, Brasov, Romania

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@Efusnews](#)**2019 CBRN Defense Conference & Exhibition***National Defense Industrial Association*

23-24 July, Wilmington, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@NDIAToday](#)**The 7th International Academic Conference on Social Sciences (IACSS)***International Institute for Academic Development*

26-27 July, Prague, Czech Republic

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@IIACD](#)**SOF Symposium: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Past, Present, and Future***Aspen Institute*

30 July, Aspen, United States

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@aspeninstitute](#)**August 2019****Advanced Summer Programme: Preventing, Detecting and Responding to the Violent Extremist Threat***Leiden University & International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague*

19-23 August, The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@UniLeiden](#); [@ICCT_TheHague](#)**Advanced Summer Programme: Terrorism, Countering Terrorism and the Rule of Law***International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague & TMC Asser Institute*

26-30 August

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ICCT_TheHague](#); [@TMCAsser](#)**Terrorism Risk Insurance Seminar***Australian Reinsurance Pool Cooperation*

29 August, Sydney, Australia

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a*

September 2019**3rd Cross-Sectoral and Cross-Pillar Meeting on Developing the Draft Work Plan to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism 2018-2025**

ASEAN

2 September, Thailand

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ASEAN2019TH](#)**14th BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group: Annual Conference***The BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group*

4-5 September, Dublin, Ireland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@USFPgroup](#)**2019 General Conference***European Consortium for Political Research*

4-7 September, Wrocław, Poland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@ecpr](#)**Postgraduate Conference 2019: Current Themes in the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence***Society for Terrorism Research*

6 September, Coventry, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@SocTerRes](#)**World Summit on Counter-Terrorism: Terrorism 2020: Understand the Present, Prepare for the Future***International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)*,

9-12 September 2019 Herzliya, Israel

Website: <http://www.ict.org.il/ContentWorld.aspx?ID=36#gsc.tab=0>Twitter: https://twitter.com/ICT_org/status/1125740755295842304/photo/1**Course: Counter Terrorism / Attack the Network (AtN)***NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)*

9-13 September, Ankara, Turkey

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a***RAN YOUNG Academy Session 3—Challenges & Progress***Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) YOUNG*

10-11 September, Barcelona, Spain

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)**The Italian Political Science Conference (SISP 2019)***Società Italiana di Scienza Politica*

12-14 September, Lecce, Italy

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a***P/CVE trends in the EU***Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P; Finnish EU Presidency*

17-18 September, Helsinki, Finland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

Extremists Being Released from Prison: Community and Family Acceptance

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) P&P

19 September, Helsinki, Finland

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

Steering Committee Meeting

Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)

24 September, Brussels Belgium

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@RANEurope](#)

4th CDCT Bureau meeting

Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism (CDCT)

26 September

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@COE_HRightsRLaw](#)

Coroners Society National Conference 2019: The Challenge of Terrorism

Coroners Society of England and Wales

27 September, Essex, United Kingdom

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a*

Course: Terrorist Use of WMD

NATO Centre of Expertise Defence Against Terrorism (COEDAT)

30 September – 4 October, Ankara, Turkey

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: *n/a*

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) & TMC Asser Institute

30 September – 4 October, The Hague, The Netherlands

Website: [visit](#) | Twitter: [@opcw](#); [@TMCAsser](#)

Acknowledgement

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About The Compiler: *Reinier Bergema is a Research Fellow and Project Manager at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) and an Assistant Editor at Perspectives on Terrorism. His research interests include, inter alia, radicalisation and Dutch (jihadist) foreign fighters.*

About *Perspectives on Terrorism*

Perspectives on Terrorism (PoT) is a joint publication of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), headquartered in Vienna, Austria, and the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University, Campus The Hague. PoT is published six times per year as a free, independent, scholarly peer-reviewed online journal available at <https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism>.

PoT seeks to provide a platform for established scholars as well as academics and professionals entering the interdisciplinary fields of Terrorism-, Political Violence- and Conflict Studies.

The editors invite researchers and readers to:

- present their perspectives on the prevention of, and response to, terrorism and related forms of violent conflict;
- submit to the journal accounts of evidence-based, empirical scientific research and analyses;
- use the journal as a forum for debate and commentary on issues related to the above.

Perspectives on Terrorism has sometimes been characterised as ‘nontraditional’ in that it dispenses with some of the rigidities associated with commercial print journals. Topical articles can be published at short notice and reach, through the Internet, a much larger audience than subscription-fee based paper journals. Our on-line journal also offers contributors a higher degree of flexibility in terms of content, style and length of articles – but without compromising professional scholarly standards.

The journal's Research Notes, Special Correspondence, Op-Eds and other content are reviewed by members of the Editorial Team, while its Articles are peer-reviewed by outside academic experts and professionals. While aiming to be policy-relevant, PT does not support any partisan policies regarding (counter-) terrorism and waging conflicts. Impartiality, objectivity and accuracy are guiding principles that we require contributors to adhere to. They are responsible for the content of their contributions and retain the copyright of their publication.

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